

BORDER WARS BRIEFING — April 2021

FINANCING BORDER WARS

The border industry, its
financiers and human rights



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants' rights looks ever bleaker.

States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government 'expert' groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower's warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today's global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

A booming industry

The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of \$65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from \$33 billion in 2019 to \$65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US\$190.61 billion by 2025.

The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: **Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.**

- The **border security and control field**, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales—all of which are among the world's major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.
- The **Smart Borders** sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including **biometrics** (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public-private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.
- **Deportation.** With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. *Newsweek* reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).
- **Detention.** The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.
- **Advisory and audit services** are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol's study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with

Turkey and the EU's Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasyllum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

Financing the industry

The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world's largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

- **The Vanguard Group** owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.
- Other important investors are **Blackrock**, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, **Capital Research and Management** (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and **State Street Global Advisors (SsgA)**, which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.
- Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm **Advent International**. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.
- In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are **partly owned by the governments** of the countries where they are headquartered.

In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public's funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.

Human rights and the border industry

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and

the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that 'taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity'. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

- Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of *non-refoulement*), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.
- The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants' lives.
- The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children'. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.
- The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.
- The building of major migration databases such as EU's Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasyllum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A\$70 million (about \$53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees' human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe's borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterranean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.

Time to divest

The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump's anti-immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of 'public resistance' hit the company financially, criticising the banks as 'clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns'.

Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

INTRODUCTION

In mid-2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), commonly known as the UN Refugee Agency, reported a record high of over 80 million people worldwide who had been forcibly displaced.¹ Of these, 45.7 million—or 57%—were internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their country of origin. Of the remaining 34.3 million, 73% were refugees and asylum-seekers in a neighbouring country. Only 15% of all refugees were hosted in the wealthier regions of Europe, North America and Australia,² yet these are the very countries at the forefront of adopting increasingly repressive migration policies aimed at preventing entry or deporting refugees. In recent years, the most controversial elements of these policies have grabbed media and public attention and have become major political and election campaign issues.

These include Australia's policy of jailing boat refugees in third countries, the US policy of building a wall on the border with Mexico and its increased detention of mostly Latin American migrants, including the separate detention of children, and the EU's response to the 2015 'refugee crisis', its crackdown on refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean, its containment of refugees in squalid camps on the Greek islands and its controversial deals with third countries to prevent migrants from reaching the European borders in the first place.

While these policies are shocking in themselves—the pictures of refugees drowning in the Mediterranean or dying of thirst at the US–Mexican border, people tortured in the detention camps in Libya, in inhumane conditions at Nauru or small children separated from their parents in US detention centres—they are merely the visible tip of the iceberg.

Underlining these policies is a narrative, heavily pushed by the industry involved in the various sectors of the repressive side of migration policies, which portrays migration mainly as a security problem. Migrants are cast as a threat that needs to be dealt with by (draconian) measures, from the militarisation of borders to wide-scale detention and deportation flights. Ainhua Ruiz Benedicto, a researcher at Centre Delas, argues that in the process of securitisation³ 'borders have come to be seen as exceptional spaces where emergency measures are deployed and where the movement of people and migration flows have become a threat', as part of 'the creation of a global system in which the hegemonic security paradigms are state-centric and militaristic.'⁴

This securitised approach to migration jeopardises refugees' human rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warns that 'it is increasingly clear that a lack of human rights-based migration governance at the global, regional and national levels is leading to the routine violation of migrants' rights in transit, at international borders, and in the countries they migrate to'. Such violations include 'a denial of civil and political rights such as arbitrary detention, torture, or a lack of due process, as well as economic, social and cultural rights such as the rights to health, housing or education'.⁵

The 'border industrial complex' is both the outcome and cause of these developments, what Todd Miller calls 'the nexus between border policing, militarisation and financial interest',⁶ or the 'immigration industrial complex'. Tanya Golash-Boza, then Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas, describes the latter as 'the confluence of public and private sector interests in the criminalization of undocumented migration, immigration law enforcement, and the promotion

of “anti-illegal” rhetoric’.⁷ Behind the leading companies in this nexus there are often large investment companies that provide them with shareholder capital and other revenue streams to keep them running.

This report examines the global border security industry, focusing on developments in the most important geographical markets (Australia, Europe, USA), listing the human rights violations and risks involved and profiling the most important corporate players and their major shareholders.

BORDER INDUSTRY

The border industry is booming. Recent market research reports predict large growth in specific fields. The border security market predicts annual growth of between 7.2% and 8.6% , reaching a total of \$65–68 billion by 2025.⁸ Europe stands out with an anticipated annual growth rate of 15%.⁹ Large expansion is also expected in the global biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets, for example, forecasts the global ‘biometric systems market’ to double from \$33 billion in 2019 to \$65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector;¹⁰ and that the AI market will reach \$190.61 billion by 2025.¹¹

Since 2015, TNI and Stop Wapenhandel have been tracking these industries, identifying the different sectors, the key players and emerging markets. The industry ranges (as explored below) from construction companies to manufacturers of drones to biometric systems—all markets predicted to grow in the coming decades.

In this report we look at the key companies in Australia, Europe and the USA in five sectors of the industry:

- border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences)
- biometrics and smart borders
- migrant detention
- deportation
- audit and consultancy services

For most of the companies, such as the major arms producers and consultancy firms, their work on migration-related issues is just part of their overall portfolio, but for some, like the private prison contractors, it is their only or a main field of work.

Border security

The border security market encompasses all equipment, technologies and services to surveil and patrol borders in order to monitor, detect, stop, arrest, turn away or deter people from crossing them. The security infrastructure is one of the most visible elements of migration policies. By 2019, there were 63 border walls worldwide that have been built since 1968.¹² Sixty per cent of the world’s population live in a country that has built at least one such border wall. These walls are much more than concertina wires or metal fences since they are accompanied by all the other less obvious border equipment: radars, helicopters, night vision equipment, drones, planes, and all kinds of new technologies to monitor, detect and try to stop migrants. When there are maritime borders, all kinds of vessels, from rigid inflatable boats to patrol vessels and frigates are involved.

The big players in the border security market are military and security companies, but mostly major military companies, which have set up special divisions for border security. After the end of the Cold War and a temporary decrease in military budgets, many of them sought new markets to expand their business. The security market has been the most important of these, seeing an enormous boost, and a gradual militarisation, especially after the attacks in New York and Washington DC in September 2001, when governments severely increased homeland and border security efforts.

Mirroring the leading role played by the Western host countries in boosting border security and control, US, Australian, European and Israeli firms are the most important corporate players in this field. These include major arms sellers Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales; four of these—Airbus, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin and Thales—are in the top 15 arms-producing companies worldwide.¹³ Arms exports to countries in the Middle East/West Asia, many of them characterised by conflict and repression, have grown by 61% from 2010–2014 to 2015–2019.¹⁴ In this way the arms companies both profit from fuelling the reasons why people are forced to flee, and then profit from militarising borders, and thus preventing refugees from seeking safety and asylum.¹⁵

There are also more autonomous developments involving different corporate actors, such as the increase in India's border security, including a barrier on the border with Bangladesh¹⁶ and patrol drones in the autonomous region of Xinjiang in China.¹⁷

Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards. In a 2017 opinion column in the *Financial Times*, Erik Prince, former CEO of the controversial private military company Blackwater, proposed setting up a public–private border police 'to provide the government of Libya with the capacity to secure land borders and so prevent migrants from reaching the Mediterranean'.¹⁸ In October 2015 the government of Slovenia announced it would start to deploy private border security guards to assist the state authorities in policing its northern border.¹⁹

An ongoing development in the field of military and security applications is the use of autonomous and robotic systems, which are increasingly used (or tested) for border security.²⁰ The best known is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), also called Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) or drone. Their use at borders is still in the early stages and has often been (geographically) limited by airspace regulations.

BOX 1. Externalisation

The market for border security is expanding both because of the increased militarisation of borders in regions such as the European Union (EU) and also a process of externalisation. This is where countries use a 'carrot-and-stick' approach to pressure third countries into acting as outpost border guards, in order to stop refugees already on their way towards their borders.²¹ Well-known examples include the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the migration deal between the EU and Turkey, the US funded Frontera Sur programme implemented by Mexico along its southern border with Guatemala, and Australia's jailing of boat refugees in third countries (Indonesia, Nauru, Papua West Guinea).

The EU, Australia and the USA spend vast amounts on externalisation, ranging from training security forces to setting up biometric databases to register the whole population of third countries. So far, most of the money goes to state authorities and intergovernmental organisations, but private-sector players are increasingly benefiting. Prominent European examples are Germany's donations of equipment to Benin, Chad, Gambia, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Turkmenistan, cooperation with and donated vessels (from the EU and Italy) to the coast guards of Turkey and Libya, and the broadening of EU civil-military training missions in Mali and Niger to include 'border management'.²²

Companies have been instrumental in bringing about such business opportunities and enthusiastically embrace them once they materialise. Naming border surveillance in the Mediterranean as one of the key drivers, Fernando Ciria (Head of Marketing, Tactical Airlifters and ISR at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS)) told journalists in June 2016 that Africa is a very promising market for Airbus, with many orders expected in the next years.²³ Later that year Jean Pierre Talamoni, the company's head of sales and marketing, said that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In African countries, he saw a particular need for maritime patrol and border surveillance aircraft.²⁴

Biometrics and Smart Walls

This sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. An important part of this sector is the development of 'smart borders', which aim to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems.

Professor John Allen (Department of Geography, Open University in the UK) describes 'smart borders' as 'risk-management technologies that rely on biometrics and data-tracking to fast track entry for leisure and business elites and block access to those deemed a security risk or the 'wrong' kind of migrant'.²⁵ They are often based on biometric identification of travellers at or before crossing borders (for example at airports), checked against existing databases. This allows registered and 'desirable' travellers to quickly pass border checks, while facilitating denial of access to others (i.e. they are detained or immediately returned), using databases such as earlier registrations as 'illegal' migrants or biometric information provided by countries of origin.

Smart border systems can also be deployed to detect visa overstayers.²⁶ This sector might be the largest growth market related to migration.

The EU has been working on a broad 'Smart Borders Package' since 2013.²⁷ The central element is the Entry/Exit-System (EES), which 'controls the time and place of entry and exit of all nationals and third country nationals' using biometric data such as fingerprints and facial records.²⁸ The EU has also started combining information from all its databases to control and monitor the movement of people crossing its external borders and sometimes also within the Schengen Zone itself. Australia is also a forerunner in the field of smart borders.²⁹

Key corporations in this sector include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture. For them it is just one item in their broad portfolios, while for others, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, migration-related work is central. The French public-private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, was selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

There is also a trend towards automation of borders. Anduril Industries, for example, has received enthusiastic responses by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) after testing its portable towers with cameras and radars, combining VR and surveillance tools through an AI-based system (called Lattice³⁰) to detect unauthorised border crossings.³¹

Deportation

Along with increased border security to stop unwanted migrants from entry, there is also an industry supporting their deportation (also known as the 'removal' or, more euphemistically, as 'return'). This involves transporting migrants, usually by air, as well as getting them to police stations, detention centres and court hearings. How far governments outsource this differs, although—with the exception of the UK—it is uncommon to privatise deportation. Most countries privatise parts of the process, such as the transport from a detention centre to an airfield or pre-deportation medical checks. Though government aeroplanes, mostly military, are sometimes used, in most cases people are deported on commercial or charter flights. In the EU, the border guard agency Frontex aims to play a growing coordinating role in joint deportations, for which large new contracts with aircraft providers are to be expected.

