PROJECT BUTTER FACTORY
Henk Slebos and the A.Q. Khan nuclear network

Frank Slijper

Transnational Institute
in association with Campagne tegen Wapenhandel
Authors
Frank Slijper
Zia Mian

Editors
Imre Szucs,Oscar Reyes

Design
Zlatan Peric

Cover image
Telstar Logistics

Printing
Drukkerij Raddraaier B.V.

Contact
Transnational Institute
De Wittenstraat 25
PO Box 14656
1001 LD Amsterdam
The Netherlands

Tel: +31-20-6626608
Fax: +31-20-6757176

wilbert@tni.org
www.tni.org

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Frank Slijper works at the Dutch Campaign against Arms Trade (Campagne tegen Wapenhandel) and has been a researcher and campaigner on arms trade issues for the past fifteen years. He graduated in 1993 as an economist (international economic relations), specialising in Dutch military procurement and the offset policies implemented to enhance the defence industry. He has written and published extensively on Dutch arms exports and policy ever since. His recent publications include The Emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex (TNI, 2005), the co-authored European Export Credit Agencies and the financing of arms trade (ENAAT, 2007); and the co-authored A.Q. Khan, Urenco and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology (Greenpeace, 2004). For more on the Dutch Campaign Against Arms
In late May 1998, the mountains in Balochistan, Pakistan’s remote and desolate western province, shook and turned white from the force of a nuclear explosion. It was Pakistan’s first nuclear test, the culmination of a nearly three decade long effort to match neighbouring India as a nuclear armed state. India, Pakistan’s neighbour, had tested its weapons a few weeks earlier; its first test had been twenty four years earlier.

In both countries, the scientists that built the bomb were lauded as heroes. None more so than Abdul Qadeer Khan, dubbed by many as the “father of the Pakistani bomb”. He was already a national figure. For over a decade, he had been in the public eye, seen on television and in the press receiving the highest national honours and shaking hands with successive Presidents and Prime Ministers. One Prime Minister of Pakistan wrote about him as “a national hero” who had given “a sense of pride to our nation”.

A.Q. Khan was an unlikely ‘national hero’ for Pakistan. He was born in 1936, in Bhopal, India. Unlike millions of Indian muslims, he did not move to Pakistan when the country was created as a majority muslim state by a partition of India that uprooted millions and claimed countless lives. But as a boy in India, he developed a passionate hatred for India and for Hindus that was to shape his life.

Khan eventually moved to Pakistan in 1952. But he did not stay. He left in 1961 to study abroad – first in West Berlin, then in the Netherlands, finally receiving his PhD in metallurgy in Belgium. He was not to return and settle in Pakistan until 1975. But within a decade, this itinerant engineer, who had spent more time living in India and Europe than Pakistan, became a central figure in that country’s nuclear weapons programme, and soon afterwards a key player in the nuclear efforts of several others.

Project Butter Factory builds on the earlier report A.Q. Khan, Urenco and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Technology (Greenpeace, 2004) to tell an important part of A. Q. Khan’s story, in particular how he was able to set up a uranium enrichment programme that produced highly enriched uranium for making nuclear weapons, and how he tried to help other countries do the same. It details how his path to becoming a ‘national hero’ relied on personal relationships, especially with his college friend Henk Slebos, and how they benefited from the drive for profit in perhaps a thousand different companies and corporations, and were not stopped because of competing political and bureaucratic self-interests at work in many countries. It also reveals how those involved justify what they do by a belief in nuclear weapons as an acceptable basis for national security.

The multi-national origin of the Pakistani bomb should come as no surprise. It may that no country has ever build a nuclear weapon totally by itself. The Manhattan Project, the United States’ successful World War II effort to make the first atomic bomb, was an incredibly international enterprise. It brought together scientists from many countries, who shared their nuclear knowledge, and relied on the support of many governments.
The Manhattan Project was both the first instance of successful nuclear proliferation and the source of the second. Klaus Fuchs, a German physicist who fled the Nazis and moved to Britain, and then was sent (along with many others) to join the US bomb programme, secretly passed nuclear weapons design information to the Soviet Union. Fuchs justified his actions by citing the need to help Russia fight the Nazis and that Russia had to be prepared to confront other great powers which might be armed with nuclear weapons in future.

All subsequent nuclear weapons programs, to some degree, also received help from outside. The United States helped Britain and then France. Russia helped China and North Korea. France and Britain helped Israel. India built its nuclear programme on the basis of the over 1,000 scientists trained in nuclear science and engineering in the United States, as part of the Atoms for Peace Programme. India’s first reactor was a British design and the plutonium it used in its first bomb was made in a Canadian supplied research reactor.

For its part, over a hundred Pakistani scientists were trained in the US as part of Atoms of Peace. One of them went on to become the Chairman of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission and was responsible for the nuclear weapons programme at the time A.Q. Khan (who was not part of this programme) returned from the Netherlands and set up the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. More direct help has come from China.

In turn, Pakistan has helped those it chose to for whatever reason. A.Q. Khan has been complicit in the nuclear efforts in Iran, Libya and North Korea, and offered to help Iraq and perhaps others. Like his friend and partner, Henk Slebos, A.Q. Khan has not paid a high price for spreading nuclear technology. After Pakistan was officially confronted with information about his activities, and his subsequent televised public confession, taking all responsibility for his activities, in 2004 A.Q.Khan was confined to one of his palatial homes in Islamabad. In July 2007, some restrictions were lifted. He is now allowed to entertain friends and to travel to see his relatives.

Today, there are nine states armed with nuclear weapons. Mohamed el-Baradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has warned that there are another 20 or 30 “virtual nuclear weapons states” that have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short time span. For these countries, and others less well prepared, it may take a threat from an existing nuclear-armed state, a change in leadership, a new found desire for national power and prestige, a resourceful scientist or unexpected access to technology to tip the balance.

Why has it come to this? Part of the reason is that all states who have or seek nuclear weapons share a common disregard for democracy and their own people — every state that has developed nuclear weapons has done so in secret from its people. Few people know that the very first resolution passed by United Nations General Assembly was a call for plans “for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” Even fewer know that in 1961 the UN General Assembly declared that “any state using nuclear and thermo-nuclear
weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilisation".

*Project Butter Factory* tries to draw some larger lessons from the story of A.Q. Khan, Henk Slebos, and the failed international effort to control nuclear proliferation. It makes some useful recommendations. But it recognises, wisely, that if we are to do more than just slow down the effort by states to become nuclear armed, we need to move purposefully towards ending the nuclear age.

Zia Mian  
Princeton, July 2007
The October 2003 seizure of a German-owned vessel, the BBC China, on its way to Libya with five containers full of uranium enrichment equipment triggered a series of revelations. The Libyan leadership publicly declared the abandonment of its nuclear programme two months after the seizure. In early 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pakistan's nuclear programme, publicly confessed to being the mastermind behind the world's largest ever nuclear proliferation scandal. George Tenet, the former CIA director, described Khan as being "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden". Today, Iran is the subject of a potentially explosive nuclear controversy, and again Khan and his international suppliers group are known to have played a key role.

All this should be seen against the background of the development of Pakistan's own nuclear programme. In the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan was considered a western ally: "The country's strategic position made it an important strategic asset for the US as a counter to post-revolutionary Iran, communist China and in the 'eighties supporting the Afghan revolt against the Soviet occupation." The opportunities given by western powers - including the Netherlands - to A.Q. Khan to set up Pakistan's nuclear programme, not only further fuelled an arms race between arch rivals India and Pakistan, it also set the basis for the almost unassailable position Khan created himself and from which he started expanding his business abroad in second half of the 1990s. It took until 2003 before a severe blow was given to A.Q. Khan's group of businessmen and nuclear experts, who for years had been able to sell nuclear technology to at least Iran, North Korea and Libya. Which other countries have been supplied in some way remains unclear.

This report sketches a picture of Dutch involvement in the nuclear trade that goes back to the 1970s. Not only did A.Q. Khan himself obtain a wealth of information on nuclear production while working here between 1972 and 1975 but, after the ground beneath his feet became too hot, he succeeded in maintaining access to former colleagues and friends in the Netherlands.

A key European supplier of Khan's ring was businessman and former study friend Henk Slebos. They knew each other from the Technical University in Delft, where they both studied metallurgy. The two have been closely connected for forty years, and the Dutchman considers himself to be Khan's best friend. Their relation surfaced in the press with the emergence of reports on Khan's nuclear proliferation network. In early 2004, a Pakistani government spokesman stated at a press conference that, among others, a Dutch businessman called "Hanks" was involved.

Slebos' wheeling and dealing with A.Q. Khan goes back to the mid-1970s, when he became one of Khan's key suppliers. Despite earlier suspicions Slebos was only caught in 1983 for illegally exporting nuclear related equipment to Pakistan, but got away with a fine. Shortly after Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, he was connected to intercepted exports to the country. In September 2003, 'Slebos Research' turned out to be one of the sponsors of ISAM, a conference organized by A.Q. Khan's
nuclear laboratories. In May 2004, Dutch authorities pressed charges against Slebos for five illegal exports to Pakistan. On 16 December 2005 he was sentenced to a year in prison, of which eight months was suspended. An appeals court is due to re-open the case in September 2007.

The sentence is risible in the light of Slebos’ public admission of proliferating goods for Pakistan’s nuclear programme for almost three decades. Sadly though – despite all official outcries about the dangers of the further spread of weapons of mass destruction - it is part of a wider trend. Since the official breakdown of Khan’s international network, very little progress has been made in the prosecution of those involved. The main suspect himself has been pardoned by General Musharraf, a move that should be seen in a broader perspective than the official explanation that prosecuting the ‘national hero’ could bring about a popular uprising. In court, A.Q. Khan might have opened a can of worms that would not only discredit key figures in Pakistan’s political and military establishment, but also many abroad.

Many questions about the scale of proliferation and the extent of the network still remain, but one conclusion can be drawn: apart from the lack of control -and possibly silent consent - by Pakistan’s successive governments, western intelligence services for their part have clearly failed to prevent this from happening, as most middlemen in the network have a European background. It is hard to say to which point it has been a matter of letting it go - because the West (read US) had decided that it was OK that Pakistan could have the bomb, and because it would enable western intelligence to keep an eye on the developing network - and where poor international cooperation and lack of control were dominating factors. As this paper reveals, from the very beginning both Dutch and international secret services have been well aware of what was happening in the Netherlands. According to Henk Slebos, A.Q. Khan has told him that he had been in touch with Dutch intelligence officials regularly. Former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has also declared that the Americans on two occasions told the Dutch not arrest Khan.