The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, and another large corporate player is Classic Air Charter in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines are also involved in deportations, some more than others. *Newsweek* reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).³² In June 2018 Virgin Airlines announced it would no longer accept forced deportations from the UK, canceling its contract with the Home Office.³³

Detention

Detention of migrants, mostly with the stated aim of deporting them, is another key dimension of migration policies, also with its associated industry players. Often detention is presented as an administrative measure (i.e. to hold migrants prior to deportation) rather than a criminal one, yet it ‘involves a coercive deprivation of a person’s most elementary liberties’, which is ‘presented as an utterly routine and mundane recourse of states “holding” (and eventually, disposing of) their ostensibly unwanted, undesirable, unwelcome foreigners’.³⁴

The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia.³⁵ Again, the degree to which governments outsource detention and detention-related services differs vastly.³⁶ In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. There are many variations in between—facilities with, for example, private guards under state management and/or with private services for catering, medical services, phone services and so on. In the Netherlands, the two most recently built detention centres, at Schiphol Airport and at Rotterdam–The Hague Airport, are run as public–private partnerships (PPPs), with a consortia of companies responsible for the construction and maintenance of the building under 25-year DBFMO (Design Build Finance Maintain Operate) contracts.³⁷ By contrast, Sweden is one of the very few countries that has reversed privatisation of migrant detention, as part of policy reforms in 1997 after widespread criticism of private companies involved in detention.³⁸

The Australian model is based on outsourcing refugee detention to camps outside Australia. Refugees arriving by boat were all transferred to the ‘offshore processing centres’ on Nauru and Papua New Guinea. At various times the Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards.

Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy. In at least ten non-EU countries the EU and/or member states have funded the construction of migrant detention centres. Italy has been a forerunner in this regard, having started to pay Libya and Tunisia to do this from around 2000. Spain did the same for Mauritania in 2006. Since then, the EU has funded or is funding new or modernised detention centres in several countries in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.³⁹

Advisory and audit services

Advisory, consultancy and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. Advisory services often take the form of lobbying, in which more government action to stop migration and the use of (new) technologies and services is heavily promoted.

The EU, for example, has based some of its migration-related policies on influential advisory reports by companies that later profit from the new policies and contracts. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents

despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol's study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and EU's Operation Sophia.⁴⁰ Since 2003 Civipol has participated in a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EUTF.⁴¹

Eurasylum is one of the few companies that works almost exclusively on migration. The other important players are major international consultancy firms, for which migration-related work is just one area in a much wider portfolio. Of the global 'Big Four', Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers seem to be the most involved.

Box 2. Escalating climate impacts and the militarisation of borders

The COVID-19 pandemic and government responses to it have had devastating consequences for refugees and migrants. Apart from direct effects, for example from living in overcrowded conditions in shelters, camps and detention centres, the crisis is being used as a pretext for a further crackdown against migrants, including new steps in the militarisation of borders.⁴² Like the pandemic, climate change is a global emergency that is likely to further accelerate border militarisation and surveillance.

The climate crisis contributes to migration and displacement because it causes more intense and more frequent natural events and processes, such as cyclones, drought and sea-level rise. As well as being a direct threat to lives, these impacts can affect the availability of water, food and can undermine livelihoods.

It is unlikely that climate change is the only reason why someone will be forced to move to seek safety. People displaced by the impacts of climate change are nearly always also displaced by other environmental, economic, political, and social factors. This makes it hard to estimate or predict numbers: 'Forecasts vary from 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050, moving either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent or temporary basis, with 200 million being the most widely cited estimate.'⁴³ Currently, most displacement is occurring within borders, but there will inevitably be increased movement across international borders as the climate crisis unfolds.⁴⁴

In addition to the climate crisis, states' and corporations' efforts to secure access to other natural resources and lands (required for extracting fossil fuels, minerals, even constructing renewable energy projects, biomass production etc.) can also fuel conflict and repression and could lead to further environmental and social problems, leading to more forced displacement and migration.⁴⁵

Political situations and economic conditions are deeply connected to the environment. Environmental disruption is shaped by the political and economic context and in turn has economic or political consequences.⁴⁶ The response of political institutions to migration is often the predominant factor that determines whether it becomes a humanitarian crisis. Thus, while environmental changes can create or exacerbate conflict, displacing more people, it is also true that migration has existed throughout human history and has enabled people to adapt to changing social and environmental circumstances. Indeed the climate crisis means that migration should be recognised as a critical form of climate adaptation.⁴⁷

The problem is the absence of the social, political and legal structures to support those forced to leave their homes, and indeed the predominant response exacerbates suffering and the denial of human rights. Most countries suffering the worst impacts of global heating lack the resources to support their population and yet may be perversely supported to monitor and repress internal migration.⁴⁸ While the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) signed in 2018 recognises climate-induced migration and has the potential to encourage governments to expand legal pathways to safety for climate migrants, it contains no binding international obligations. In addition, the GCM actively seeks to reduce irregular migration and is therefore likely to make it even harder for people to cross borders without authorisation in order to find safety. There was some progress when the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled in January 2020 that people from places where climate change poses an immediate threat to their lives could not be forced to return.⁴⁹ The overall global context for climate migrants though is deeply hostile.

In large part, this is because the influence of the border industry together with military interests has reinforced the perception that climate change is a national and international security issue.⁵⁰ As described by Hayes and Buxton in *The Secure and the Dispossessed: How the military and corporations are shaping a climate-changed world*, 'by portraying people as some kind of Hobbesian mass that will inevitably meet food shortages with violence, or as hordes of would-be migrants massing at our borders, we are giving succour to the security strategists and politics of fear that make people more willing to contemplate giving up their freedoms'.⁵¹

This framing of climate-induced migration serves to reinforce the construction of categories based on race or other ethnic markers as a threat, and justify the implementation of increasingly draconian migrant and refugee policies by Western governments. Walls, bullets, drones and cages are presented as essential to eliminating this 'threat'.⁵²

The automation of border policing and the expansion of digital identification systems will make the brutality of borders more efficient—faster, more accurate, to scale and less costly. Responsibility for this future will lie not just with those directly involved, but also those who finance their work.

Industry lobbying and influence




Illustration from TNI's report: Border Wars- The Arms Dealers profiting from Europe's refugee tragedy (2016)

When companies (or industry organisations) are involved in policy-making, often through successful lobbying and a welcoming attitude by the concerned authorities (for example, inviting industry representatives onto official advisory committees), this can lead to economic interests dominating the discourse at the expense of other factors, such as human rights.

Industrial lobbying in this domain is characterised by a push for the security narrative in dealing with migration, as described above, and/or for policies and measures, and bigger budgets. Companies and their lobbying organisations position themselves as experts on the issues involved, often taking a technical approach to present their goods and services as the necessary solutions to (perceived) problems and threats.

Although the ways of lobbying may differ across the geographical markets this report examines—campaign donations are, for example, especially important in the US—much of this revolves around contacts and the willingness of policy-makers to work together with companies, industry organisations and their lobbyists. So, industry organisations and representatives are invited to official advisory committees, meet policy-makers and politicians, organise conferences and roundtables, take part in military and security fairs, present influential advisory papers and so on.

Our earlier research in the *Border Wars* series has pointed to considerable corporate influence in the development of policies regarding such issues as border militarisation, the use of biometrics for border control and the rise of smart borders, the introduction of autonomous systems for border security and control, and the privatisation of migrant detention. This has mostly resulted in policies and concrete measures that are profitable for companies, with growing budgets, expanding markets and more demand for their goods and services, while creating more risks for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and endangering respect for their human rights.

Table 1. Lobbying on the border industry

Important lobbying groups for the border industrial complex in Australia, Europe and USA	
Name	Region
Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe	Europe
Association of Private Correctional & Treatment Organisations	USA
Australian Industry & Defence Network	Australia
Australian Security Industry Association	Australia
British Security Industry Association	UK
Defence Industry Security Association	UK
Defence Teaming Centre	Australia
European Association for Biometrics	Europe
European Organisation for Security	Europe
National Defense Industrial Association	USA
Secure Identity Alliance	Global
Security Industry Association	USA

GLOBAL BORDER INDUSTRY

Table 2 lists the main corporates involved in the global border and migration industry, as identified in this and in previous reports in our *Border Wars* series, most of which focused on the border security sector and on contracts in Europe (including externalisation efforts in Africa and the Middle East) and the US.

Key companies in the border industrial complex identified in Border Wars reports				
Name	Country	Publicly listed?	Sector	Key countries/regions provided
Accenture	Ireland	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• EU • Japan • USA
Airbus53	Trans-European	yes	• border security	• Africa • Australia • Europe • Middle East
Atos	France	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• Europe
Boeing	USA	yes	• border security	• USA
Booz Allen Hamilton	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• USA
Civipol54	France	no	• biometrics & smart borders • audit and consultancy	• Africa • Europe
Classic Air Charter	USA	no	• deportations	• USA
Cobham	UK	no	• border security	• Australia
CoreCivic	USA	yes	• migrant detention	• USA
Damen	Netherlands	no	• border security	• Africa • Europe • Middle East
DAT-CON	Slovenia	no	• border security	• Europe
Defendec	Estonia	no	• border security	• Europe
Deloitte	UK	no	• audit & consultancy	• Australia • Europe • USA
Elbit	Israel	yes	• border security	• Europe • Israel • USA
Embraer	Brazil	yes	• border security	• Latin America
Eurasylum	UK	no	• audit & consultancy	• Africa • Europe • Middle East
Fincantieri	Italy	yes	• border security	• Europe

FLIR Systems	USA	yes	• border security	• Europe • USA
G4S	UK	yes	• deportations • migrant detention	• Australia • Europe • USA
General Atomics	USA	no	• border security	• USA
General Dynamics ⁵⁵	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders • border security • migrant detention	• USA
GEO Group	USA	yes	• migrant detention	• UK • USA
GMV	Spain	no	• biometrics & smart borders • border security	• Europe
Hensoldt ⁵⁶	Germany	yes	• border security	• Africa • Europe • Middle East
IBM	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• Australia • Europe • USA
IDEMIA ⁵⁷	France	no	• biometrics & smart borders	• Africa • Australia • Europe
Indra	Spain	yes	• biometrics & smart borders • border security	• Europe
Intermarine	Italy	no	• border security	• Africa • Europe
Israeli Aerospace Industries	Israel	no	• border security	• Europe • Israel • USA
L3 Technologies	USA	yes	• border security	• USA
Leidos	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• USA
Leonardo ⁵⁸	Italy	yes	• biometrics & smart borders • border security	• Africa • Europe
Lockheed Martin	USA	yes	• border security	• Australia • Europe • USA
Mitie	UK	yes	• deportations • migrant detention	• UK
PAE	USA	no	• border security	• USA
Palantir Technologies	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• UK • USA
PricewaterhouseCoopers	UK	no	• audit & consultancy	• Australia • Europe • India • US
Raytheon	USA	yes	• border security	• Europe • Middle East • USA
Rheinmetall	Germany	yes	• border security	• Africa • Europe • Middle East
Saab	Sweden	yes	• border security	• Europe
Serco	UK	yes	• migrant detention	• Australia • UK
Sopra Steria	France	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• Europe
Thales	France	yes	• biometrics & smart borders • border security	• Africa • Australia • Europe • Middle East
Thomson Reuters	Canada	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• USA
Unisys	USA	yes	• biometrics & smart borders	• Australia • Europe • USA

FINANCING THE BORDER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX



A US Customs Border Patrol mobile surveillance vehicle stationed at the border near Lukeville Arizona and Sonoyta, Sonora. (Laura Saunders)

This section looks at how the border industrial complex is financed, focusing on shares in the profiled companies. As noted by Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Johanne Rübner Hansen and Oliver Joel Halpern at Aalborg University (Denmark), ‘The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, the operations and strategic visions of many of the PMSCs [private military and security companies] involved in EU border control would not be possible without the involvement of these financial actors, providing both public and private equity’.⁵⁹ Their research is focused on the EU, but the same is true elsewhere.

Although the focus here is on company ownership, raising funds by issuing shares (equity) is only one part of corporate finance. The profiled companies also obtain bank loans and credit facilities, as well as selling corporate bonds (IOUs that are bought by investors such as pension funds and asset-management firms). Governments and development banks provide additional support in the form of grants, export credit or concessional (below market rate) loans. These means of financing are all the subject of public campaigns, either to encourage divestment (see below) or to encourage financiers and regulators to adopt investment rules—such as exclusion lists or Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria—that prevent or reduce lending to the leading corporates in the border industrial complex.

Asset-manager capitalism

Table 3 shows the investment companies that are among the largest shareholders in three or more of the 17 publicly listed companies profiled in this report. For an overview of the ten largest shareholders for each of these companies, see Annex 1.

As might be expected, the world's largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in companies involved in the border industrial complex. The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group, which manages private prisons. Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

Table 3: Investment companies with shares in companies involved in border industries

Investment companies among the ten largest shareholders in >2 companies profiled (% of total shares of company) ⁶⁰																	
Company	Accenture	Airbus	Booz Allen	CoreCivic	Elbit	G4S	GEO Group	IBM	Leonardo	Lockheed Martin	Mitie	Palantir	Serco	Sopra Steria	Thales	Thomson Reuters	Unisys
Investor																	
BlackRock ⁶¹	2.43		2.82	2.79			3.28	5.62	1.63	2.13		1.42	5.33		1.27		2.75
Capital Group ⁶²	1.97	9.09		2.72						8.98							
Geode Capital Management	1.50							1.47		1.46							
Fidelity ⁶³	1.55				2.36						3.00			3.35	0.93	1.68	12.8
Harris Associates						6.85					3.02					1.58	
Morgan Stanley	1.36					3.60		0.00									
Norges Bank Investment Management								1.01	1.24		2.82			2.41			
Northern Trust Investments	1.51							1.23			5.19						
SSgA Funds Management	4.21		2.54	3.30			3.13	5.95		15.1							3.25
T. Rowe Price ⁶⁴			9.64						1.33						2.78		
The Vanguard Group	8.35	2.07	9.69	15.8	1.38	2.63	15.4	7.87	1.97	7.45	1.99		2.98	1.94	1.37		12.6

It is important to understand how and why these investments are made, in order to devise strategies to counter them (see divestment section, below). In the case of publicly traded companies—that is, those whose ownership is made up of shares that are traded on stock markets—the most relevant consideration is whether they favour an 'active' or 'passive' investment strategy. As the term implies, active investors select the companies in which they wish to invest. These decisions are mainly based on profit motives, although some use ethical criteria. Passive investors buy a diverse range of shares in accordance with the relative weight of particular companies or categories of company on share indexes (e.g. the S&P500 or FTSE100, which track the largest companies by market value on the Wall Street and London stock exchanges).

The recent growth of passive investment is a key feature of what Benjamin Braun of the Max Planck Institute calls 'asset manager capitalism' to describe a fundamental shift in corporate ownership towards just a handful of big investors that own stakes in multiple companies.⁶⁵ The Big Three asset-management firms—Blackrock, the Vanguard Group and State Street Global Advisors—all

made their names and grew to dominance by adopting the passive approach.⁶⁶ As of 2020, these three firms collectively manage around US\$16 tn, are the largest shareholder in 40% of all publicly listed companies in the US, and control over 20% of the shares of the S&P500.⁶⁷ As Table 4 shows, they are also major investors in the companies profiled in this report. Shifting the investment portfolios of the Big Three alone would make a significant dent in the border industrial complex but, as shown in the divestment section below, challenging a passive investment strategy requires more than simply pressuring asset managers to behave more ethically.

While passive investment accounts for the largest holdings in most of the companies featured in this report, there are exceptions. For example, two of the 17 profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.⁶⁸ Private equity firms such as Advent are under-regulated and have shown little interest in adopting ethical criteria in their investments. There are initiatives to encourage these firms to conduct ‘human rights due diligence’ before making purchases, but unless these are made mandatory they are unlikely to influence the practices of the companies concerned.⁶⁹

Who owns the border industrial complex?

Asset-management firms do not own the assets that they invest, so when companies like Blackrock and Vanguard are identified as the largest shareholders it is worth asking whose money they are actually using to bankroll the border industrial complex. As with most share ownership, the answer is that most of the money is actually ours—with asset managers placing investments on behalf of pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments, as well as directly investing individuals’ savings through brands like Blackrock’s iShares. In the UK, for example, Blackrock manages £16.5bn of local government pensions, and almost £4bn of Transport for London’s pension fund.⁷⁰ Blackrock is also a key player in the Federal Reserve’s massive 2020 bailout of US corporations, since it runs the multi-billion-dollar programme to buy up debt from large companies affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷¹

State ownership

The three large European arms companies, active in the border security market, are principally owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered. Partial government ownership sets up a network of interests that can drive the expansion of the border industrial complex. According to Lemberg-Pedersen, Rübner Hansen and Halpern, retaining significant ownership stakes in arms producers ‘represents a strategic choice on the part of states. It allows states to pursue national political and economic interests through the companies, and conversely, to pursue company interests through state policies’.⁷² Arms exports can be seen as a part of foreign policy and international relations. Who gets arms produced in our countries, or with whom do we want to cooperate in producing arms? What do we get out of this (money, influence, support to specific countries in regions with conflict and so on) and what do we (want to) get in return?

Table 4. State ownership of companies in border security (in top 10 shareholders) (% of total shares of company)⁷³

	Airbus	Leonardo	Thales
France	10.9		25.7
Germany	10.9 ⁷⁴		
Italy		30.2	
Spain	4.12		

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. These rights are embodied in international human rights law (IHRL) and principles, though certain rights may be restricted to nationals (e.g. voting rights), and in specific agreements concerning migration.

The International Bill of Human Rights comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols.⁷⁵ Children's specific rights are covered by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. These legally binding treaties and conventions include universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination. The UDHR states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state', that 'everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country' (article 13), and that 'everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution' (article 14).

For refugees and migrants some other instruments, such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention Against Torture, add specific rights (in particular the principle of non-refoulement⁷⁶), as do some regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Cartagena, San José, Mexico and Brazil Declarations on Refugees (Latin America). Only countries that have ratified these are bound by them.

Human rights agreements such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (which refers to the Refugee Convention (Article 18) and reiterates the non-refoulement principle (Article 19)), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the American Convention on Human Rights (not ratified by the US), also play a role at the regional level and countries that have ratified them are obliged to respect them. Australia has no specific Bill of Rights, but some human rights are protected under the Constitution and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 gives effect to Australia's obligations under international human right treaties.

Migration policies: system crimes and necro-politics

Migration is often painted as a security problem, with refugees and migrants perceived as threats and many aspects of border and migration policies aimed at keeping or getting them out. This jeopardises the protection of their human rights. Many states pay lip service to their adherence to human rights law and principles, but ignore them in practice. Moreover, on the waves of right-wing populism it is not uncommon to see proposals to deny or remove the human rights of migrants and refugees, including countries cancelling their participation in treaties such as the Refugee Convention or severely reforming them to limit protection and rights.⁷⁷

Migrants are often in extremely vulnerable situations, dependent on financial support, and public authorities frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights as the freedom from cruel or inhumane

treatment. Often there are no legal means to counter this, since instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951 are unenforceable in the sense that there are no courts that hear complaints from individuals concerning breaches of such rights. For other instruments, including the ECHR, this is possible and courts have upheld rights of refugees and migrants, though outcomes are mixed.

Some groups of refugees, such as women, children and people in the LGBTQ+ community, face particularly high risks of specific human rights abuses, including gender-based violence, sexual assault, discrimination and exploitation.⁷⁸

The following paragraphs present an overview of human rights risks related to the five sectors of the border industry investigated in this report and to specific developments, such as border externalisation and the rise of autonomous systems for border security. However, it is the entire system of treatment of refugees and migrants and the migration policies that add up to the denial of and infringement of universal human rights. This goes beyond the human rights violations connected to these five sectors and also encompasses such practices as letting refugees die rather than rescuing them, refusing shelter or providing substandard shelter in inhumane circumstances, exploitation of migrant workers, limiting access to health care, education, work and legal assistance, criminalisation of undocumented people, racial profiling and inciting racism. In general, Australia, the EU and its member states and the US all have wide-ranging policies aimed at deterring migrants and refugees and making their lives as difficult as possible. In 2012, the former UK Prime Minister Theresa May, in her previous capacity as Home Secretary, coined the term ‘creating a hostile environment’ for such policies.⁷⁹

Since 2017 the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), an opinion tribunal established in 1979 as a direct continuation of the Russell Tribunals ‘to give recognition, visibility and a voice to the peoples suffering violations of their fundamental rights’,⁸⁰ has organised a series of sessions on many aspects of EU migration policies. Their scathing conclusions are mostly equally applicable to the policies of the US and Australia, which are built on the same policy of treating migration as a security problem and threat and many of the same practices regarding refugees and migrants.



Migrant rights activists at the 45th Permanent Peoples Tribunal on Migration in Barcelona in 2017

In a round-up session in Brussels (April 2019) the PPT concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. As for the nature of these crimes, the PPT established that ‘even though they may not be personally ascribable to individual perpetrators according to commonly agreed criminal law definitions they must be recognised as “system crimes”’.⁸¹ Earlier the PPT had qualified EU policies as ‘necropolitics’, based on letting people die, ‘denying the elementary duty of protection to those in distress, abandoning the survivors in subhuman conditions’.⁸² And in a follow-up session in Berlin (October 2020) the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was condemned as a document that ‘confirms the policies and practices of the EU and its Member States in the area of asylum and immigration which, put together, are a total denial of the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers’, despite paying lip service to the principle of non-refoulement and fundamental rights.⁸³

Similarly, coalitions of human rights and migrant organisations denounced the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018). The Maghreb Social Forum called it ‘a minimum consensus between rich and poor states, which guarantees to the first ones freedom to keep on going with the militarization of their borders’, which ‘could even legitimize and justify some regressions in terms of rights of migrants instead of contributing to a governance respectful of the human rights of migrants’.⁸⁴ Another coalition, led by La Via Campesina, considered it ‘a step backwards regarding human rights’, that ‘proposes to discipline and organize migration to serve the interests of States and their true owners, transnational corporations and financial capital’.⁸⁵ The PPT also repeatedly pointed to the criminalisation of solidarity with refugees and hindering of search and rescue efforts by non-government organisations (NGOs), as well as to the lack of accountability and impunity that accompany all these grave human rights violations, making it almost impossible for refugees and migrants to exercise and insist that duty bearers protect their rights.

Border security and human rights

Increased border security has many consequences and risks in terms of human rights. These range from direct violence against refugees to stop them from crossing a border to denying people the right to seek asylum, to jailing and possibly deporting them (see the sections on deportations and detention), to pushbacks, with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of *non-refoulement*).

There have been reports of border authorities firing (warning) shots at, and sometimes hitting, refugee boats and at migrants crossing borders in Australia, Europe and the US.⁸⁶ There are numerous other stories of violent behaviour, including European border guards using pepper spray, nightsticks and dogs against migrants, Australia’s pushbacks of refugee boats to Indonesia, and the US Border Patrol kicking, hitting and even killing migrants at the US–Mexican border, abusing those held in short-term custody (including physical abuse and denying of water and food).⁸⁷

Human rights are also endangered by countries closing off certain migration routes, forcing them to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.⁸⁸ This has resulted in more—avoidable—deaths, signalling that such policies endanger migrants’ right to life.