Apart from a chronology of Slebos’ activities over the past decades, this report presents a series of proposals that should contribute to preventing similar cases from happening. Without such measures, new proliferation scandals may easily develop again in coming years and further spread weapons of mass destruction across the globe.

The road to stopping countries acquiring the technology is not through saying some can have it and some can’t. As past history has taught us, if countries cannot acquire this technology through legal means they will acquire it illegally, if they have political will, determination and enough money to pay for it. If the international community is serious about tackling the threat of proliferation, there is an urgent need to agree and implement a comprehensive fissile material treaty that bans the production and possession of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Ultimately, only by ending the nuclear age will the threat of a nuclear breakout be curtailed.

Fireworks

Henk Slebos (Elburg, 9 February 1943) has
known A.Q. Khan for more than forty years, since he switched from aerospace to metallurgy at Delft Technical University in 1963. They both lived in Rijswijk, and travelled together to Delft every day. They became friends and “contact has since remained”. In 1968, Slebos helped Khan to move to Louvain, Belgium, where he was working on his doctorate.

After his studies, Slebos worked for five years in the Royal Dutch Navy. He was a ‘trouble shooter’, repairing frigates, mine hunters and submarines. He was also involved in buying titanium tubes for submarine exhaust systems and doing research on underwater welding.

Through his navy job Slebos got in touch with the specialist firm Explosive Metal Working Holland (EMWH), which treats steel and other materials used in explosives. In 1974 he started working there as a commercial director. “You were working with fireworks legally, I found that interesting”, he said on a 2002 audio recording in the possession of Dutch daily newspaper NRC.

At EMWH, Slebos worked on the Kalkar fast breeder reactor and for UCN, the Dutch branch of the tri-nation uranium enrichment company Urenco. This connection is how Khan (working with FDO) and Slebos got in touch professionally as well, since both were working for Urenco subcontractors. In 1974, Khan is also said to have written two letters to then Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, offering his services to Pakistan’s emerging nuclear programme.

The documented meetings between A.Q. Khan and Slebos include meeting at the 1975 Nuclex nuclear exhibition in Basel. They subsequently conducted research together on the highly secret 4-M type ultracentrifuge (see below). These two occasions were first revealed by the Dutch radio programme Argos in spring 2005, which had obtained a copy of secret documents of investigations into the Khan affair, including the involvement of Dutch companies. Part of it forms the basis of the later February 1980 public report on Khan to the Dutch parliament. Argos quoted parts from these secret reports showing that Slebos was already in the frame for Dutch export control authorities in the mid-1970s. “Mister Henk Slebos was commercial director with the firm Explosive Metal Working Holland (EMWH) in Roosendaal till July 1976. (...) After the resignation of Slebos from EMWH he started his own engineering bureau in Alkmaar,” says one section on Khan’s contact network.

Another part of the investigation’s report – based on testimony by Slebos’ boss at EMWH, Nico Zondag – reads: “According to Zondag, Slebos had met with a former fellow student, a Pakistani national, at the Nuclex in Basel (October 1975). That former fellow student must have been Khan. […] At the BVD it was examined whether a further investigation with regards to Slebos was meaningful. Regarding the character and the weight of the details available this was then considered not to be opportune, the report concludes.

This was, to say the least, a very peculiar reaction to receiving such information, given that A.Q. Khan had suddenly left the Netherlands only sixteen months earlier, shortly after having been transferred to a different position within FDO in light of a couple of incidents - one of them being Khan’s suspicious behav-
iour at Nuclex - had raised suspicions with the security services here.

On behalf of EMWH, Slebos supplied UCN welding samples to FDO, where at times A.Q. Khan himself received them.⁵⁵ Slebos is remembered by Zondag as a hard worker: “In busy times if necessary he would even drive with his Saab to Urenco in Almelo in the middle of the night to deliver our products.”⁵⁶

According to Zondag, Slebos was fired in 1976 as a result of Urenco management complaining about his undue curiosity. He repeatedly appeared at places where he was not supposed to be. “After the third complaint we had to take measures”.

### 4-M

Another section in the now declassified government report, reviewing Khan’s ultracentrifuge (UC) work at FDO, mentions that he had done metallurgic research on the explosive welding of cascade piping for the highly secret 4-M type UC, “including visits from Mr. Sleebos” [sic].⁵⁷

That Khan (and Slebos) have worked with 4-M technology is probably the clearest evidence that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is likely to have benefited from the most advanced uranium enrichment technology available at the time, which also included so-called G-2 and CNOR/SNOR technologies.⁵⁸ While the Dutch government had long denied further proliferation, in January 2004 it finally admitted that it had “indications” that Urenco technology had been smuggled not only to Pakistan but had also reached Iran, North Korea and Libya.⁵⁹ A little later rumours circulated that not only Pakistan’s P-1 – largely based on CNOR/SNOR, possibly incorporating 4-M elements⁶⁰ – but also the much faster spinning P-2 – based on the German G-2 for which Khan had been translating technical documents while in the Netherlands - were in Iranian hands.⁶¹ This pointed to the further proliferation of European uranium enrichment technology, stolen in the Netherlands, from Pakistan to third countries.

### Delivering the whole lot

In late 1976 - shortly after he had left EMWH - Slebos flew to Pakistan for the first time. As he recalls:

And there problems came up. You look at that then purely as a boffin. He is a metallurgist and I am a metallurgist. I have got the knack of aircraft construction, and besides I had been in this troubleshooting work with the navy with which you worked with all kinds of material that you could think of. That’s how my contact has started and continued. At a certain moment business has resulted from that. I delivered him (...) the whole lot, the whole range from electronics to the construction materials, all kinds of things that were not forbidden to deal in.⁶²

He admitted to the court that sentenced him in 1985 (see section ‘Mitigating circumstances’), that he was well aware of the destination of his nuclear export activities. The record of his testimony reads:

Early in 1977 I met Khan again in the Netherlands, at my home. During a con-
conversation he asked me whether I could deliver goods to Pakistan for a project he was working on. The project he was referring to was the setting up of a laboratory in which fuel should be enriched for a reactor in Karachi. From that time on till today I have regularly acted as supplier of various goods for the Khan project.33

During one of his visits to his former boss Nico Zondag, Slebos told him that he had become one of Khan’s advisors for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He urged Zondag to join him and make a lot of money, but Zondag declined. On another occasion, when Slebos again asked him to go with him to Pakistan, he had a suitcase with construction drawings of ultracentrifuge parts, possibly copied when working at EMWH, as it was involved in a number of experimental UC tests. Zondag then warned UCN security and was invited for a visit, where, to his astonishment, they seemed unimpressed by his story. “Why don’t you go with him to Pakistan and grab his suitcase?” he remembers them asking.34 As it turned out, Slebos suddenly changed his schedule and flew from Cologne instead of Schiphol. Apparently no effort was made to stop him.

Slebos knows what he is doing and is willing to take risks. Using front companies in Europe, the Gulf States and Pakistan, and concealing consignment contents and final destinations are part of his modus operandi.

The Pakistan pipeline

Henk Slebos started Slebos Research BV in January 1978.35 Activities recorded by the Dutch Chamber of Commerce range from conducting research and development related to metals and material connections, to “explosive metalworking” and “developing and advising in the broadest sense of the word”. In later years, trading in wine, deep-frozen chickens and fertilizer also become part of his business.36

Over the course of decades Slebos arranged countless transactions on behalf of A.Q. Khan. One of these was the involvement of Slebos in the VDT (‘Pakistan pipeline’) deal as a middleman.37 This deal is probably the largest publicly known export of UC-related material from the Netherlands to Pakistan.

In the late 1970s, VDT worked on a deal to supply thousands of maraging steel tubes for Pakistan’s ultracentrifuge programme – the Pakistan pipeline. 6,200 tubes were exported between 2 November 1976 and 10 September 1979. A batch of 300 tubes was held by customs at Schiphol airport on the latter date. The case went to court in the aftermath of the release of the public government report on Khan in February 1980. While several people explained that the tubes had UC specifications, and though the management itself was convinced that the tubes “would be used for the ultracentrifuge process”,38 a loophole in the then-applicable export laws got the company off the hook when a case was brought against it in 1984. According to the court, it could not be proven that the tubes were specifically developed for ultracentrifuge purposes, apart from the question whether the tubes “perhaps will be used for ultracentrifuges”.39 It also turned out that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had been aware of the whole deal from the start, but had not taken any serious action before 10 September 1979, when the investigation into the Khan affair
had already started.⁴⁰

Recently released material sheds new light on the case, in particular on the involvement of Henk Slebos. On 25 April 1977 his former boss and EMWH director N.A. Zondag testified on his former employee to a UCN security officer, in the presence of a security official from the ministry of Economic Affairs and a BVD agent. The Dutch radio programme Argos quoted from a summary of that testimony, which was part of the ‘secret’ report:

After some time (the exact point in time cannot be determined anymore) Slebos approached his former employer at EMWH, Mister N.A. Zondag, again. Slebos asked whether EMWH could treat a metal tube (10 cm high and 10 cm diameter), which was handed over by him to Zondag, with explosives. (...) Something or other was, said Slebos, meant for ultracentrifuges. (...) During this conversation Slebos showed construction drawings that according to Zondag were related to the UC-project. The untreated tubes would be manufactured in the neighbourhood of Eindhoven. After his resignation Slebos would have been in Pakistan several times.⁴¹

The tubes mentioned by Zondag must be those eventually produced by VDT. And as the BVD decided not to further investigate Slebos, Khan’s friend continued his quest to get the tubes treated. Instead of EMWH he found the French company Calorstat - another UCN subcontractor – willing to take on the job. That became known accidentally when two UCN employees visited the plant in February 1979. Another passage from the secret report of the Dutch fact-finding committee on A.Q. Khan reads:

[The two UCN employees] came across flow-formed tubes there that were coming from the Netherlands. In all likelihood these tubes were flow-formed at DAF [VDT’s mother company - FS]. In this context the hosts at Calorstat said that they had an order from the Netherlands to put an inside facing rill on the tubes. This was the same treatment for which Slebos had come to EMWH some years before. [...] That it concerned a Pakistani end-user became clear in June 1979 through information that was received by the BVD and with which the relation Slebos-Pakistan was clearly shown.⁴²

Unlike with VDT, this did not result in a criminal case against Slebos.
Inaction

There was frustration with the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs when the VDT case finally petered out. A secret memo from one of the ministry’s top bureaucrats, Mr. A.J. Van Galen Last, to the deputy secretary-general of the ministry reads:

Meeting of this morning was devoted to consequences of disappointing decision of a court in Breda […]. Public prosecutor has, apparently deliberately, passed on the possibility of further appeal. […] Though also there was the impression that ‘acquittal’ was more due to lack of interest of the public prosecutor. A plea was even made by the public prosecutor to Bos43 to stop the lawsuit! […] When all lawsuits are over late October, evaluation of all involved members of cabinet will be drawn up, esp. reg. [sic] the Dutch export policy in general and the non-proliferation [policy in particular]. […] Important is also that exports for Pakistan still take place – including supposed bomb-parts – that cannot be stopped for one reason or the other. I propose, apart from the Bos-group evaluation, to inform M [minister - FS] after his return, because what is going on can be of essential (negative) significance to the Dutch non-proliferation policy.44

Though Slebos was not mentioned in person, he was clearly the subject of the memo as it starts with a remark on the appeal against the refusal of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to grant an export licence for an oscilloscope (see below).