Human rights and border externalisation

Externalisation of migration policies is another concern. It 'has a dire effect on access to support and complicates the delivery of humanitarian services', as the Red Cross notes.⁸⁹ More broadly, as our 2018 report *Expanding the Fortress: The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU's border externalisation programme* showed, externalisation sometimes leads to strengthening dictatorships and repression. The EU and its member states donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, expanding and strengthening their capacities. It also undermines political and economic stability, for example by ruining migration-based local economies, as well as diverting and abusing development cooperation funds.⁹⁰ Nowhere are the consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) continue funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias that create a hell for refugees and migrants, with violence at borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.⁹¹

In another case, tied to an Airbus border security deal with Saudi Arabia, dozens of German police officers, paid by the bilateral development agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)), were deployed to train Saudi border officials, including weapons training.⁹² Saudi Arabia is one of the world's most repressive regimes and its border guards are directly responsible for human rights violations. In April 2020, for example, they killed dozens of Ethiopian migrants, firing at them when they were driven to the border by Houthi forces in Yemen.⁹³ The Airbus project is continuing despite a German arms export ban on Saudi Arabia in the wake of the killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Airbus fiercely protested the ban saying it would affect its border contract work, even threatening to sue the government.⁹⁴

Autonomous systems and human rights

A number of autonomous systems for border security have been introduced in recent years. After testing drones for border patrol in the Mediterranean in 2016, in October 2020 Frontex awarded €50 million in contracts for drone surveillance services to Airbus, Elbit and Israeli Aerospace Industries. Likewise, many European countries, as well as Australia and the US, have increased the use of drones for border security.⁹⁵ As part of a security system on the border with Syria, constructed by national military company Aselsan, Turkey started the use of so-called 'smart' military towers with observation and obstruction systems.⁹⁶ Press reports that they were equipped with automatic weapons systems were denied by the Turkish authorities and seem unlikely to be true.⁹⁷

That is not to say that autonomous weapons at borders are a complete fantasy. In a promotional mail to Frontex, the Bulgarian state-owned company Prono suggested the use of a 'system for amplification of state border protection', 'recording and reporting attempts for illegal penetration across the state border'. Its offer included 'manageable or automatic non-lethal impact and manageable lethal influence on offenders without requiring constant monitoring by qualified personnel'. The proposal, which Frontex did not take up, also said that 'if requested ammo with non-lethal effects could be replaced by ammunition with lethal effects'.⁹⁸

PAX has been warning and campaigning against the rise of weaponised systems ('killer robots'), including their possible use for 'border enforcement', because of their ability 'to select and attack individual targets without meaningful human control'.⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch also calls for a ban, concluding that there 'are serious doubts that fully autonomous weapons would be capable of meeting international humanitarian law standards, including the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, while they would threaten the fundamental right to life and principle of human dignity'.¹⁰⁰

The use of unarmed autonomous systems also can have serious human rights consequences. For example, the use of new surveillance technologies, including drones, at the US-Mexico border led to an increase in deaths, mainly by pushing migrants to take more dangerous routes.¹⁰¹

The development of autonomous systems and applications is also a prominent subject of state-funded Research and Technological Development (RDT), which in turn gives a view into (industry-influenced) political thinking about future deployment. The EU, for example, has funded several research projects under its seven-year Framework Programmes. These include TALOS, aimed at developing an 'mobile, [...] autonomous and adaptive system for protecting European borders', with unmanned ground platforms as both watching stations and first-reaction patrols to 'stop the illegal action almost autonomously with supervision of border guard officers'. ROBORDER, another project, sought to develop 'a fully-functional autonomous border surveillance system with unmanned mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles', also capable of use in swarms.¹⁰²

Data and human rights

Much of the personal information on refugees and migrants is filed in large database systems. Too much, unsorted, information can also lead to problems, because users run the risk of being unable to see the wood for the trees or having access to only part of the available information. Hence, many governments are now seeking to connect databases and making them inter-operable.

In May 2019, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe adopted regulations to enable inter-operability between various information systems, including its migration databases (Eurodac, SIS II, VIS and others), to 'improve security, allow for more efficient checks at external borders and contribute to prevent and combat illegal migration'. This would lead to a European search portal and a shared biometric matching service, which would allow the EU and member states simultaneously to search multiple databases and cross-check identities with biometric data.¹⁰³ The cost of connecting the databases is estimated to be at least €425 million over nine years, of which €225 million would go to eu-LISA and €136 million to member states for updating systems and training.¹⁰⁴ Tony Bunyan from Statewatch questioned the EU's reasoning: 'The Commission's proposal for interoperable centralised EU databases is justified on the threat posed to internal security by migration and terrorism. This conflation of threats based on fear of the 'other' is a classic case of state racism'.¹⁰⁵

As well as collecting their own data, some governments also buy information from companies. In the US, for example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has contracted Thomson Reuters (see profile below) and RELX (formerly Reed Elsevier) to supply data to track and arrest migrants.¹⁰⁶

The use of these new technologies gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination, and misuse of collected information.¹⁰⁷ Migrants wishing to enter a country, be it on a visa or to seek asylum, have to yield an increasing amount of personal data, including biometric information. This is often supplemented, or in the case of 'irregular' migrants or tracking of migrants via third countries, replaced with information gathered in other ways, such as social media surveillance, extracting information from smartphones and/or buying data from commercial intelligence services.¹⁰⁸

One controversial example is the test of the Vehicle Face system on parts of the US–Mexico border. This consists of cameras, developed by the Oak Ridge National Labs in Tennessee, recording images of people in vehicles crossing the border with the aim of creating a facial-recognition system to check collected images against those already stored with authorities.¹⁰⁹ Malkia Cyril, executive director of the Center for Media Justice, called this 'an example of the growing trend of authoritarian use of technology to track and stalk immigrant communities' and 'absolutely a violation of our democratic rights'.

This is in itself an invasion of privacy, but might also lead to discriminatory practices, threatening for example the right to asylum. This is especially the case when human decision-making has made way for the use of (AI-based) automated processes. Some applications run the risk of being used in a way that makes selections based on for example the colour of a person's skin ('ethnic profiling') or the person's assumed religious faith, as in the infamous US 'Muslim travel ban'.

The Brennan Center for Justice observes that 'algorithms are generally incapable of making the types of subjective evaluations that are required in many DHS immigration programs, such as whether someone poses a threat to public safety or national security or whether certain information is "derogatory." Moreover, because these types of threats are difficult to define and measure, makers of algorithms will turn to "proxies" that are more easily observed. But there is a risk that the proxies will bear little or no relationship to the task and ... instead reflect stereotypes and assumptions'.¹¹⁰ Petra Molnar, a lawyer at the University of Toronto, raises 'the growing role of the private sector in the collection, use and storage of these data' as a human rights concern, asking what they will do with the personal data they gather or to which they have access. This is especially problematic when a company is contracted for 'aid work' as well as for border security and control work.¹¹¹ Molnar and Diego Naranjo at European Digital Rights also warn that 'refugees are often left out of conversations around technological development, and like other marginalized communities, they often become guinea pigs on which to test new surveillance tools before bringing them to the wider population'.¹¹² The discrimination embedded in these systems can be seen in the US in the contrast between the CBP Global Entry programme, which 'allows expedited clearance [...] through automatic kiosks at select airports' for regular and rich travellers¹¹³ and the so-called 'Muslim travel ban', by which certain groups of people from a list of currently 13 countries (in the somewhat watered down version approved by the Supreme Court under former President Trump) were categorically denied access to the US, until current President Biden repealed this in January 2021.¹¹⁴ This also had its effect on the Global Entry programme, which revoked the memberships of people from the countries on the travel ban list along with hundreds of other persons with a (supposed) Muslim, Arab, or South Asian background.¹¹⁵

Finally, an additional problem is that data collection and storage is prone to hacking, as the case of American company Perceptics shows. Perceptics sold license-plate readers to CBP, before the contract was cancelled when the company—without permission—used the obtained images to try to develop a system to match license plates with the faces of a car’s occupants. The hack resulted in photos of faces and license plates of some 100,000 drivers being released on the dark web. Correspondence from Perceptics, which also was obtained through the hack, showed a general neglect of security and privacy issues. Nate Freed Wessler of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) placed this in the broader context of a government position based on a ‘blanket assertion that there are no privacy concerns at the border and that they have latitude to do whatever they want there’.¹¹⁶

Deportations and human rights

Both deportation itself and the circumstances under which deportations take place threaten human rights. Reacting to the former Trump administration’s surge in arrests, detention and deportation of migrants, Human Rights Watch concluded that ‘many of these deportations threaten a range of fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum from persecution, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’.¹¹⁷ Moreover, deportations may be returning refugees to unsafe countries where they face violence, persecution, discrimination, poverty and so on. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Insufficiently trained staff and a lack of transparency and accountability, all of which are more common when the process is privatised, can be contributing factors.

Detention and human rights

The human rights of migrants are at risk, both in being detained as well as by the circumstances and treatment in detention facilities. According to UNCHR, ‘detention, for immigration-related purposes, of asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless persons should normally be avoided. It should always be a measure of last resort, with liberty being the default position’. While many governments indeed say it is a ‘measure of last resort’, how this is defined is increasingly stretched. UNHCR lists as risks:

- ‘Detention increases the vulnerability of persons of concern. They are at greater risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and face increased risks to their health and wellbeing and to their psychological or mental state.
- Detention, even for short periods, especially affects persons who are vulnerable, in particular children (whether unaccompanied or with their families).
- Detention can restrict access to asylum and other protection procedures and may make it more difficult for UNHCR to access persons of concern.
- Detention increases the risk of refoulement.
- Restrictions on freedom of movement, even if they do not amount to detention, may subject persons of concern to additional risks, including by preventing them from seeking safety away from active hostilities during armed conflict and in other situations of violence’.¹¹⁸

UNHCR also states that, based on the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 'children should not be detained for immigration related purposes, irrespective of their legal/migratory status or that of their parents'.¹¹⁹ Children are, however, commonly detained in many countries, sometimes as part of a family or together with a parent, but most horrifically under the former Trump administration, separated from their family where children as young as two and three years old were locked up for weeks or months without access to legal support, sleeping on the concrete floor of overcrowded cells.¹²⁰ The treatment of detained migrants is another concern. There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding, poor and unhealthy conditions and so on. In Australia, the Human Rights Commission rang the alarm bell in June 2019 about the use of force in detention centres after investigating 14 complaints.¹²¹ Yet the Border Force spokesperson defended the violence, saying it did 'not agree that the use of force examined in the incidents was disproportionate or inconsistent with or contrary to the complainant's human rights'.¹²²

Studies in Turkey have shown that 'the risk of arrest and length of detention appear to be a consideration for people in selecting a route'.¹²³ This fits into the general pattern that follows from migration policies, not in the least its externalisation: by obstructing certain migration routes refugees are pushed to look for other, often more dangerous, routes.¹²⁴

Many of the problems associated with private migrant detention centres are similar to other parts of the prison system, where privatisation and racialised repressive policies (such as the US War on Drugs) have created a 'prison industrial complex'. This is described as 'a self-perpetuating machine where the vast profits [...] and perceived political benefits [...] lead to policies that are additionally designed to ensure an endless supply of "clients" for the criminal justice system'.¹²⁵ In turn, companies profit from incarcerating people by building and running prisons, cheap prison labour and so on. In relation to migrant detention, this means that companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs, which in turn drives policies and practices that contribute to this with consequences such as understaffing, insufficiently trained staff, inadequate support and poor housing conditions.

BORDER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The 23 corporations identified in this report as major actors in Border Industry Complex have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants.

Obviously, no company would proudly state it cares nothing about human rights. Rather, all the companies have made statements about their respect for and commitment to human rights and sustainability. For some, this just is an aside on their website, while others have elaborated policies and regulations. Such policies and marketing cannot hide the (large) gaps between their espoused commitments and their actual activities. Of course, governments are also guilty of a gulf between rhetoric and reality. In 2013 the then UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, warned that while ‘welcoming the inclusion of migrants’ rights in the policy framework’ of the EU in regard to migration, he remained ‘concerned that the protection of the human rights of migrants, and in particular irregular migrants, is often not implemented on the ground’.¹²⁶

Many company policies include an adherence to international human rights standards and instruments. The two best known of these are the UN Global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), both voluntary codes of practice.

The Global Compact comprises ten principles, of which the first two read: ‘Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights’ and ‘make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses’. The other eight principles are about labour rights, the environment and corruption.¹²⁷ The UNGPs provide ‘further conceptual and operational clarity for the two human rights principles championed by the Global Compact’ and ‘an authoritative framework for participants on the policies and processes they should implement in order to ensure that they meet their responsibility to respect human rights’.¹²⁸

The Guiding Principles provide a list of foundational and operational principles. The former basically repeat the two principles of the Global Compact, that ‘internationally recognized human rights’ should be ‘understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’.¹²⁹ The operational principles stipulate that ‘business enterprises should express their commitment to meet this responsibility [to respect human rights] through a statement of policy’, which is ‘approved at the most senior level of the business enterprise’ and is publicly available.

Other operational principles include that ‘business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence’, which ‘should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships’, that business enterprises should have ‘meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders’, that ‘business enterprises whose operations or operating contexts pose risks of severe human rights impacts should report formally on how they address them’ and that ‘where business enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes’.¹³⁰

Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs are not mentioned in the principles that concern companies, but it is stated that states should address legal barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy (judicial mechanisms) 'where certain groups, such as indigenous peoples and migrants, are excluded from the same level of legal protection of their human rights that applies to the wider population'.¹³¹

Table 5 gives an overview of public commitments to the UNGPs and signatories to the Global Compact among the companies profiled in this report. (See the company profiles for more information about their policies and practices regarding human rights.)