There were similar feelings within the US bureaucracy, where the lack of action from the Dutch was criticised, despite regular high-level talks on the issue, at least according to some. “I can’t give you numbers, but there were numerous diplomatic contacts relating to Mr. Slebos over the years when I was involved”, says former CIA agent Richard Barlow, who was the most important analyst of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear programme for many years from the mid-1980s, but they were “very frequent”.45 “It was a major agenda item. Always. […] Our government talked to your government and vice versa about Mr. Slebos. And of course about Mr. Khan as well”, states Barlow. Both governments were well aware of Slebos and his activities but did nothing to stop him. The Dutch government should have done more but nothing happened, Barlow claims, recalling that inaction as frustrating.

Former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers46 remembers the American attitude completely differently, at least up until the mid-1980s. Not only did the US government dissuade the Dutch from arresting Khan in as early as 1975, when it learned about his suspicious behaviour, but the Dutch were also asked not to act in 1986, when it became clear that Khan was using Dutch territory to purchasing nuclear components.

“When it developed further, [I] found it a bit strange that he could continue without real action being taken. On the other hand, I felt something like, okay, it’s American business. It’s their business to do it. We didn’t feel it as a – in terms of safeguarding the world against proliferation risks – as a Dutch responsibility.”47 On another occa-
sion, Lubbers said: "I think that in this case the American intelligence service was practising something which is very normal over there: 'give us all the information, but don’t detain him, let him go. We’ll follow him and then we’ll get more information [...] we’ll uncover things.'" 48

An interview with a former security agent responsible for Khan in Almelo is also remarkable. 49 At some point, the man found A.Q. Khan’s behaviour suspicious – he was asking questions that fell outside his area of work – and reported it to his bosses in The Hague. He was told in no uncertain terms to leave it. Personal notes from the former head of security of UCN, the late Piet Six Dijkstra, also reveal that it was the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the BVD, not UCN, that failed to take action against Khan’s suspicious behaviour. 50

No matter whether it was Dutch or US unwillingness to act against Khan, there was no apparent lack of information from the side of the Dutch. Given its relative wealth of information from an early stage and given the broad international interest in the Khan affair, the possibility of Dutch ignorance, awkwardness or impotence – often cited as characteristic of the Dutch intelligence services – cannot have been a leading factor here.

Though there has been good cooperation with international intelligence services at times, a recent investigation into Dutch intelligence operations against the proliferation of WMD disclosed that an unnamed foreign secret service had at some point practically taken over an operation on Dutch soil. 51

It is significant that in many known cases (legal or preventive) action against Slebos was undertaken only at the instigation of foreign intelligence services (see different examples in sections below). 52 Also, if and when the Dutch authorities took action to prevent Slebos from dealing with Pakistan, he was often already one step ahead of them.

The inescapable conclusion is that justice has been favourable for all involved in Dutch legal cases connected to the Khan affair. From Khan to Slebos, as well as the FDO and VDT companies involved in criminal cases in the first half of the 1980s, none of those involved have ever served a jail term. The heaviest penalty for large-scale international nuclear proliferation was a relatively minor fine.
**Special works**

According to German broadcasting corporation ZDF, Henk Slebos met the head of the Special Works Organisation (SWO), Amid Ali Said, in the Netherlands in 1980. As the purchasing arm of Pakistan's nuclear programme, the SWO had a tradition of buying from Dutch companies.

Apart from VDT’s tubes, FDO – A.Q. Khan’s former employer – also sold or offered equipment to the SWO. Their business contacts had started in late 1975 and were later co-ordinated through A.Q. Khan who, for example, organised business trips to Pakistan for FDO's sales manager Kuys in 1976, 1977 and 1979. Kuys always briefed the BVD internal security service on his experiences after each trip. “I have been to Pakistan three times. Each time I consulted with the BVD before and afterwards. I went with their permission so as to acquire more information”, he was quoted as saying on the Dutch radio programme Argos. In 1979, FDO had received Pakistani orders for vacuum and measuring equipment worth 1.3 million Dutch guilders (approx. €600,000).

From April 1979 onwards, after the public emergence of the Khan case and some strong interventions by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the legal way open to the SWO was largely cut off. It therefore seems reasonable to believe that Slebos’ role as middleman started to become more crucial from then on.

**Gun-type nuclear bomb**

At the same time there was also an increase in the government’s interest in Slebos. He had already been warned in 1980 by Mr Engels, the director of the Economic Investigation Service (Economische Controledienst or ECD), on three – unspecified – transactions that had raised major suspicion. He had been told about the existence of a list of so-called strategic goods that require an export licence.

After this visit I realised that I ran an increased risk [...] All the more so because I knew in any case that it was about goods that might be needed for the earlier mentioned nuclear project to enrich uranium. [...] Despite that I continued to deliver goods that were ordered with me from Pakistan. The reason that I continued was the fact that I was in a bad position financially. I realised that I ran the risk of a possible fine [...].

One business initiative of his, in particular, caused alarm bells to ring at the highest levels of government. A string of secret memos, letters and notes during 1982 reveal nervousness over attempts by Henk Slebos to export materials to build and explode a nuclear bomb – quite a step further than ‘simply’ selling uranium enrichment technology. Information on the case has been acquired from British sources. Israel’s Mossad was also in touch with the BVD about the case.

From January 1982, the internal security service BVD (now AIVD), and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Economic Affairs deliberated feverishly on how to prevent Slebos from acting. The withdrawal of his passport was also considered. Ministers were informed and the issue was part of the agenda of several meetings of the cabinet council. Notes on these meetings are still classified “top secret”. The then Prime Minister Van Agt informed his foreign counterparts on the matter.
A reconstruction of this extremely sensitive case by the daily newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* traces it back to autumn 1981. At that time Slebos approached the Austrian company Böhler Edelstahl via a yachting contact of his, for the delivery of a cylindrical pressure barrel for extremely high pressure - 75 cm high, with a 15 cm inside diameter. In December, Slebos added to this a request for two steel half balls with an inside diameter of 33 cm.

By February 1982, the boating contact had told Slebos that Böhler could not deliver the items - though technically it would not have been difficult. Possibly Böhler had discovered – or was told– that they could very well be the cannon barrel for a gun-type nuclear bomb and two parts for a nuclear implosion bomb. Slebos had already tried other potential suppliers of these parts, Machinefabriek St. Antonius in Maasbracht, and Metaalgieterij Verdult in Heerhugowaard, which had both received warnings from the ECD not to do business with him.

Frustrating his attempts was the only solution at hand for the Dutch authorities, as "judicial action has little chance of success". At least these three companies were convinced not to deal with Slebos, but Pakistan finally got at least part of what it wanted. According to the *NRC Handelsblad* it was Turkish businessman and Slebos associate Günes Cire (see later) who got the half balls to Pakistan.

**Depleted uranium**

Within weeks another case caused deep concern. Slebos had taken up a Pakistani request for depleted uranium. He ordered several hundred kilos from Dutch company Highways International in Baarn, which got it from Union Minière (now Umicore) in Belgium. Slebos requested Highways director Van Belle to send it to Dubai. Van Belle thought that the case seemed suspicious and contacted the Israeli embassy in Brussels, meeting an intelligence agent at Brussels North station on 13 July 1982. Ten days later, the cargo was stopped, with Van Belle being arrested on 29 July. Dutch authorities considered undertaking legal action against Slebos, his girlfriend, and Opak Intertrade Ltd., but in the end only Van Belle had to face trial. A note on one of the case documents says: "emphasis on necessity of avoiding unwanted publicity."

**Mitigating circumstances**

After some hectic months, the secret service BVD issued an “informative note” on Slebos in September 1982. Apparently eyes were now more focused on him, though he still had never been yet been caught for his active involvement with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

That finally changed when - allegedly by accident, but equally likely because of surveillance on him - Slebos was caught illegally exporting a US-made Tektronix oscilloscope from Schiphol airport on 23 October 1983. He had ordered the instrument through its Dutch affiliate and on behalf of General Aziz of Pakistan’s government procurement office. Aware of likely problems in gaining an export licence, Aziz had suggested sending the mainframe via Assah Electrical Establishment in the emirate of Sharjah. Slebos had told the freighter that the ship-
ment concerned a "difficult" oscilloscope. To reduce chances of interception he sent four boxes with related parts through a different shipping company and directly to "Automation Instruments" in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Slebos received a one-year jail sentence in July 1985, but a year later an appeals court reduced that to a six-month suspended sentence plus a 20,000 guilder (about €9,000) fine. In the verdict, the appeals court concluded that Slebos had intentionally tried to export the oscilloscope without the required export licence, having already been warned by the Dutch government's Economic Investigation Service (ECD). However, it took into account that he had never previously been prosecuted, and that it had not been proven that the instrument would be used for Pakistan's nuclear programme.74

These mitigating circumstances led to a very lenient sentence for Slebos, so that the case itself became another major blow for those concerned to promote arms control. After the previously failed cases against FDO, VFT and A.Q. Khan himself,75 it appeared that the calculated risk of exporting strategic material without the required permits was worthwhile.76 Whenever caught, one could rely on a legal system that had great difficulty in imposing prison sentences for such offences, at worst imposing a small fine.