Table 5 Companies' adherence to international human rights instruments

Adherence to major international human rights instruments		
Company	UN Global Compact (date of joining) ¹³²	UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (expressed support)
Accenture	17 January 2008	+ ¹³³
Airbus	17 June 2003	-
Booz Allen Hamilton	-	+ ¹³⁴
Classic Air Charter	-	-
Cobham	-	-
CoreCivic	-	+ ¹³⁵
Deloitte	26 July 2000	+ ¹³⁶
Elbit	-	-
Eurasylum	- ¹³⁷	-
G4S	16 February 2011	+ ¹³⁸
GEO Group	-	+ ¹³⁹
IBM	-	+ ¹⁴⁰
Idemia	29 October 2006 ¹⁴¹	-
Leonardo	4 September 2018	+ ¹⁴²
Lockheed Martin	-	-
Mitie	-	+ ¹⁴³
Palantir	-	-
PricewaterhouseCoopers	24 June 2002	+ ¹⁴⁴
Serco	-	+ ¹⁴⁵
Sopra Steria	11 May 2004	-
Thales	3 June 2003	-
Thomson Reuters	12 April 2016	-
Unisys	-	-

For some companies, there is a more direct relation with human rights violations, for example because they work directly with migrants, such as private prison contractors, while others provide tools that authorities can use for human rights violations.

Going beyond direct responsibility for human rights violations, Daria Davitti, Assistant Professor in Law at the University of Nottingham in the UK, in an article on the involvement of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in shaping and implementing the European Agenda on Migration, argues that 'by framing refugees and migrants as a "security threat", influencing EU policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration, and then providing the security services ideally placed to address such a prioritized threat, PMSCs might have done the opposite of what is recommended in the UNGPs. Rather than acting to prevent their involvement in gross abuses and treating such risk as a legal compliance issue, they may have actively engaged in increasing the risk of their occurrence, making it more likely in the fragile and complex context of EU migration control'.¹⁴⁶

Companies differ in the scope of how they frame their human rights responsibilities and efforts. While some narrow it down to direct rights, mostly in terms of labour rights, others also refer to the human rights consequences of their work. Some consider only their internal processes, while others also have rules or guidelines for their suppliers, in line with the UNGPs.

Outsourcing, lobbying and human rights

Corporate involvement in migration policies takes different forms—which also affects how they are implicated in human rights issues. In some cases, companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns (and these are noted in company profiles). Others may be responsible for supplying the equipment used, the infrastructure, or resourcing border militarisation which denies human rights.

Given the increasing outsourcing of public tasks to the private sector, this both expands corporate involvement in human rights abuses and reduces the transparency and accountability of border work as the state relinquishes its role. This has led to many complaints as companies try to meet constant demand (for example, to detain more people) while trying—as all corporations do—to cut costs and maximise profits, leading to poor work, understaffing, use of defective equipment, inadequate facilities and so on (especially in working with vulnerable people, such as detained migrants).

States may even force companies to be involved in border security and control work, as in the example of demanding that airline companies screen passengers as a form of outsourced immigration control. Refusing to allow (irregular) migrants on flights or immediately taking them back on return flights, even when they apply for asylum, leads to jeopardising the right to seek asylum and breaching non-refoulement principles.¹⁴⁷

Companies are also indirectly responsible for human rights abuses because of how they (or industry organisations) are involved in policy-making, often through successful lobbying or being invited by welcoming policy-makers, which could lead to economic interests guiding policy at the expense of other factors, such as human rights.

States are often reluctant to impose human rights regulations on companies, especially in relation to those committed in other countries, and there is no legally binding extra-territorial instrument. While negotiations about binding rules, such as the proposed UN Binding Treaty for Transnational Corporations on Human Rights, are inching forward, self-regulation is often presented as a solution. This has resulted in voluntary codes and non-binding instruments, such as the UN Global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights described above. Voluntary or self-regulation is, however, highly problematic, and has failed to stop corporate human rights violations and sustained corporate impunity.¹⁴⁸

In a discussion paper on 'Human Rights and Technology', the Australian Human Rights Commission emphasises the rule of law, but is also optimistic that 'good co- and self-regulation—through professional codes, design guidelines and impact assessments—can promote sound, human rights compliant development and use of new technologies'.¹⁴⁹ By contrast, in 2016, Alfred de Zayas, the UN Independent Expert for the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, put it clearly in a discussion on transnational corporations (TNCs) and human rights: 'Self-regulation does not work. We need binding regulations. Now'.¹⁵⁰

Research has pointed to many flaws in voluntary self-regulation regimes regarding human rights in relation to TNCs' extraterritorial activities, including vague terminology, no clear indicators to deal with activities in conflict zones and repressive regimes, and lack of effective compliance mechanisms, monitoring and reporting standards.¹⁵¹ As a result, voluntary codes have little to no influence on business operations and in no way guarantee respect for human rights. Nonetheless, TNCs tout their adherence to such voluntary codes to give the image of being a responsible business, while at the same time emphasising that such codes make mandatory regulations and legally binding instruments unnecessary and using them to silence public criticism.¹⁵² Thus, as activists pushing for the UN Binding Treaty treaty have stated, a legally binding instrument is necessary to 'end corporate impunity, and address the systemic power of transnational corporations which has reached unprecedented impacts on the daily lives of affected communities', such as refugees and migrants.¹⁵³

PROFILED COMPANIES

This section profiles 23 companies active in border security and monitoring, data collection and smart borders, consultancy, detention and deportation. These companies are the largest profiteers in Australia, Europe and the USA and/or are involved in controversial work. Together they present a good insight into these markets overall and the many associated problems, including human rights violations.



Border Security Expo, San Antonio, Texas (Todd Miller)

Accenture is an Ireland-based multinational professional services company, which is involved in many border-management projects worldwide, often based on the use of biometrics.

Accenture used the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015 to promote its biometric identification systems as a means to register refugees swiftly. In one promotional brochure, Accenture argues that 'when a young boy's body washed up on a Turkish shore, the subject of refugees became less about numbers, or a political issue, and more of a humanitarian crisis', but also reproduces the narrative of refugees as a threat to security, writing that '[t]here are terrorists who choose to pose as refugees'. In both cases, Accenture used the crisis to justify its business.¹⁵⁸ In the meantime, Accenture employees had started petitioning the company to cancel the 'unethical and immoral' contract in light of the US government's policy to separate migrant families: 'The technology we provide is sold in the name of efficiency, but all we see is technology supercharging inhumane and cruel policies. [...] We joined Accenture because we want to work for a company that does good in the world, a company that helps vulnerable immigrants, not facilitates putting them into cages'.¹⁵⁹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$43.2 billion¹⁵⁴

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

509,000¹⁵⁵

HEADQUARTERS:

Dublin (Ireland)

CEO:

Julie Sweet

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)
(15 DECEMBER 2020):The Vanguard Group (8.35%)¹⁵⁶KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES BORDER
CONTROL SERVICES:France, Japan, Netherlands
and the US and maintains EU
biometric databases.¹⁵⁷

SECTOR:

Border security, including helicopters, drones and border security systems

Airbus is a pan-European company, a result of several mergers, but is headquartered in the Dutch city Leiden, mainly for tax reasons.¹⁶⁴

Most of its production takes place in Germany, France and Spain, states which also are shareholders. Airbus is the contractor for one of the largest border security projects worldwide: the construction of a €2 billion border surveillance system along the borders of Saudi Arabia, a country with one of the most repressive regimes in the world. In March 2017, Airbus sold its border security and electronics division to the US private equity firm KKR & Co for about €1.1 billion. While Airbus initially maintained a minority share, the new company, rebranded as Hensoldt, bought this and became completely independent in September 2018.¹⁶⁵ Airbus does not work directly with refugees and migrants, as do some other companies in this section, but it provides equipment and services that run the risk of being used for human rights violations. The company wittingly supplies them to states that are accused of such violations.

Airbus, for example, is one of the companies performing the through-life support for the P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, which play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall to prevent migrants arriving by boat.¹⁶⁶ The connected offshore detention system has been repeatedly denounced by UNHCR and various human rights organisations. Under this system, asylum seekers were detained and held in inhumane detention centres in third countries and so denied the right to apply for asylum in Australia. In February 2020, the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) wrote that 'the[se] conditions of detention appear to have constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment ... and the gravity of the alleged conduct thus appears to have been such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of international law'.¹⁶⁷ In autumn 2020 Airbus won two new contracts in Mediterranean border security that entailed high human rights risks. One, with Israeli Aerospace Industries, to provide drone surveillance services to Frontex, the EU agency which just weeks later was exposed as being involved in illegal pushbacks from Greece to Turkey.¹⁶⁸ In April 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres had already denounced European aerial surveillance that 'played a growing role in the early detection of boats departing from the Libyan coast', which has 'too often contributed to people being disembarked in Libya under unsafe conditions' and ending up in detention.¹⁶⁹ Libya itself announced the purchase of 10 helicopters from Airbus for border patrol, among other uses, further adding to this problem.¹⁷⁰

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

€70.478 billion¹⁶⁰

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (31 DECEMBER 2019):

134,931¹⁶¹

HEADQUARTERS:

Leiden (Netherlands),
Blagnac (France)

CEO:

Guillaume Faury

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):

French government (10.9%), Gesellschaft zur Beteiligungsverwaltung (on behalf of the German government) (10.9%), Capital Research & Management Co. (World Investors) (5.10%)¹⁶²

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES BORDER CONTROL SERVICES:

Algeria, Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Lithuania, Mali, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, and Ukraine.¹⁶³

SECTOR:

Biometrics and smart borders, including biometric border control¹⁷¹

Booz Allen Hamilton (commonly referred to as Booz Allen) is a management and information technology consulting firm that works primarily for the military and government institutions.

It employs many former intelligence officers and has been dubbed the 'world's most profitable spy organization'.¹⁷⁵ The whistle-blower Edward Snowden, who leaked information about secret surveillance programmes from the National Security Agency (NSA), was previously employed at Booz Allen.¹⁷⁶ Between January 2017 and July 2019 Booz Allen was awarded over \$68 million in ICE contracts.¹⁷⁷ The company also provides services to CBP and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (to help oversee the (failed) SBI-Net-project¹⁷⁸).

In 2018 the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre invited Booz Allen to respond to allegations that it profits from the former Trump administration's anti-immigrant crackdown and the detention of migrants and asylum seekers through contracts with ICE, but the company gave no response.¹⁷⁹ Apart from its work on migration, Booz Allen also has close links to the authoritarian regimes of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where it helped set up an equivalent of the NSA, and Saudi Arabia, where it runs training for the Saudi Navy and cybersecurity experts.¹⁸⁰

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$6.704 billion¹⁷²

**NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
(31 MARCH 2019):**

26,069¹⁷³

HEADQUARTERS:

McLean (USA)

CEO:

Horacio D. Rozanski

**MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15
DECEMBER 2020):**

The Carlyle Group (11.6%),
The Vanguard Group (9.69%),
T. Rowe Price Associates
(9.64%), JPMorgan Investment
Management (5.71%)¹⁷⁴

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

US



SECTOR:

Deportations, including air charters for deportations

In the US, Classic Air Charter (CAC), founded in 2010, is the primary contractor for ICE air charters, based on a single contract of \$340.9 million between 2017 and 2020.¹⁸¹

CAC sub-contracts to other companies to undertake the flights, including iAero Airways (formerly Swift Air), World Atlantic Airways, and Omni Air for so-called 'special high-risk charter' (SHRC) deportation flights.¹⁸² Otherwise, very little is known about the company, such as its revenues and number of employees.