Export control regulations clearly failed to meet the new realities of people earning a living with the proliferation of materials and equipment to build weapons of mass destruction. Worse, five years after the parliamentary report on Khan and with enough evidence on a very active Henk Slebos, export control authorities stood almost empty-handed in their counter-proliferation efforts. Despite top-level ministerial talks, export legislation remained far from effective.

With the criminal case pending Slebos kept on trying to get his oscilloscope across the border - this time legally. He applied for an export permit and, upon refusal, took the case to court, which ruled against him in spring 1985.77 The appeals court in his criminal case later decided to confiscate the oscilloscope.

**Philips**

Slebos does not give up easily: his business continued even while he was being prosecuted for the illegal export of the Tektronix oscilloscope.78 In late 1983, three special machines from Swiss company Schaublin left the port of Hamburg (Germany) on a Polish cargo ship to Karachi, with the final destination being the cover firm Technical Equipment in Islamabad.79

Business had, however, become more complicated for Slebos, as shown in the case of Dutch company Philips. At some point, the Dutch government issued a warning not to do business with Slebos anymore. As a consequence its cryogenic department could no longer deal with him.80 The company of course had a reputation to protect.

Slebos remained undeterred. In 1984, he tried to export several Philips oscilloscopes to Pakistan, but the electronics giant only wanted to deliver with a green light from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Slebos then inquired with the Ministry, but was told to
apply for an export permit as the specifications of the oscilloscope required. According to Slebos, he believed its technical specifications did not require a permit, unlike the Tektronix one.

The interventions at Philips came too late to prevent a number of transactions being completed. In 1981 Philips sold equipment worth 800,000 Dutch guilders (or €364,000) to OPAK Intertrade Ltd., a Swiss post-box company that was set up by Slebos via Dr. Leonard Stolk, an “international tax advisor” based in Zurich. OPAK then sold it on to PAK Chemical Co. in Islamabad, another cover firm for A.Q. Khan’s nuclear project. Later that year, Philips paid Slebos another 76,000 guilders (€34,500) commission. OPAK’s profit for 1981 stood at 450,000 guilders (€205,000). To mask the transaction, Stolk created another shell company in August 1981: Oatenfield Ltd in London, which became the new destination for Philips equipment bound for PAK Chemicals, with payments continuing to be made through a bank in Zurich.

The Dutch and British authorities did not act against Philips when they subsequently found this out. Prosecuting one of the best-known Dutch companies for assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme would have been close to diplomatic suicide, after all the damage that the Khan story had already done since 1979.

Berufsverbot

Henk Slebos experienced similar interventions when buying mould steel from Johnson in Lelystad, but the company was told by the ECD not to deal with him. On similar grounds, the Rotterdam-based company Esmeijer cancelled a Slebos order for lathe parts. One conclusion could be that in the mid-1980s Slebos was being monitored almost around the clock.

Angry that his export business with Pakistan was blocked even for goods that formally do not need an export licence, Slebos and his counsel, Mr. Doorenbos had a meeting at the Ministry of Economic Affairs in April 1985 – weeks before the initial verdict in the oscilloscope trial. A resume of the meeting written by the Ministry says that “only the goods which [...] appear on the list [of strategic goods] are considered to require a licence” and that “licence applications have to be assessed and concluded within reasonable time as far as possible. The term ‘reasonable time’ must be seen in the light of the extent of the investigation that is required to come to a sound decision.”

Slebos went to the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry with another lathe he had ordered and for which the Ministry of Economic Affairs had denied him a licence for “financial traffic strategic goods”. Aardse Haarlem BV, which had received orders from Slebos to buy the Hitachi Seiki lathe, had been told by export licensing officials that both Aardse – Hitachi Seiki’s Dutch representative – and Slebos needed such a document as the latter name was on the end-user statement written by the Punjab Fertilizer Company in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The reason given for the licence denial was “the interest of the international legal order”, partly because officials thought that Punjab Fertilizer was being used for Pakistan’s nuclear procurement programme.
Slebos’ defence argued that months afterwards Punjab Fertilizer was able to buy two identical machines directly from Japan without any problems. The same machines had even been bought directly by A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories. Given Slebos’ profile – and the apparent lack of Japanese export control - that was now a safer option indeed. This led defence lawyer Doorenbos to put it to the court that “this smells like Berufsvorbot.” In October 1986 the court rejected Slebos’ appeal.89

Balls of Steel

An example of administrative steps to fight Slebos’ business with Pakistan was the attempted addition of specific steel balls to the list of strategic goods. In early 1986 the Ministry of Economic Affairs had proposed to include “steel balls with a diameter smaller than 6 mm and bigger than 2 mm with a specification equal to or better than DIN 5401 class III” to the list.90 An explanatory note makes reference to “the essential function that certain sorts of balls can have in gas-ultracentrifuges,” and states that all circumstances should be taken into account when deciding whether or not a licence would run contrary to Dutch non-proliferation policy. With a provisional measure like this, the extended prohibition should have come into immediate effect. For unknown reasons, however, the balls of steel were not included in the next change in the export regulations.91

The step was apparently a response to an attempt by Slebos in 1985 to export 10,000 such balls, produced by Finkenrath and ordered through its Dutch affiliate HFH Aandrijvingstechniek in Eindhoven. The 4mm chrome-steel balls match the size used in UCN’s ultracentrifuges.92 On 28 October 1985 Slebos Research had applied for an export permit for “so-called bicycle steel balls”93 When he had not received a decision after five months he and his counsel Doorenbos arranged another meeting at the Ministry of Economic Affairs on 16 April 1986. As the steel balls were not added to the list of strategic goods, Slebos was told at the meeting that he was free to export them without a licence. However, as a top official told Slebos, the department was still free to approach and discourage potential suppliers from dealing with Slebos, so that they “would not unintentionally get involved in international problems.”94 Whether or not Slebos succeeded in exporting the steel balls to Pakistan cannot be determined.

Project Butter Factory

According to German broadcaster WDR, in 1985 and 1986 Slebos received 750,000 guilders (around €340,000) from the Pakistani embassy in Bonn in his German Commerzbank account. The TV programme claimed he was involved in a deal for Khan with German steel company Arbed Saarstal. Interviewed by the Germans, Slebos explains that financial problems were the reason for his activities. He is quoted as having code-named his business with Pakistan “Project Butter Factory.”95

On 24 December 1988 A.Q. Khan was caught in a car at the Belgian border, near his wife’s family home in Bergen op Zoom, the Netherlands, apparently as a result of intense security service monitoring of Slebos, who was travelling with him.96 Khan – travelling
under a false name\textsuperscript{97} - was deported back to Pakistan. According to the WDR journalists, the two had also met in the Netherlands in July of that year.\textsuperscript{98} On both trips Khan was said to have been looking for European suppliers of measuring equipment to register nuclear test explosions.\textsuperscript{99}

**Catch all?**

Details about Slebos' activities on behalf of Pakistan’s nuclear programme between 1989 and the late 1990’s are shrouded in mist.\textsuperscript{100} It would be logical to assume that while active interference by Dutch officials with Slebos may have closed down a lot of business opportunities at home, at the same time Slebos may successfully have created new business channels abroad, making Dutch intervention more difficult. Regulations could be circumvented by choosing foreign suppliers to ship goods directly to Pakistan or elsewhere on his behalf, without them ever touching Dutch soil (see the section on ‘Aluminium’ below). Alternatively, Slebos may have chosen to export from the Netherlands to companies abroad, from where onward shipping to Pakistan was deemed easier.\textsuperscript{101} Another theory has it that the art of disguising relevant exports - by supplying huge amounts of seemingly irrelevant materials - had been refined by Khan’s network (see the ‘Janus’ section below).

Since 1996, Dutch export control authorities have tried to undermine his export business with the creation of a new tool, the so-called catch-all clause, with which an \textit{ad hoc} export licence obligation can be invoked whenever licence-free goods are suspected to be destined for WMD-related programmes. Often the application of the catch-all clause can be considered a ‘no’ in itself, as the very reason for invoking the clause is suspicion that the goods have undesirable purposes. Together with its attempts to foil Slebos’ business activities by discouraging potential dealers, the catch-all clause has given the Dutch government a legal instrument to stop Slebos from exporting anything that could have a military purpose.

According to the Dutch government, “S.” (read Slebos) did not get any export permits from 1998 onwards.\textsuperscript{102} In “a number of cases” it applied the catch-all clause to Slebos-related exports; roughly two-third of 22 catch-alls invoked between 1996 and 2004 would seem to be connected to Slebos.\textsuperscript{103} “Relevant investigation services” are supposed to check that Slebos observes these export rulings.\textsuperscript{104} This does not mean that the catch-all clause is a clear-cut guarantee that Slebos will not try exporting again through different channels, legal or illegal.

Within weeks of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, in May 1998, the \textit{Vrij Nederland} weekly reported that three Slebos consignments were being held at Schiphol airport, and two more in Austria and Belgium.\textsuperscript{105} Both Slebos Research and Bodmerhof BV were said to be involved. Although the goods normally would not have needed an export licence, the catch-all provision was applied. Asked about the case in an interview, Khan stated: "I know Slebos as a righteous Dutch citizen, who takes all precautions to obey laws and rules. Before he delivers something to Pakistan, he always checks everything again and again."\textsuperscript{106}

The legal battle continued until late 2003. Slebos had sold part of the equipment - an LMF\textsuperscript{107} made compressor, type V 17 5518 L,
40-K - to a company called Verboom International in Schiedam. It was denied an export licence to Pakistan in May 1999 and the company subsequently went to court in 2000 to fight that decision. The firm claimed that the compressor was meant for an ordinary company, the People’s Steel Mill in Karachi, despite Slebos having previously given the Institute for Industrial Automation (part of Khan’s supply network) as the final destination. Intelligence and export control authorities, however, claimed that the compressor was “very suitable for use with the Ghauri missiles, as used in the Pakistani missile programme”. In October 2003 the Ministry of Economic Affairs finally won the case - the decision to refuse an export licence for the compressor was upheld. What happened with the other Slebos equipment impounded in 1998 remains unclear.