Most of the flights go to other destinations in the United States, and to the Caribbean, Central America and South America.¹⁸³ There have been frequent reports of violence and abuse during such flights. Research conducted by the University of Washington Center for Human Rights found 'serious abuses, including due process violations, and the repatriation of migrants to countries they had fled under circumstances that suggest violations of international law'. The abuses included 'several documented cases of physical violence against detainees by guards, either in airports or aboard the flights themselves'. There were also 'numerous accounts of mistreatment [and] excessive force'.¹⁸⁴

When an ICE deportation flight to Somalia in December 2017 was forced to return to the US for logistical reasons, the 92 refugees who were aboard 'told of abuse on the flight, saying they were shackled with chains on their wrists, waists, and legs for more than 40 hours; forced to urinate in bottles or on themselves; and that ICE officers beat and threatened some passengers'. According to a complaint filed by a legal team on behalf of the refugees, 'ICE agents kicked, struck, or dragged detainees down the aisle of the plane, and subjected some to verbal abuse and threats'.¹⁸⁵ CAC's CEO Donald Moss also owns Sportsflight, which was sub-contracted by DynCorp to fly terrorism suspects for the CIA to secret prisons all over the world, where they were often tortured in the name of the post-9/11 'War on Terror'.¹⁸⁶ There is no mention of human rights on the website of CAC.

HEADQUARTERS:

New York (USA)

CEO:

Donald Moss

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

US

SECTOR:

Border security, including surveillance aircraft

Partly through its subsidiary Surveillance Australia, the British aerospace and defence company Cobham is the main contractor for Australia's border security efforts.

This includes the A\$1 billion (US\$768 million) Project Sentinel contract (2008–2021), under which Cobham Aviation Services integrated on-board mission systems for Australia's Dash 8 maritime surveillance aircraft, and operates and maintains the aircraft.¹⁸⁹ With its maritime surveillance work for Australia, Cobham contributes to its policy of jailing boat refugees in third countries, where they have faced numerous human rights violations. In January 2020 Advent International, a US private equity investor, completed the £4 billion purchase of Cobham, turning it into a private business and delisting it from the London Stock Exchange.¹⁹⁰

TOTAL REVENUE (2018):

£1,863.3 million¹⁸⁷

**NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
(31 DECEMBER 2018):**

10,069¹⁸⁸

HEADQUARTERS:

Wimborne Minster (UK)

CEO:

David Lockwood

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia

CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)) was founded in 1983. It owns and manages 122 private prisons, re-entry centres for inmates nearing release and immigrant detention centres, or runs them on a concession basis.¹⁹⁴ Of its total 2019 revenue, 29% came from ICE contracts (up from 25% in 2018 and 2017).¹⁹⁵ There is a long record of human rights violations and other controversies in facilities run by CoreCivic. These include poor and violent treatment of detainees, poor medical care and employing inadequate and racist staff. This has resulted in several deaths, including suicides.¹⁹⁶ According to the company, criticisms of its role are based on misinformation.¹⁹⁷ It is telling that CoreCivic tries to debunk accusations prominently on its website—a testimony to the public criticism it has received. In 2016 the US Justice Department announced that it would end contracts with private prison contractors, because their facilities compared poorly in both safety and correctional services to government-run prisons. The Trump administration reversed this decision, but President Biden is expected to revoke this. CoreCivic, like GEO Group (see below), donated substantially to several pro-Trump political action committees (PACs), and in October 2019 both companies took the lead in launching a new lobbying organisation for private prison contractors—Day 1 Alliance—which planned to educate ‘Americans on the small but valued role the private sector plays in addressing corrections and detention challenges in the United States’.¹⁹⁸

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$1,980.7 million¹⁹¹

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

14,075¹⁹²

HEADQUARTERS:

Nashville (USA)

CEO:

Damon T. Hininger

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):

The Vanguard Group (15.8%), Epoch Investment Partners (5.39%)¹⁹³

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

US

SECTOR:

Audit and consultancy services, including consultancy and management support

Deloitte is one of the global 'Big Four' consulting companies, which is reflected in its global portfolio on migration issues. ICE has been a major client since 2003.

Between January 2017 and July 2019 Deloitte was awarded \$104 million in contracts with ICE and \$177 million in contracts with CBP.²⁰² Most of the work focuses on consulting services for general and administrative management, which includes support for immigration enforcement and detention.²⁰³ Deloitte is also active in advising on the development of smart borders, especially promoting its own Smart Border Analytics Tool.²⁰⁴

In mid-2018 Deloitte employees started a petition to ask the management to end the contracts with ICE and CBP on moral grounds.²⁰⁵ Dan Helfrich, CEO of Deloitte Consulting, responded to the concerned employees by assuring them that Deloitte's work "does not directly or indirectly support the separation of families."²⁰⁶

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$46.2 billion¹⁹⁹

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

312,000²⁰⁰

HEADQUARTERS:

London (UK)

CEO:

Punit Renjen

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, Germany, UK, US²⁰¹

SECTOR:

Border security, including surveillance aircraft, drones, equipment for border guards

Military and security equipment from Israeli companies is sold around the world, often promoted as 'field-proven' or 'combat tested'.²¹²

Israeli companies are also at the forefront of the international border security market. Their unique selling strategy capitalises on their involvement in Israel's border security infrastructure that violates human rights, including the Separation Wall on the West Bank and the fence on the border with Egypt.

Elbit Systems, Israel's largest arms producer (ranking 28 on the global Top 100 list compiled by SIPRI in 2018²¹³), has, for example, supplied surveillance systems for the Separation Wall as well as for Israel's borders with Lebanon and Syria.²¹⁴

Elbit's policy on human rights is short and vague: 'You are expected to treat all people with whom you may deal in connection with the Company with dignity and respect for human rights and fair labor practices. Company policy supports measures to oppose human trafficking and modern slavery, with respect to our own human resources activities and those of our supply chain'.²¹⁵

The involvement of Elbit in the Israeli West Bank Barrier has led several large international investors to disinvest, including the Norwegian Pension Fund, the Danske Bank and French investment and insurance firm AXA.

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$4,508.4 million²⁰⁷

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (31 DECEMBER 2019):

16,575²⁰⁸

HEADQUARTERS:

Haifa (Israel)

CEO:

Bezhalel Machlis

Major shareholders (>5%)
(15 December 2020):

Michael Federmann (chair of the Board of Directors) (44.3%)²⁰⁹

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

European Union (Frontex and EMSA),²¹⁰ Greece, Iceland, Israel, Switzerland and US.²¹¹

SECTOR:

Audit and consultancy services, including research and consultancy

According to its website 'Eurasylum Limited is an international research and consulting company that specialises solely in issues of immigration and asylum policy on behalf of public authorities worldwide'.²¹⁷

Eurasylum has a long list of clients in this field, including the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Frontex, NATO and fellow companies IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers.

One of Eurasylum's most controversial projects is its co-management of the architecture, engineering, design and project management for nine detention centres in Ukraine.²¹⁸ A February 2015 report in *Der Spiegel* cited refugees who had been locked up reporting on overcrowded prisons and camps with very poor hygienic conditions where they were beaten, tortured with electric shocks, forced to sleep on the floor and deprived of food.²¹⁹

Eurasylum does not mention human rights policy or adherence to international human rights instruments on its website. It participated in the UN Global Compact from 2006 to 2009, when it withdrew for unknown reasons.²²⁰ Despite its own lack of a (published) policy, the company has written several reports and given advice on human rights and fundamental rights.

OFFICE LOCATION:

Stockport (UK)

MANAGING DIRECTOR:

Solon Ardittis

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

EU, Jordan, Ghana, Iraq, Libya²¹⁶

**SECTOR:**

Deportations, migrant detention, including transportation and providing staff

G4S (formerly Group 4 Securicor) is the world's largest private security company, providing a broad range of security services, ranging from cash handling to private military deployment.

In the field of migration G4S is active in transportation, deportation and facility security, but mostly known for managing or providing staff for detention centres. In December 2020, G4S announced it had agreed to a takeover offer from US company Allied Universal Security Services, and recommended shareholders accept this offer.²²³

G4S published an elaborate human rights policy as well as detailed Human Rights Guidelines for its staff. The company acknowledges its special position as a 'global security company', assuring the public that: 'We will actively assess the impact of our business on human rights. We will encourage our people to develop businesses that consciously and actively enable people to realise their rights and we will take special care to monitor the risks that aspects of our businesses could directly or indirectly contribute to the violation of human rights, or how we could become complicit in violations by our partners suppliers or customers'.²²⁴

G4S is also a founding signatory of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. Despite this, the company has been frequently linked with human rights violations, with a long list of incidents all over the world. There have been numerous accusations of violence against migrants in detention centres and while detained migrants are transported and deported. In 2017, BBC Panorama showed covert footage exposing G4S staff 'mocking, abusing and assaulting' detained migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK.²²⁵ In that same year G4S, along with the Australian government and fellow company Broadspectrum, was hit with a class suit by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. Eventually, the case was settled for A\$70 million (about \$53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement.²²⁶

In several instances, governments ended contracts with G4S because of these and other incidents, yet the company keeps getting new contracts to run or provide services to other detention centres. In the UK, however, things became so bad that G4S announced in September 2019 it would end its involvement in migrant detention there.²²⁷

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

£7,758 million

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

570,000

HEADQUARTERS:

London (UK)

CEO:

Ashley Almanza

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):

Credit Suisse Securities Europe (8.34%), Schroder Investment Management (7.50%), Harris Associates (6.85%)²²¹

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, Austria, Netherlands, UK, US²²²

Apart from the detention-related incidents, G4S has also been involved in other controversies. On 12 October 2010, Jimmy Mubenga died after being restrained by three G4S guards on a deportation flight from the UK to Angola. The guards were found not guilty of manslaughter, but the government ended its contract with G4S for escorting detained migrants and the coroner in the investigation concluded that there was evidence of 'pervasive racism' in the company.²²⁸

Human rights concerns regarding G4S are not confined to its migration business. It has, for example, been criticised for its role in Israel, where it worked in prisons in which Palestinians were tortured, as well as provided security at the border check points with the Palestinian Territories. For the controversial US prison at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, G4S provided cleaning and facility staff. G4S employees have also been accused of torture, mistreatment and neglect in (youth) prisons in the UK and South Africa.²²⁹



Asylum seekers protesting at the Villawood detention center in Sydney (Adam J.W.C./Wikimedia)

Along with CoreCivic, GEO Group is the main operator of private migrant detention centres in the US, including many ICE processing centres.²³³

ICE contracts provided its single largest source of income in 2019 for running 14 of its detention centres.²³⁴ Its division GEO Transport also provides secure transportation services for over a dozen such facilities.²³⁵ Its subsidiary, **BI Inc.**, earned over \$500,000 for running a supervision programme for migrants outside detention, using 'location monitoring systems', such as GPS-enabled ankle bracelets, to make sure migrants are present at court hearings and for deportations.²³⁶ Outside the US, GEO Group also runs two detention centres in the UK: Dungavel Immigration Removal Centre in Scotland and Harmondsworth migrant detention centre in London.

Former ICE director Julie M. Wood is a member of its board of directors,²³⁷ and David Venturella, former Director for the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations at ICE, is one of its Senior Vice Presidents.²³⁸

There have been numerous complaints about the treatment of migrants held in detention centres managed by GEO Group. These include accusations of poor medical services, denial of medical treatment, lack of food, (prolonged) solitary confinement of mentally ill persons, and violent and discriminatory treatment.²³⁹ In December 2019, a federal judge in California allowed four former detainees, on behalf of thousands of others, to sue GEO Group for coercive labour practices, 'violating minimum wage, unjust enrichment, and antislavery laws by coercing detainees to work for free, or, in some cases, \$1 per day, by threatening them with punishment and depriving them of basic necessities'.²⁴⁰

Despite all its lobbying efforts and millions of dollars of donations its executives and staff have given to political candidates, GEO Group brazenly states that it 'plays absolutely no role in passing, setting, or advocating for or against immigration laws and policies'.²⁴¹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$2,477.9 million²³⁰

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2020):

23,000²³¹

HEADQUARTERS:

Boca Raton (USA)

CEO:

George Zoley

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)

(15 DECEMBER 2020):

The Vanguard Group (15.4%)²³²

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

UK, US

International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is a multinational technology company. It is one of the largest contractors for CBP, with 145 contracts for a total value of \$1.74 billion between 2008 and 2019, mainly for technological infrastructure and support.²⁴⁶

In May 2016, IBM was the lead sponsor of the EU Security, Migration and Borders Conference in Brussels, organised by Forum Europe and RAND Europe,²⁴⁷ when IBM announced its development of 'self-learning machines to help in the asylum decision-making process' by assisting in profiling people asking for international protection.²⁴⁸ In January 2021 IBM signed a contract with Libya's Interior Ministry to develop its electronic visa system.²⁴⁹

After Trump's election in 2016, IBM employees circulated a petition in which the company's CEO was criticised for writing a supportive letter to the new president. They also asked that IBM respects their right not to participate in government contracts that violate civil liberties.²⁵⁰ The board of the company didn't publicly respond to the petition.