A.Q Khan’s network of competitors

In late 2003, starting with the investigation into the BBC China ship in Italy and the subsequent Libyan abandonment of its programmes related to weapons of mass destruction, it gradually became clear that - apart from the previously known illicit international assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme - A.Q. Khan, together with a number of businessmen and companies from Europe, Asia and Africa had been involved in a huge operation to do the same for Libya, Iran and North Korea.

It remains hard to judge the real functioning of what is commonly known as the A.Q. Khan network, and how relations between its partners have developed. Henk Slebos must have known most of them for a long time. He explained to the Dutch TV programme Zembla that the people that helped Pakistan build its bomb all more or less knew each other. He himself was in contact with “maybe even a thousand” companies across Europe supplying him the materials he was looking for. He insisted, though, that after Pakistan’s successful nuclear bomb test in 1998 his job was over, denying involvement in operations for other countries.

One example of an old acquaintance of both Khan and Slebos is the late Turkish Günes Cire, whom they both knew from Delft’s Technical University. Cire visited Slebos at home in December 1985. In 1986 he was part of Slebos Research’s board for a few months. Another close Slebos associate was the late Heinz Mebus, according to German investigative journalist and long-time Khan-watcher Egmont Koch.

Slebos’s name also appeared in conjunction with the well-publicised case of the German-owned ship BBC China. Laden with nuclear equipment and on its way to Libya, the BBC China was caught by American inspectors in Italy on 4 October 2003. The seizure revealed a trove
of information on the persons and companies supplying Libya with nuclear-related materials. The Sri Lankan businessman Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir (allegedly the network’s chief financial officer and money-launderer), the Malaysian company Scomi Precision Engineering117, and the Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) of Briton Peter Griffin were all implicated. The BBC China was also carrying aluminium castings and dynamos from the Turkish company ETI Elektroteknik – then owned by Günes Cire - in which Slebos at the time had a 15 per cent share.118

British citizen Peter Griffin knows Henk Slebos from the Khan trade as well, though more as competitor, as he recalls:

It was never a network, a network implies that people are working together. It was intensely competitive. I would compete against, for instance, Slebos. Sometimes I’d send a quotation over for some equipment and when I asked ‘when are you going to place the order’ I was sometimes told that they had decided not to proceed but later I’d find out that someone had passed my quotation to Slebos who had come in 5 per cent or so cheaper and therefore got the order.119

Griffin and Slebos are reasonably well acquainted. Griffin’s wife knows Slebos “very well”, but told a Dutch newspaper that social and commercial contacts with Slebos have now been severed.120 The two men saw each other, for example, at the wedding of one of Khan’s daughters121, and they once jointly met Cire in London.122

Griffin has been connected to A.Q. Khan since 1980.123 He is believed to have been the person behind Bin Belailah Enterprises in Dubai, which was linked with Mebus, Slebos and OPAK Intertrade in the 1980’s.124

In 2004 B.S.A. Tahir accused Griffin of being the planner and middleman in the Project Machine Shop 1001, which was to set up a workshop in Libya to make ultracentrifuge components that could not be obtained from outside the country.125
Timbuktu

That Henk Slebos plays a key role in A.Q. Khan's nuclear business becomes clear with the story of Khan's unexplained travels around Africa between 1998 and 2002. Together with high-ranking Pakistani nuclear officials, Slebos took part in at least one of these trips. The London-based accountant Abdul Ma'bood Siddiqui has recorded his travels with Khan and friends in the Urdu-language memoir "A short trip to Timbuktu" that was published in 2000.

Siddiqui's son Abu was co-director of SMB Europe, the European affiliate of B.S.A. Tahir’s Dubai based SMB Group. Abu Siddiqui was arrested in May 1999 for illegal nuclear-related exports to A.Q. Khan and convicted in October 2001. He only got a suspended sentence, as the judge believed that Siddiqui was not aware of A.Q. Khan's status as head of Pakistan's nuclear programme.

In his book Siddiqui talks about an invitation he got from Tahir for a trip to Dubai in February 1998. There he met A.Q. Khan, two top officials from Khan Research Laboratories (KRL, Pakistan's uranium enrichment factory) and “Mr. Hank”, a trader in air-filtration and solar energy systems as well as metallurgic articles. They flew via Casablanca to Bamako in Mali, and travelled on to Timbuktu, where Hotel Hendrina – named after Khan’s Dutch wife – was being built with money from A.Q. Khan.

Siddiqui describes another trip that took place at the end of February 1999, when “the old group”, together with Dr. Nazeer Ahmad and two other close associates of Khan, travelled from Dubai to Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Niger and Chad. Slebos is known to have been in direct contact with Nazeer Ahmad. On a third trip in February 2000, no fewer than ten African countries were visited.

According to the guest book, three KRL directors, including Nazeer Ahmad, visited Hotel Hendrina in February 2002 - a year after Khan had been discharged as head of KRL. After the proliferation scandal unfolded in late 2003, most of the Pakistani officials that had been travelling through Africa were questioned by the authorities in Pakistan.

The St. Pancras boys' choir

The most explicit recent proof of Slebos’ dealings with Pakistan emerged in late 2003, when the Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade revealed that Slebos Research was one of the sponsors of ISAM 2003, the International Symposium on Advanced Materials in Islamabad and the main international scientific event of KRL. Though no longer KRL chief, A.Q. Khan was still ISAM’s main host, as "patron" of the organising committee. The "international scientific committee" consisted, among others, of Khan’s former tutor at the university of Louvain (Belgium), the Dutch emeritus professor Brabers.

In response to a number of questions from parliamentarians on the Dutch participation in the meeting and its relation to Dutch non-proliferation policy, then Foreign Minister De Hoop Scheffer agreed that KRL was indeed part of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons industry, and that - though the government did not have information that ISAM was set
up to further develop that industry - it was "not fully possible to rule out that the exchange of knowledge and information during the symposium directly or indirectly contributes to that development".\textsuperscript{135}

Curiously, one Dutch participant at ISAM, professor Das of ECN\textsuperscript{136}, afterwards admitted that he had been there in the pay of the Dutch intelligence service AIVD. He had worked for them frequently, for many years and in many countries. At ISAM 2001 he had even visited Khan at home and met president Musharraf;\textsuperscript{137} of course, he also knew Henk Slebos.

Asked about his ISAM sponsorship, the St. Pancras-based businessman told a journalist: "I do business in all of Asia, but not in Pakistan. I have nothing to hide and I didn't even go to the symposium myself. I only sponsored it. That is nothing peculiar though? [...] If I subsidise the boys' choir of St. Pancras, you don't ask strange questions, do you?"\textsuperscript{138}

\textbf{On trial again}

In February 2004 – within days of Khan's confession of nuclear proliferation on Pakistani television, and days after the name 'Hanks' surfaces in the media as one of Khan's accomplices – Dutch media reported that the Public Prosecutor had launched an investigation into illegal exports from Slebos to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{139} The investigation had, in fact, already started in 2001, but only after requests from Germany and the US.\textsuperscript{140} On two occasions, in December 2002 and April 2004, offices and houses were searched. A month later, the indictment against Slebos, former employee Zoran Filipovic, and his two companies Slebos Research and Bodmerhof revealed five violations of the export law between 1999 and 2002.\textsuperscript{141} In all cases, goods (manometers, O-rings, bearings, graphite and triethanolamine) were alleged to have been exported - without the requisite licence - to the Institute for Industrial Automation (IIA), widely regarded as a purchasing arm of A.Q. Khan's KRL, Pakistan's key nuclear facility.

In July 2001, German authorities had already sent a "request for mutual assistance" on the export of bearing balls to Pakistan by TEAM Industries GmbH (Leonberg, Germany), in which Slebos would have acted as a middleman. According to the specialist magazine Nuclear Fuel Slebos had ordered 10,000 of these tiny – just over four millimetres - chrome steel balls with TEAM Industries between 2000 and 2001.\textsuperscript{142} The case is particularly remarkable in the light of the seemingly identical case ten years previously.

Like Slebos, TEAM Industries and its director Ernst Piffl have been connected to A.Q. Khan for decades. In 1998, Piffl was sentenced to 45 months in jail, and fined for illegally exporting 'pre-form scoops' – unfinished little tubes - for ultracentrifuges. In court he said that he regretted his actions, and would cooperate further with the German foreign intelligence service BND.\textsuperscript{143}

Nevertheless, the court “did not divulge that Slebos had in 2001 also shipped thousands of other steel bearing balls to IIA that precisely matched the metallurgical and design specifications for the bottom bearing of the Urenco centrifuge known as CNOR. Intelligence
sources told *Nuclear Fuel* that evidence that Slebos exported these goods to Pakistan was considerable.” Western intelligence and export control sources further allege that the steel balls “were not destined for Pakistan but for centrifuge programmes in Libya or Iran.”

Eventually, the required ball bearings were supplied by Alkmaar-based engineering equipment wholesaler Laman. Declared as “spare parts”, they flew from Schiphol to Islamabad 29 March 2001. It is suspected that a second transaction of 10,000 may have slipped through as well. Sources do not say how all this could happen, and why action was only taken after a request from Germany. As the export of such steel balls would possibly have required an export licence, failure to apply for one should have been reason to stop the shipment and to prosecute Slebos or Laman or both on violation of export laws. If no export licence was required the catch-all clause should have been invoked immediately. Either way action should have been taken by the Dutch government.

In January 2001, a case against Slebos was launched at the request of the US. Dutch customs took up the case and discovered that a Schiphol-based shipping agent had indeed exported six MKS “absolute capacitance manometers” to Pakistan. The manometers are classified as dual-use because of their application in nuclear processes, and therefore required an export licence, which Slebos did not apply for. The chemical substance triethanolamine - or TEA - was likewise exported by Slebos C.S. without a permit. This was one of a series of cases against Slebos brought at that time. A second case involved the illegal export of graphite, in which Slebos acted as the middleman, ordering from Dynimpex (Noord-Scharwoude, the Netherlands), a company just a few kilometres from his hometown. On Slebos’ request, it had tried to send (via Amsterdam, Brussels, Bahrain and Dubai) special graphite that would have required an export licence to the People’s Steel Mill in Karachi, declaring the consignment as being “electronic assemblies for computers”. The consignment was intercepted at Schiphol on 3 July 1999, and Dynimpex was fined 12,500 guilders (€5,672) in 2001 for violating export laws.