In 2017 a coalition of rights groups urged IBM and other tech companies to refrain from developing technology to help identify people for visa denial and deportation from the US, after they took part in an information session held by the Trump administration to discuss vetting of migrants.²⁵¹

While IBM remained important in implementing former President Trump's migration policies, the company is not immune to social pressure. In June 2020, in the slipstream of massive Black Lives Matter (BLM) and anti-police brutality protests in the US, its CEO announced the company would no longer provide facial recognition technology to police departments for mass surveillance and racial profiling.²⁵²

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$77.14 billion²⁴²NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
(31 DECEMBER 2019):**352,600**²⁴³

HEADQUARTERS:

Armonk (USA)

CEO:

Arvind Krishna

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)
(15 DECEMBER 2020):Capital Research & Management
(8.50%), The Vanguard Group
(7.87%), SSgA Funds Management
(5.95%)²⁴⁴

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, EU, Libya UK, US²⁴⁵

SECTOR:

Biometrics and smart borders, including biometric applications and databases

TOTAL REVENUE (2018):

\$2.3 billion²⁵³

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

close to 15,000²⁵⁴

HEADQUARTERS:

Courbevoie (France)

CEO:

Pierre Barrial

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, Egypt, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Mali, Mauritania, Norway, Singapore, UK, Uzbekistan²⁵⁵

Identity and security solutions company IDEMIA, formerly OT Morpho, is the result of a merger between Oberthur Technologies and Morpho, after it was sold by its parent company Safran in 2017.

IDEMIA is owned by the US private equity firm Advent International.²⁵⁶ In February 2013, the European Commission awarded Morpho, in a consortium with Accenture and HP, a contract worth €70 million for the maintenance of the European Vision Information System (VIS).²⁵⁷ A few months later, Morpho signed a partnership agreement with Interpol, including 'collaboration on the subject of border security' through the use of biometrics.²⁵⁸

On its website, IDEMIA writes extensively about corporate social responsibility and sustainability, including a focus on human rights.²⁵⁹ However, the company works closely with Egypt's authoritarian regime²⁶⁰ and has been accused of supplying it with tools for mass surveillance, including identity-management databases.²⁶¹ According to Amnesty International, IDEMIA also supplied facial-recognition equipment to China, which uses it to 'keep people under constant observation' and for 'systematic repression'.²⁶²

SECTOR:

Border security and biometrics and smart borders, including border surveillance equipment (helicopters), drones, biometrics, satellite observation

Like Airbus, Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly named Finmeccanica) is an important supplier of helicopters for border surveillance.

Leonardo is also one of the main suppliers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe's borders, is involved in the biometrics market (eu-LISA Entry/Exit System), EU satellite-observation projects and it leads the first European Defence Fund research project, OCEAN2020, which aims to integrate unmanned naval platforms (drones) in maritime surveillance and interdiction missions, using satellites to connect drones and command and control of naval vessels to land centres.²⁶⁷

Leonardo has a six-page human rights policy on its website, including the statement that it 'is committed to prevent illegal practices related to the sale and distribution of its products through the Trade Compliance Program, utilizing tools and processes of due diligence on counterparts and monitoring activities in Sensitive Countries', which includes 'countries whose Governments acted in breach of International Agreements on Human Rights'.²⁶⁸ Despite these words, Leonardo is known to supply equipment and services to human rights violators. This includes providing Algeria and Libya with helicopters for border surveillance, several border security system contracts with Libya (which are hampered by the ongoing civil war) and flying surveillance drones for a trial by Frontex.²⁶⁹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):**€13.784 billion²⁶³****NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
(31 DECEMBER 2019):****49,530²⁶⁴****HEADQUARTERS:****Rome, Italy****CEO:****Alessandro Profumo****MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)
(15 DECEMBER 2020):****Government of Italy (30.2%)²⁶⁵****KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:****EU, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Italia, Latvia, Libya, Malta, Mauritania and Slovenia²⁶⁶**



SECTOR:

Border security, including radar systems, surveillance planes, drones²⁷⁰

Lockheed Martin is the world’s largest arms producer. It is also a big player in border security and control, especially in the US. Between 2005 and 2019 it earned \$1 billion under 20 contracts with CPB.

Its human rights policy is very internally focused: ‘We will support human rights by treating employees with respect, promoting fair employment practices, providing fair and competitive wages, and prohibiting harassment, bullying, and discrimination, use of child or forced labor, or trafficking in persons for any purpose’.²⁷⁵

In recent years the company has, however, been denounced by human rights organisations for continuing to supply arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which use them in the war in Yemen.²⁷⁶ Its supplies for border patrol at the highly militarised US–Mexico border also entail high human rights risks.²⁷⁷

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$59.812 billion²⁷¹

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (31 DECEMBER 2019):

110,000²⁷²

HEADQUARTERS:

Bethesda (USA)

CEO:

Jim Taiclet

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):

SSgA Funds Management (15.1%), The Vanguard Group (7.45%), Capital Research & Management Co. (World Investors) (6.00%), Putnam (5.32%)²⁷³

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, Portugal, Spain, US²⁷⁴

Mitie is a British facilities management and professional services management company. On its website it promotes itself as ‘the largest provider of immigration removal centre management and operations and secure escorting services (in-country and overseas) for the Home Office, caring for over 13,000 detainees’.²⁸¹

In the UK the deportation process has been outsourced to Mitie under a 10-year contract for £525 million, which took over from Tascor (a subsidiary of Capita) in May 2018.²⁸² Two years into their contract, there had already been several complaints of Mitie employees threatening people who are deported. The HM Chief Inspector of Prisons inspected three flights between July 2018 and November 2019, concluding that there were ‘unacceptable’ practices going on, especially with the (long) use of restraints.²⁸³

Mitie also runs detention centres in the UK, competing on price, which has resulted in understaffing, poor maintenance, insufficient medical care, migrants being locked in their cells for more hours a day as well as less cleaning, fewer activities and less access to doctors. There have been various injuries and even deaths as a result.²⁸⁴ The deteriorating situation led to several hunger strikes in the detention centres.²⁸⁵

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

£2,221.4 million²⁷⁸

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2020):

48,900²⁷⁹

HEADQUARTERS:

London (UK)

CEO:

Phil Bentley

**MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)
(15 DECEMBER 2020):**

Silchester International Investors (17.9%), Brandes Investment Partners (5.23%), Northern Trust Global Investments (5.19)²⁸⁰

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

UK

Palantir Technologies was founded as a private company in 2003 by Peter Thiel, a well-known venture capitalist and ally of former President Trump. It is notoriously secretive about its work and finances, but had to open up more when it went public at the end of September 2020. This was accompanied by a complex structure which guarantees that (voting) power will remain solidly in the hands of the founders, including Thiel and CEO Alex Karp.²⁸⁹

Palantir provides software tools to ICE which allows ICE agents to create profiles of people based on data from different databases, which help them see data that would be relevant for targeting, arrest, and prosecution.²⁹⁰ In late 2020 the company expanded its business to the UK, winning a contract to oversee post-Brexit border and customs data.²⁹¹

According to a report by migrant rights organisation Mijente and others, Palantir's services to ICE have led to a 'dangerous acceleration of surveillance technology at the hands of police and prosecutors... an infrastructure that also fuels discriminatory policing practices targeting people of color'.²⁹²

Palantir makes no mention of human rights on its website and seems to have no human rights policy. It does have some principles on 'Privacy and civil liberties engineering', claiming that 'Palantir was founded on the conviction that it's essential to preserve fundamental principles of privacy and civil liberties while using data'. The same document also states that 'From their first day, new Palantirians are trained to ask: "Do I want to live in the kind of world that the technology we're building would enable?".²⁹³ However, when employees say 'no' to certain work that Palantir is doing and raise human rights concerns they are blatantly ignored, with CEO Karp staunchly defending the company's work for ICE and committing to continue to support the Trump administration's migration policies despite employee protests.²⁹⁴

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):**about \$742.6 million²⁸⁶****NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (MAY 2020):****about 2500²⁸⁷****HEADQUARTERS:****Palo Alto (USA)****CEO:**

Alex Karp

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):Founders Fund Management (8.76%), Peter Thiel (7.76%), Sompo Holdings, Inc. (7.31%)²⁸⁸**KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:**

UK, UK

PricewaterhouseCoopers (Pwc) is one of the global 'Big Four' consulting companies, which is reflected in its global portfolio on migration issues.

In 2017, PwC, together with political risk consultancy Eurasia Group, published the report 'Managing the refugee and migrant crisis: The role of governments, private sector and technology', which advocated for closer cooperation between public and private actors and blatantly stated that 'the migrant crisis can generate a variety of opportunities for businesses'. It saw those opportunities primarily in business roles in management, planning and coordination, as well as leaning heavily on the promotion of technological 'solutions' and the use of biometrics.²⁹⁹

Between January 2017 and July 2019 ICE granted PwC contracts worth over \$5 million.³⁰⁰ Shortly thereafter the company wrote that it 'divested its public sector business in 2018 and does not perform work for US Immigration and Customs Enforcement'.³⁰¹ While this may remove some human rights concerns, PwC's work for Frontex, the European Commission and the Australian government still run a high risk of involving the company in policies that violate human rights.

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$42.4 billion²⁹⁶

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

276,005²⁹⁷

HEADQUARTERS:

London (UK)

CHAIRMAN:

Robert E. Moritz

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, Aruba, EU, India, US²⁹⁸

Serco is a provider of public services, active in several sectors. In the field of migration Serco is known mainly for managing detention centres, especially in Australia.

This includes the controversial detention center on Christmas Island, 220 kilometres off the coast of Indonesia, which was temporarily closed in 2018 after reports of harsh treatment of detained migrants.³⁰⁵

Serco has been accused many times of harsh treatment of migrants in detention. In 2012 a training manual for detention guards was leaked, which gave explicit instructions on how to hit, kick and strike detained migrants, how to inflict pain and use batons against them.³⁰⁶ The Australian government dismissed critics, saying that the manual was outdated.³⁰⁷

A report by the Australian Human Rights Commission examining Australia's detention system expressed several specific concerns about Serco in October 2019, including unnecessary use of restrictive measures, the use of restraints (hand cuffs, spit hoods, face masks) and poor record keeping.³⁰⁸

In the UK, since 2017 Serco has been running Yarl's Wood detention centre, where mostly women and families are held. An April 2009 report by the Children's Commissioner found a lack of good healthcare, including refusing medical treatment to seriously ill children, neglect of mental health problems, and violent behaviour against children, primarily during arrest and transport to the centre.³⁰⁹ Women jailed in Yarl's Wood have accused Serco staff of sexual abuse on repeated occasions, but the company denies "there is a widespread or endemic problem". Serco says it takes such allegations seriously and "take[s] prompt and decisive disciplinary action".³¹⁰

In February 2020 the UK Home Office announced that Serco will take over the management of the detention centre Brooks House near Gatwick Airport from G4S, with a contract until 2028. G4S decided to not renew its contract after the reported mistreatment of detained

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

£3,248.4 million³⁰²

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

50,000³⁰³

HEADQUARTERS:

Hook (UK)

CEO:

Rupert Soames

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)

(15 DECEMBER 2020):

FIL Investment Advisors (5.92%), BlackRock Investment Management (5.33%)³⁰⁴

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, UK

SECTOR:

Biometrics and smart borders, including biometric systems and databases

The French IT consultancy firm Sopra Steria arose from a merger between Sopra and Steria in 2014. Its Benelux part, and formerly Steria, ‘contributes for nearly two decades, to further developing centralised databases and services around border control and migration’.³¹⁶

It has won many contracts for EU identity databases (VIS, SIS, Eurodac), with a total value of over €150 million.³¹⁷ Statewatch warns that the continuous expansion of these migration databases, and projects to enhance their interoperability, ‘will increase the risks of racial profiling and undermine the purpose limitation principle [...] involve secondary purposes propelling the processing of new types of personal data [...] and will massively increase the number of alerts on expulsion orders and refusal of entry or stay in the SIS, further entrenching the structure of ‘Fortress Europe’.³¹⁸

Sopra Steria’s deep involvement in these databases is at odds with its own statement that it ‘complies with the principles and fundamental rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of United Nations and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’.³¹⁹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):**€4,434.0 million³¹²****NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (31 DECEMBER 2019):****46,245³¹³****HEADQUARTERS:****Paris (France)****CEO:**

Vincent Paris

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):Sopra GMT (19.6%), Amundi Asset Management (6.62%)³¹⁴**KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:**EU, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania, Slovenia, UK³¹⁵

SECTOR:

Border security, biometrics and smart borders, including radar, communication systems, border surveillance systems, drones, biometric identification

Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands. One of its core activities is the production of radar and sensor systems, including radar systems for patrol vessels.