The other two cases included in Slebos’ trial concerned the export without permit of goods that were put under a catch-all: a few dozen bearings and 11,000 O-rings. The latter case was discovered when officials visited Ace Vital Logistics, the shipper of the manometers. The very next day a catch-all was imposed on the O-rings, but as a result of the raids on his office it turned out that another 9,000 had already been delivered to the IIA, with Dynimpex again the supplier.

It took one-and-half years before, on 16 December 2005, the district court in Alkmaar, the Netherlands, convicted Slebos, his former employee and his companies Slebos Research and Bodmerhof. Slebos was sentenced to prison for one year, of which 8 months were suspended, plus €197,500 in fines, including those for his companies. The businessman has remained free his appeal hearing, which is set to take place in September 2007. The ex-employee had to fulfil 180 hours community service and pay a €5,000 fine.

So far, Slebos has managed to get away with a relatively minor penalty, despite his prior
track record and his public admission of having been in the business for so long. This signals to anyone willing to enter the nuclear proliferation business that it is easy to get away with involvement in this trade from the Netherlands.

Janus

Sadly, the conviction of Slebos uncovers just the tip of the iceberg. According to one investigator, it looked as if Slebos was “making a shipment to Pakistan about once a week on average” since the early 1990s. Unnamed western intelligence officials claim that the “cumulative trail of evidence” showed that Slebos was obtaining “a nearly endless assortment of wire, lubricants, valves, oils, industrial fasteners, seals, filters, tools, switches, compressors, torches, and other gear” on behalf of KRL and the IIA. “If you looked at everything on the order books you would think they were outfitting a hardware store; we had no idea what most of this stuff was for”, according to a Dutch investigator in 2005.

One theory among customs and intelligence officials is that the ordering of large quantities of seemingly meaningless materials served to disguise exports of other more crucial centrifuge parts. The question then remains how Slebos managed to make deliveries to Pakistan on a weekly basis, with maybe fifteen catch-alls in six years trying to stop his consignments. For someone you would expect to be under round-the-clock surveillance such a return is not reassuring. This is reinforced when remembering that his trial only happened after foreign requests for information about his dealings.

All this fits well with Slebos’ business profile, as proclaimed on his company’s website:

We find hard-to-get objects for customers all over the world. We have delivered machine parts of sawing machines, grinding wheels, fixings, iron and metal alloys, laboratories and testing equipment, software and much more.

The site was also advertising an anti-fouling system, his latest venture, which had even gained the interest of his former employer, the Royal Dutch Navy.

Slebos’ business activities have been many and various. In 2003, his website – showing a Janus face - also mentioned “Technical Troubleshooting”, “Prefab Buildings”, “Technical purchasing”, “Technical Engineering” and even “Wine Import” - but not anymore. Since 2004, www.slebos.com has been down.

Aluminium

What might have been one of his latest attempts to supply his old friend A.Q. Khan is a case of dealing in special-grade aluminium that emerged during 2005. It is an example of another major loophole in Dutch arms control regulations, namely (financial) involvement as broker or middleman in the export of nuclear related materials that do not touch Dutch soil. In this case, Slebos is alleged to have solicited a Swiss commercial agent in 2004 to organise procurement of aluminium tubing from the Russian Federation via Switzerland and Dubai to KRL or related Pakistani institutions. Alerted by Swiss authorities, who had been tipped off by the
Dutch, the Russian company cancelled the transaction. The Dutch government has not taken any steps against Slebos in this matter, as it lacks the legal means to do so. The Dutch weekly Vrij Nederland had earlier mentioned similar transactions involving magnesium and graphite from China.

The pressing question is how many times previously Slebos had successfully exploited this major loophole in Dutch arms control legislation. Dutch officials that talked with Nucleonics Week claim that changing the law would require harmonisation of EU law. Remarkably, the Netherlands previously required a licence for three-way traffic in all 'strategic goods' - being both military and dual-use goods as listed in the annexes of the Dutch handbook on strategic goods – the so-called “licence financial traffic strategic goods” or FVS. However, apparently somewhere during the 1990s the scope of the licence was narrowed to military goods only. In spite of the recent revelations about Slebos' (financial) involvement in the trade in nuclear related dual-use goods not touching Dutch soil, The Hague shows no sign of urgency in closing the loophole.

A recent EU initiative in this direction is only of very limited scope (see below: ‘Measures to be taken’).

**Détente**

Speaking to the press for the first time in more than two years, Henk Slebos was interviewed by documentary programme Zembla shortly before his latest trial neared its verdict. As the 'sphinx' spoke he showed insights into what he described as his ideas and motivations. Besides admitting that he had earned a decent fortune with his trade, Slebos mentioned high-flown political reasons for having helped Pakistan acquiring its nuclear bomb. He does not try to deny or play down his involvement. On the contrary: “I am proud that I have prevented a number of wars”, says Slebos immodestly, when asked whether he was proud of having co-operated in the making of an atom bomb. “I am not proud of an atom bomb as such, but sometimes it can be a necessity that it is there.”

Slebos portrays himself as a man with a mission, a mission of peace. “I am seeking for some détente on earth”, he says. But it is lonely at the top. “In these positions you are rather lonely […] if you have a goal in life to realise.”

He claims that the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme was an essential stability factor to counter India's ambitions. “If part of the earth permits itself to have [nuclear weapons] and you say the rest can not have them because they are too stupid […] , you kick me against the leg.”

According to Slebos his mission was accomplished after Pakistan acquired its nuclear status. “Now there was balance,” he said, “to me that was the end of the game”. He distances himself from further proliferation to other states or non-state actors. Such statements run contrary to evidence of his activities after 1998, up until at least 2004. Moreover, given the close relationship between A.Q. Khan and Slebos, including for example their joint trips to Africa, it sounds implausible that the man was completely unaware of Khan's nuclear deals with Iran, Libya and North Korea.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In January 1972, then-president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assembled the best scientists in his country in the city of Multan. At the meeting, he disclosed his plans to embark on a nuclear programme and asked for their help. Just weeks later, Abdul Qadeer Kahn – assumed to have been absent at the meeting in Multan - started working at FDO, a small but crucial subcontractor to uranium enrichment company Urenco and its Dutch branch UCN. For three and a half years he had access to a wealth of confidential and classified information. In these years at FDO, he solicited aid to start helping his country. He returned home in late 1975 when his behaviour came under increasing suspicion. Shortly afterwards, he became the head of the uranium route to Pakistan's nuclear bomb.

With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty just a few years old, Kahn had managed to bring first design data and supplier names, then equipment to Pakistan. Within a few years, the uranium-enrichment programme under his direction succeeded in progressing at an unexpectedly high speed. When the media broke the story of his spying activities in 1979, Khan was busy working to get all he needed from the international market, partly by using contacts he had made while in Europe.

Henk Slebos, an old friend from Delft University, was an important figure in this network of contacts. The two worked closely together for decades. Even though early intelligence reports showed his close association with Khan, it took years before Slebos felt the export control agencies breathing down his neck. Despite evidence of cases where his activities were obstructed, he largely got away with continuing to facilitate nuclear proliferation. The only criminal case against him during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a suspended sentence, and a relatively minor fine. Clearly Slebos was not deterred: he fought back and took the state to court to dispute export control decisions – though largely without any real success. From the late 1990s, the introduction of a catch-all clause began to obstruct his business, and again Slebos tried to find new ways around it.

Lessons learned?

Most steps in the whole Khan saga were initiated only after information was received from foreign intelligence services, or after breaking news from media organisations on the case. That was the case with the breaking of the story on Khan in 1979 (by German broadcasting company ZDF as well as American CBS), his attempts to export the half balls (a story broken by UK and Israeli intelligence) and the most recent criminal case against Slebos (revealed by German and US intelligence). Most A.Q. Khan-related court cases in the Netherlands would probably never have happened if the media or foreign intelligence services had not rung alarm-bells.

At the same time, the US has a similar record of letting Khan and his accomplices off, while knowing that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was threatening peace and security in the region and beyond. According to former Prime Minister Lubbers it was urgent...
appeals by the US that stopped authorities from arresting Khan. Then, as well as now, it was US dominance in foreign policy that dictated Dutch actions. These days, regardless of India’s rejection of the non-proliferation treaty, the US has started nuclear co-operation with that country.

While consistently denying any involvement in the spreading of nuclear technology, in January 2004, the Dutch government at last had to admit that ultracentrifuges found by IAEA inspectors in Iran showed clear marks of Urenco technology. A month later, when A.Q. Khan confessed his wider proliferation activities, it became clear that it would only be a matter of time until similar marks are proven on centrifuges found in Libya or North Korea. While the exact extent to which North Korean and Iranian programmes have been dependent on Khan is unclear, the Dutch connection was certainly there. With the growing pressure on both North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear programmes, it should be borne in mind that elements of their programmes can be traced back to the Netherlands, where ever since the late 1970s the government has frantically tried to disguise its apparent inability to deal with the situation adequately.

**Measures to be taken**

Apart from the realities of international geopolitical relations that have dominated policies to curb or allow non-nuclear or threshold states to acquire nuclear technology, adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the general aim of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, a number of specific initiatives would support a stronger international non-proliferation policy.

Since 11 September 2001 there is a renewed sense of urgency regarding the fear of a further spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially in relation to the possibility of non-state actors acquiring such weapons. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and the 2003 European Union Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction reflect these concerns. Certainly A.Q. Khan’s revelations in early 2004 have further contributed to that.

Indeed, policy changes have since been proposed by the European Commission, which governs the EU’s trade rules in dual-use goods as they are part of its internal market system. Brussels’ latest step in tackling unwanted proliferation from Europe dates from December 2006 and is the result of a longer initiative to reform its dual-use export control system. But policy reform does not take place overnight in a 26 country consensus-based system. Moreover, these proposals are likely to require various concessions in order to be passed, watering down a set of policies that already appear insufficient to tackle the problems at stake. The Trade directorate’s consultation process, as is typical of EU decision making, only invites business, and not arms control NGOs, to submit their concerns.

Initiatives, especially from an EU level, to better control the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction should at least include:

- Better transparency and parliamentary control of the activities of both national and...
foreign intelligence services with regards to counter-proliferation activities. The case of A.Q. Khan and the Netherlands has shown that Dutch and foreign intelligence services were aware of Khan's spying activities, but did not take measures to effectively stop him. Only in late 2005, after revelations by former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, as well as parliamentary pressure, did Parliament and the general public finally gain access to decades-old reports revealing that inactivity.

- Demanding increased transparency in reporting on dual-use exports. Not a goal in itself, good reporting on dual-use exports is necessary for good analysis. This is currently lacking throughout most of Europe. Under pressure, the Dutch government has recently started making available details in what seems be the most extensive form of reporting on dual-use exports in use.

- Increased capacity and quality of physical control at home. Customs agents generally lack the time and/or technical skills to sufficiently control the large amounts of goods that leave the country. 'Smart' exporters tend to exploit weaknesses within Europe, moving goods out of the EU from the country perceived to have the weakest control system. This is now very easy with dual-use items as exporters do not need a licence for intra-EU trade.

- Better cooperation between international export control partners, including more common training and more regular and better structured exchanges of information.

- Stricter end-user controls. At present, there is mostly only pre-licence control of the stated end-use(r), and hardly ever any checking of real end-use upon delivery in the country of destination. The modus operandi of many of the Khan network shows consistent disguising of both content, financial and physical traffic routes, as well as end-use.

- Controlling not only brokering activities in the arms trade, but in trade in dual-use goods as well.

- Controlling transit/transhipment flows of dual-use goods. The emerging realisation of the need to control transport of arms over one's territory should be extended to dual-use goods as well.

- Extending the list of strategic goods that require an export licence. Chemical and nuclear proliferation affairs over the past decades have taught that traders have often been able to freely export relevant goods without breaking any laws, as no licence was required to export them. Apart from physical exportation, intangible transfers (e.g. digital, oral) of WMD-related technology also require much stricter controls.

- Internationalising the use of the catch-all clause, bringing licence-exempt goods suspected of potential WMD or other military use under the export control regime. The case of the Netherlands since the late 1990s could serve as an example for other countries.

- Last but not least: for decades proliferation of nuclear weapons technology has often happened with the (silent) consent of major powers. Apart from the five declared nuclear-armed states (the US, Russia, France, the UK and China), Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan - and possibly North Korea - have also mastered the nuclear option.\textsuperscript{169} Control on proliferation of nuclear weapons should be deemed to be failing without serious disarmament initiatives by the current nuclear powers, including NATO countries hiding under the American nuclear umbrella.
APPENDIX I TIMELINE

1963: Abdul Qadeer Khan starts studying in Delft, the Netherlands, gets MSc degree in 1967.

1971: A.Q. Khan receives PhD in metallurgy in Louvain, Belgium.

1971: India humiliates Pakistan in war that gains independence for Bangladesh (then East-Pakistan).

January 1972: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is claimed to have said in a speech to scientists in Multan: "We will defend our country using any means necessary and build a nuclear capability second to none. We will eat grass for 1000 years, if we have to, but we will get there."170 'Project 706' – the Pakistani equivalent of the US Manhattan project - is launched.

May 1972: A.Q. Khan starts working at FDO, a main Urenco subcontractor.

May 1974: India conducts nuclear tests. Soon after A.Q. Khan offers his services then PM of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that had embarked on a nuclear programme.


1976: A.Q. Khan starts what later becomes known as Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). Slebos flies to Pakistan for the first time.


March 1979: German ZDF television breaks story on A.Q. Khan's espionage while in the Netherlands.


November 1983: A.Q. Khan convicted by Dutch court – in absentia - to 4 years for espionage; he is acquitted in 1985 by an appeals court due to a 'technicality'.

1984: Dutch companies FDO and VDT are acquitted in two separate criminal cases of illegal nuclear trading with Pakistan.
July 1985: Dutch court sentences Slebos to 12 months imprisonment. A year later, an appeal court changes that to a six-months suspended sentence, plus a 20,000-guilder (about €9,000) fine.


December 1988: *Persona non grata* A.Q. Khan is caught in a car with Slebos in the Netherlands and put on a plane back to Pakistan. The two are also said to have met in the Netherlands months before.


Summer 1999: Kargil crisis: Pakistan and India are close to war in Kashmir.

October 1999: General Pervez Musharraf stages a coup to replace Nawaz Sharif who is in Sri Lanka.

March 2001: President Musharraf dismisses A.Q. Khan from his post as chairman of KRL, as the government gets uneasy about revelations of Khan’s business activities. He is instead appointed as Special Science and Technology Adviser to the President of Pakistan.

Post 9/11: US lifts arms embargo against India and Pakistan to garner support for war on terror. In October 2001, the Pakistani government arrests three Pakistani nuclear scientists, all with close ties to Dr. A.Q. Khan, for their suspected connections with the Taliban.

December 2001 - summer 2002: War looms between India and Pakistan after bomb attack on Indian parliament.

September 2003: The vessel *BBC China* is caught in Italy with Libya-bound nuclear goods.

19 December 2003: In a surprise move, Libya announces the abandonment of its WMD-programmes.

4 February 2004: A.Q. Khan publicly admits to having proliferated nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. He was pardoned the following day by Musharraf, and has since been under house arrest.

2006: US and India agree on nuclear cooperation. Pakistan gets green light for purchase of long list of US weapons, among which are F-16 fighter aircraft.
NOTES

5 This has been described in detail in: Joop Boer, Henk van der Keur, Karel Koster and Frank Slijper, "A.Q. Khan, Urenco and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology - The symbiotic relation between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons", commissioned by Greenpeace International, May 2004.
8 “De Nederlandse atoombom”, Zembla (Dutch television), 7 November 2005 (http://player.omroep.nl/?aflID=2327467 from around 13’45”).
14 The name Explosive Metal Works Holland is also used by some sources. The company no longer exists under either name. Some mention Roosendaal, others Schijf or Rucphen as its work base.
16 Eric van Staten, “Ideaal droomhuis”, De Telegraaf, 20 August 2003; Alberts and Knip, 21 February 2004. Though building was finished in the mid-1980s, Kalkar had never been used as such. The whole project was finally stopped in 1991. Today it is an amusement park.
17 The 'Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium' (Physical Dynamic Research laboratory) was founded as in-house laboratory for Stork-Werkspoor in 1971 and used to be one of the
main UCN subcontractors. Khan started working at FDO in May 1972.

18 More precisely: UCN (Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland), the Dutch branch of the tri-national uranium enrichment company Urenco.

19 ’Rapport van de onderzoeksgroep betreffende de activiteiten van Dr. Ir. A.Q. Khan,’ June 1979; Dutch Radio 1, VPRO’s Argos, 29 April 2005. Argos had made an earlier programme quoting from the report on 14 January 2005. Under parliamentary pressure most of the report was declassified later in 2005.


21 Quote from shooting script Argos, 29 April 2005.

22 The testimony of Nico Zondag was made on 25 April 1977.

23 Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, the internal security and intelligence service, now AIVD.

24 Quote from shooting script Argos, 29 April 2005.


27 Quote from shooting script Argos, 14 January 2005.

28 See also Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan developed more powerful centrifuges”, Nuclear Fuel, 29 January 2007.


31 See e.g. Mark Hibbs, “Iranians claimed bearing impasse halted work on P-2 centrifuge”, Nuclear Fuel, 27 February 2006.


33 Quote from his oscilloscope criminal court case file. County court of Alkmaar, 2 July 1985.


36 In July 1979 Bodmerhof BV – in the first half of the 1990s a textile trading company, later importing and exporting for the metal industry and exporting technical products - is founded. From 26 November 1991 its only shareholder was Slebos Research BV. It was discontinued from 14 June 2004, and in its last months, only functioned as a holding company. It is unclear with what purpose Bodmerhof was set up initially.

37 Van Doorne’s Transmissie based in Tilburg, at that time a largely government controlled company that was part of vehicle builder DAF (based in Geldrop, close to Eindhoven). Today VDT is part of the German Robert Bosch Group. For more on the VDT case see: Joop Boer, Henk van der Keur, Karel Koster and Frank Slijper, ”A.Q. Khan, Urenco and the proliferation
41 Quote from shooting script Argos, 14 January 2005.
42 ‘Rapport van de onderzoeksgroep betreffende de activiteiten van Dr. Ir. A.Q. Khan’, June 1979, as quoted in Dutch Radio 1, VPRO’s Argos, 29 April 2005.
43 Deputy Secretary-General at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and leader of the government’s fact-finding commission on Khan, therefore also known as the Commission Bos or (Working)Group Bos, that existed from 1979 until the early 1990s.
44 Unofficial translation of “Internal memorandum”, 21 September 1984. It was released through a FOIA request by makers of KRO’s Reporter in 2004.
45 “De Nederlandse atoombom”, Zembla (Dutch television), 7 November 2005.
49 Zembla, 7 November 2005.
50 See Argos, 2 December 2005.
51 “Toezichtsrapport inzake het onderzoek van de Commissie van Toezicht naar de rechtmatigheid van het AIVD-onderzoek naar proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en overbrengingsmiddelen”, CTIVD 5B, 10 August 2005, p. 4-7.
52 At different times, authorities in Britain (half balls, 1982), Israel (depleted uranium, 1982), Germany (bearing balls, 2001) and the US (manometers, 2001) requested Dutch action against Slebos.
53 ZDF, 17 February 1981, as quoted in: Jan Pijper and Hugo Schneider, ”Wat Khan kon, kon Khan nooit alleen”, de Volkskrant, 14 March 1981. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up the Special Works Organisation under the Defence ministry in the mid-seventies, to control nuclear activities. Former Finance minister Ghulam IshA.Q. Khan was appointed as its first coordinator.
54 To get an idea of FDO’s relations with the SWO, one should take a look at documents that were declassified through a FOIA request made by Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad. See for example page 11 a.f. at http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/projecten/Khan/openbaar/Khan_4.pdf .
55 “Rapport van de onderzoeksgroep betreffende de activiteiten van Dr. Ir. A. Q. Khan, d.d. juli 1979”, p.20.
56 It was also Kuys who back in 1974 had asked Khan to translate G-2 centrifuge technology manuals with UCN in Almelo.
57 Argos, 29 April 2005
See documents released through the Dutch FOIA request made by daily NRC: http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/projecten/Khan/openbaar/Khan_7.pdf. FDO was prosecuted in the early 1980s, but acquitted, as the judge found that though embedded devices required an export licence, the measuring machine involved did not need one.

The ECD merged in 1999 with fiscal intelligence service FIOD and is now called FIOD-ECD. It is part of the Belastingdienst-Douane (tax and customs authorities) of the Finance Ministry.


Because of a work-to rule action by the unions, personnel at the airport were checking every single package. This is mentioned in the plea of Slebos’ counsel in a later appeal against the decision not to grant him an export licence for the Tektronix oscilloscope (see below). See also Egmont Koch, Atomwaffen für Al Qaida”, Aufbau Verlag, Berlin 2005, p.154 plus note, and “Vriend Khan hoort 15 maanden eisen”, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 19 June 1985.

Most of this section is based on Slebos’ statements made on the affair to the court (County court of Alkmaar, 2 July 1985).

Arrestnummer 1011/86, Arrest van het Gerechtshof te Amsterdam, uitspraak 3 juli 1986.

The mid-1980s saw similar results in cases of illegal exports from the Netherlands to Iran and Iraq.

College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven [Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry], case number 160/01/25; verdict 17 May 1985.


Plea note of Slebos’ counsel, Mr. C.J. Doorenbos, in case at College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven [Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry] on export licence refusal Tektronix oscilloscope by Min. Ec. Affairs (case number 160/01/25; verdict 17 May 1985).

Letter from Mr. F. Weiss, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 29 January 1985.


OPAK was taken over by Slebos Research BV from 30 September 1982. Almost ten years later, Henk Slebos lost an income tax dispute on his 1982 income through OPAK. (Dutch High Court, 18 December 1991, nr. 27.497).

Under German law, an order of ‘professional disqualification’. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berufsverbot

Plea note of Slebos’ counsel, Mr. C.J. Doorenbos, in case at College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven [Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry] on export licence refusal Tektronix oscilloscope by Min. Ec. Affairs (case number 160/01/25; verdict 17 May 1985).


Dutch: “College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven”, Case number 160/01/32.

Dutch: “Vergunning Financieel Verkeer Strategische Goederen (FVS)”. According to the FVS application the lathe was worth 237,287.50 Dutch guilders (about 108,000 euro).

Verdict “College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven”, 21 October 1986, No. 164/03/1.

“Notitie voor de Heer Mr. J. Bos”, F. Weiss (Ministry of Economic Affairs), 10 February 1986.

Possibly the measure received either opposition from other parts within the Dutch bureaucracy in the final stages, or may have received disapproval from international partners. Questions to the ministry of Economic Affairs regarding this issue had not been answered at the time this briefing went to press.


In the words of Slebos’ counsel C.J. Doorenbos. Letter to Economic Affairs, 17 April 1986.

As quoted by Doorenbos (Letter to Economic Affairs, 17 April 1986).


100 A.Q. Khan related information released under the Dutch FOIA by the ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals little if anything for this period.

101 The United Arab Emirates have often functioned as transhipment port (that Slebos e.g. tried to use with the oscilloscope in 1983). Turkey may have been used by Slebos through his share in ETI, as well as Malaysia’s SCOMI, that became known in late 2003 as an A.Q. Khan/B.S.A. Tahir cover firm for ultracentrifuge components Khan’s network. (See section ‘Network of competitors’).


103 See list of catch-alls at: http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/projecten/Khan/kamer/Karimi080404.html


107 Leoborderfer Maschinenfabrik AG, Austria.


110 The government refused to provide details on that in answer to questions from MP Karimi (GreenLeft); see: http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/projecten/Khan/kamer/KVRKhan120204Karimi.pdf en http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/projecten/Khan/kamer/KVRKhan190204Karimi.pdf


114 Excerpt dossier number 37041403 Dutch Chamber of Commerce, as seen on 25 September 2006.


Plus some foreigners working for the company like the Tanner brothers from Switzerland.


Jaco Alberts and Karel Knip, "Henk S., de handelaar die aan alles kwam”, NRC Handelsblad 4 May 2004.


Jaco Alberts and Karel Knip, "Henk S., de handelaar die aan alles kwam”, NRC Handelsblad 4 May 2004.

Including a 12-ton heat treatment furnace, a high-specification measuring machine, an overhead crane and high-strength aluminium bars. The customers were listed on shipping papers as Peoples Steel Mill in Karachi and UETC in Islamabad. Note that the People's Steel Mill also was the presumed destination of Slebos' business partner who had bought his LMF compressor (see “Catch all?”). Sources: Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, "Malaysia Arrests Nuclear Network Suspect", Washington Post, May 29, 2004; “Western Intelligence Agencies Missed Link to A.Q.Khan's Nuclear Proliferation Network”, Public Education Center, http://publicedcenter.org/stories/siddiqui/; Edward Harris and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Head of Pakistan's nuclear ring made repeated visits to uranium-rich Africa”, AP, 20 April 2004; Stephen Fidler and Victoria Burnett, “The nuclear entrepreneur”, Financial Times, 6 April 2004. Also see: Nick Lazaredes, “A Blind Eye to the Islamic Bomb”, SBS (Australia) Dateline, 23 June 2004 (transcript), who makes the connection with the infamous BCCI, that was co-founded by one Aslam Siddiqui. Lazaredes does not mention what (family) relations both men have.


According to Pakistani newspaper News International (1 February 2004) “a Pakistan Air Force C-130 aircraft was also used by Dr. Qadeer in early 2000 to ferry an exclusive range of
carved Pakistani wooden furniture from Islamabad to his Timbuktu hotel. Chief KRL centrifuge expert Dr. Muhammad Farooq accompanied the furniture on the flight to Tripoli (Libya) and on by road to Mali.

131 Then Director-General of KRL’s science and technology cooperation directorate.
132 Jaco Alberts and Karel Knip, "Henk S., de handelaar die aan alles kwam", NRC Handelsblad, 4 May 2004
133 Press Release Campagne tegen Wapenhandel, 3 September 2003, see www.stoparmstrade.org.
136 Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland - Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands.
141 Dutch: “In- en Uitvoerwet IUW”.
148 Depending on its specifications certain steel balls require an export licence today; see ‘Handboek Strategische Goederen,’ post 2A001.
149 Requisitoir, p. 12-14.
150 Requisitoir, p. 5-9.

"KNRM test vinding omstreden techneut", de Volkskrant, 24 February 2004. SRAF Nederland BV, an acronym for Slebos Research Anti-Fouling, makes the system. There is also a SRAF office in France that is directed by a Dutchman (www.sraf-fr-antifouling.com).

Other known companies in which Slebos was involved are: Sleedoorn Styling (home and office furnishing, bankrupt in 1989); RA Products (solar energy, dead 1996); Milieu- en Energiesystemen (energy, 34% share) (source: Alberts and Knip, "Pakistan verdenkt Nederlander 'Hanks’", NRC Handelsblad, 7 February 2004).

Backtracking previous site content is possible through http://web.archive.org/.


Possibly in 1992, because of harmonisation reasons, as trade in dual-use goods became part of the EU’s internal market. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs could not further clarify questions regarding this issue by the time this briefing went to press.

See: letter on scope of Dutch legislation on extraterritorial activities ity (“Brief van de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken” (Tweede Kamer, 22054 nr. 111, 5 July 2006) and “Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg” (Tweede Kamer, 22054 nr. 98, 7 March 2006).

“De Nederlandse atoombomb”, Zembla (Dutch television), 7 November 2005 (http://player.omroep.nl/?aflID=2327467 ). All quotes in this section come from this documentary.

He says it has made him a millionaire in guilders – the former currency that is rated 2.2 against the euro.

Zembla, 7 November 2005 (http://player.omroep.nl/?aflID=2327467 around 12'30’").

A case with many similarities is that of the export of chemical weapon precursors to Iraq by many Western nations up until 1984. Despite consistent signals of a C-weapon build-up by Saddam Hussein in the previous years, it was finally after US pressure that (limited) steps were taken in early 1984 to halt further progress.

Adopted 28 April 2004, see: http://disarmament.un.org/Committee1540/

See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/dualuse/index_en.htm. Note that it wrongly defines dual-use goods as “goods and technology developed for civilian uses, but which can be used for military purposes”. Equally often it is the other way around: developed with a military goal, goods later become available on the civilian market as well.


“Call for comments on the Proposed changes to the Dual Use legal Framework. Commission invites exporters to send their comments on the proposals to change the current legal framework on export control of Dual Use items
Militarism and Globalisation Project

The TNI Militarism and Globalisation Project aims to highlight the links between rising militarisation and the process of globalisation. It aims to exemplify the connection between globalisation and war; between the carving out of new markets by means of trade and by means of violence; between the economics of neoliberalism and the politics of empire. Its current focus includes work on defence industrial reorganisation, EU security, the arms trade and the accountability of foreign military bases.

TNI briefings are available free for download at www.tni.org. Please contact andrea@tni.org for hard copies.

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Frank Slijper, The Emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex: Arms Industry Lobbying in Brussels

Achin Vanaik, The Second Nuclear Age: Reducing Risk for the People of South Asia
Transnational Institute

Founded in 1974, TNI is an international network of activist scholars committed to critical analyses of the global problems of today and tomorrow. In the spirit of public scholarship and aligned to no political party, TNI seeks to create and promote international cooperation in analysing and formulating possible solutions to such global problems as corporate driven globalisation, militarism and conflict, poverty and marginalisation, social injustice and environmental degradation. It aims to provide intellectual support to those movements concerned to steer the world in a democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable direction.

Campagne tegen Wapenhandel

The Dutch Campaign Against Arms Trade (Campagne tegen Wapenhandel) is a politically independent organisation that investigates the arms trade policies and realities, publishes books, reports and articles, organises protest and informs politicians and the media on current developments. It stresses the need for a much stricter application of the present European Union Code of Conduct on arms exports, that should prevent arms exports to conflict regions and human rights abusing regimes. Working in close cooperation with international partner organisations, the campaign seeks to promote the concept of human security rather than military security.

The Campaign Against Arms Trade is part of the European Network Against Arms Trade (www.enaat.org).
Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in May 1998, after almost three decades of building up the necessary technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan was the key player in this effort, and Henk Slebos, whom he first met at Delft University in the 1970s, was an important contact in a trade that allowed Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons.

*Project Butter Factory* tells the story of Henk Slebos, A.Q. Khan and the failed international effort to control nuclear proliferation. It is a story of how the drive for profit, competing political interests and weak regulations in the Netherlands allowed the export of dual-use nuclear components to continue unchecked.

The Slebos case is a clear example of the failed international effort to control nuclear proliferation. If lessons are to be learnt, writes Frank Slijper, then it is high time for the reform of the system governing dual-use exports at EU level, and for the existing nuclear powers to stop turning a blind eye to proliferation and start serious disarmament.