In 2019 Thales acquired Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, for €4.8 million, integrated as its Digital Identity and Security (DIS) division.³²⁴ This division supplies fingerprint identification technology for the EURODAC database.³²⁵

While Thales joined the UN Global Compact in 2003 and touts its adherence to human rights principles, it has no issue with supplying equipment and services to known human rights violators.³²⁶ Anti-migration policies even play a role in allowing other arms exports. In 2015, the Dutch government granted a €34 million export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt, even though it admitted that grave human right violations take place in Egypt. It still granted the export license, partly because of the role the Egyptian navy plays in stopping irregular immigration to Europe.³²⁷

There are human rights risks related to the use of Thales radar and communication systems in patrol vessels deployed during Frontex operations and the EU military Operation Sophia on the coast of Libya.³²⁸ The supply of biometric identity cards to authoritarian regimes, such as those of Algeria, Morocco and Turkey, are also problematic in relation to human rights.³²⁹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

€18.4 billion³²⁰

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2019):

80,000³²¹

HEADQUARTERS:

Paris (France)

CEO:

Patrice Caine

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)

(15 DECEMBER 2020):

Government of France (25.7%),
Dassault Aviation (24.7%)³²²

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, EU, France, Ghana, Greece, Latvia, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, UK³²³

**SECTOR:**

Biometrics and smart borders, including collection and analysis of (personal) data

A media multinational, Thomson Reuters is best known as the parent company of the press agency, Reuters. It is less well-known that its portfolio also includes legal and data-collection and analysis software and services.

Thomson Reuters has earned millions from contracts with CBP and especially ICE, in particular through its subsidiaries Legal West and Thomson Reuters Special Services (TRSS).³³³ Most of this comes from giving ICE access to databases with public and proprietary information, license-plate scanning data and real-time jail-booking data.^{334 335}

In October 2019 TRSS was contracted, for up to \$3.4 million, to 'help ICE monitor 'possible threats' against the agency's officials', after actions against high-ranking officials.³³⁶ Stephen Rubley, the CEO of TRSS, is a member of the board of the ICE Foundation, a non-profit to support ICE employees.³³⁷

There has been considerable criticism of Thomson Reuters for its work for ICE. Thomson Reuters is one of the targets of Mijente's #NoTechForIce campaign along with Amazon Web Services, Microsoft and Palantir. In June 2018 Privacy International (PI) wrote to the company, asking Reuters to 'commit to not providing products or services to US immigration agencies which may be used to enforce such cruel, arbitrary, and disproportionate measures.'³³⁸ In April 2020 BCGEU, a major Canadian labor union, filed a shareholder proposal to the board of Thomson Reuters to 'address the obvious human rights issues related to how their software is being used and to make sure the company is living up to its obligations as a participant in the United Nations Global Compact'.³³⁹ The proposal was supported by 30% of the independent Thomson Reuters shareholders.³⁴⁰

Spokespersons for the company have consistently refuted all criticisms, giving statements to the press that for years have been a variation of the claim that its services to ICE are meant for criminal investigations.³⁴¹

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$5,906 million³³⁰

**NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
(31 DECEMBER 2019):**

24,400³³¹

HEADQUARTERS:

Toronto (Canada)

CEO:

Steve Hasker

**MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%)
(15 DECEMBER 2020):**

The Woodbridge Co. (65.9%),
Royal Bank of Canada (7.92%)³³²

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

US

BORDER SERVICES:

Biometrics and smart borders, including IT services, biometrics and AI applications, tracking systems

Unisys is a multinational IT company, working for both the public and private sector, offering a range of technologies for border security and control. It tops the list of CBP contractors, earning \$2 billion under 35 contracts between 2005 and 2019.

It also worked for ICE with over \$23.5 million in contracts running from 2005 to 2013.³⁴⁶ In 2014 ICE appointed Kevin Kern, a former senior vice president and chief information officer (CIO) at Unisys, as its new CIO.³⁴⁷

Unisys also develops the threat assessment system LineSight, based on artificial intelligence which combines data from government agencies and other sources, including passengers' travel histories and Interpol intelligence, to give a mathematical risk evaluation of flight passengers.³⁴⁸ Erica Posey of the Brennan Center for Justice warned about bias creeping into this and similar systems: 'Any predictive algorithm trained on existing data sets about who has been prevented from travelling in the past will almost certainly rely heavily on proxies to replicate past patterns'.³⁴⁹

Unisys was also criticised for taking part in a Frontex-coordinated meeting in 2016 to discuss technology to 'manage' refugee flows. At the meeting the company promoted its 'refugee management suite' for pre-registration of migrants, including such features as 'controlling refugees before they reach Europe using phone apps and biometric data gathering'.³⁵⁰

TOTAL REVENUE (2019):

\$2.95 billion³⁴²

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (31 DECEMBER 2018):

22,000³⁴³

HEADQUARTERS:

Blue Bell (USA)

CEO:

Peter Altabef

MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS (>5%) (15 DECEMBER 2020):

Fidelity Management & Research (12.8%), The Vanguard Group (12.6%), Neuberger Berman Investment Advisers (5.10%)³⁴⁴

KEY COUNTRIES IT PROVIDES:

Australia, EU, US³⁴⁵

LOBBYING

Australia, the EU and the US all have some form of registration of lobbying and/or political donations. These differ in form and are not all compulsory, so in these cases the available information might give only a fragment of the real picture. Nevertheless, the figures show that almost all companies profiled in this report have a significant US lobbying presence (with their own employees and/or via lobby firms), while those that have provided information to the EU lobby register have had dozens of meetings with the European Commission. Many of these companies have a broader portfolio, meaning that lobbying and meetings with officials may concern various subjects. In the US lobbyists engaged by the companies more often than not have held a government post (government regulator, Congressional staff or member of Congress).

Some companies that mostly gain from one or several specialised contracts in the field of deportations (Classic Air Charter, Mitie), consultancy (Eurasylum) or biometric identity databases (Sopra Steria) apparently have less or no need to lobby on any significant scale in lack of needing policy changes or budget increases.

Table 6. Corporate lobbying

Data on lobbying by companies						
Company	Australia	EU ³⁵¹		UK	USA ³⁵²	
	Lobby register ³⁵³	Lobbyists (EP accr.) ³⁵⁴	Budget (year)	Meetings with EC ³⁵⁵	Lobby register (1st year) ³⁵⁶	Lobbyists (% revolving door) ³⁵⁷ (2020)
Accenture	-	1 (0)	€500,000—€599,000 (2018/19)	15	-	60 (75%)
Airbus	-	11 (1)	€1,750,000—€1,999,999 (2019)	201	+ (2017)	36 (80.56%)
Booz Allen Hamilton	-	-	-	-	-	26 (57.69%)
Classic Air Charter	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cobham	+	-	-	-	-	6 (83.33%)
CoreCivic	-	-	-	-	-	14 (64.29%)
Deloitte	-	*358	*	*	+ (2020)	28 (85.71%)
Elbit	+	-	-	-	-	6 (50.00%)
Eurasylum	-	-	-	-	-	-
G4S	-	2 (0)	<€9,999 (2019)	3	-	2 (100.00%)
GEO Group	+	-	-	-	-	18 (88.89%)
IBM	-	10 (3)	€1,750,000—€1,999,999 (2019)	114	-	35 (65.71%)
IDEMIA	-	2 (0)	<€9,999 (2019)	2	-	23 (73.91%)
Leonardo	-	3 (2)	€300,000—€399,999 (2019)	45	+ (2017)	23 (69.57%)
Lockheed Martin	+	-	-	-	+ (2020)	69 (72.46%)
Mitie	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palantir	-	1 (0)	€10,000—€24,999 (2018)	1	-	23 (78.26%)
PricewaterhouseCoopers	-	9 (7)	€800,000—€899,999 (2018/19)	30	+ (2020)	39 (89.74%)
Serco	+	-	-	-	-	3 (100.00%)
Sopra Steria	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thales	-	7 (1)	€300,000—€399,999 (2019)	26	-	5 (60.00%)
Thomson Reuters	-	-	-	-	+ (2017)	5 (80.00%)
Unisys	-	-	-	-	-	7 (42.86%)

Donations

Donations to political candidates, elected politicians and political parties can serve as a means to 'buy' influence and to get their attention for what the companies need or want, such as contracts and policy changes. Research suggests that political donations at the very least give donors significantly greater access to policy-makers.³⁵⁹

Table 7, an overview of political donations by the companies profiled in this report, shows that donations are mainly significant in the US. In Australia, the EU and the UK (large) donations are far less common. In the US companies may not directly contribute to candidates or parties, but many have set up affiliated political action committees (PACs), to which employees, shareholders and their family members can make donations.

As Table 7 shows, most companies have donated between tens of thousands and millions of dollars in about ten years. Large international consultancy companies as Accenture, Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which their migration-related work is only a part of their business, have been the largest donors in Australia, the EU, UK and US. Lockheed Martin is another exceptionally large donor in the US, although this will also reflect their wider portfolio of military contracts. It is also notable that companies specialised in private prison work, including migrant detention, such as CoreCivic and GEO Group, are also relatively large donors.

There are some exceptions: companies that do not work or have only minor business in the US, such as Eurasyllum, Mitie and Sopra Steria, logically do not donate there at all, while some quite large companies such as IBM, Thales and Thomson Reuters have no company PACs, though individuals affiliated with the company may have made contributions.

In the other countries/regions, only Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers are somewhat regular donors to candidates and/or political parties. For the EU the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations of the European Parliament has been keeping a register of donations only since 2018.

Table 7. Corporate political donations

Company donations to political parties, candidates and elected politicians				
Company	Australia (2010–2019) in AUD ³⁶⁰	EU (2018–2019) in € ³⁶¹	UK (2010–2019) in £ ³⁶²	USA (2011–2020) in \$ ³⁶³
				Company PAC
Accenture	–	–	–	2,428,561
Airbus	–	–	42,508.50	1,280,415 ³⁶⁴
Booz Allen Hamilton	–	–	–	72,983
Classic Air Charter	–	–	–	–
Cobham	–	–	–	1,111,587 ³⁶⁵
CoreCivic	–	–	–	1,381,615
Deloitte	1,352,752	13,000	499,227.17	19,295,441
Elbit	–	–	–	394,338 ³⁶⁶
Eurasyllum	–	–	–	–
G4S	–	–	–	219,843 ³⁶⁷
GEO Group	–	–	–	3,737,862
IBM	–	–	–	–
IDEMIA	–	–	–	140,830
Leonardo	–	–	–	2,028,624
Lockheed Martin	–	–	–	20,716,329

Mitie	-	-	-	-
Palantir	-	-	-	32,427
PricewaterhouseCoopers	1,905,236	-	1,992.65	14,143,082
Serco	-	-	-	629,248
Sopra Steria	-	-	-	-
Thales	57,057	-	-	-
Thomson Reuters	-	-	-	-
Unisys	-	-	-	580,933

Revolving doors

In the US, as Todd Miller notes in TNI's report *More than A Wall*, the 'government-industry relation has become so tight and so blurred that some government officials no longer see any distinction', with for example 'almost all former CBP commissioners and DHS secretaries hav[ing] shuffled into the private sector or various consulting companies, giving both 'expert opinions' and greasing the wheels between industry and homeland security'.³⁶⁸ The private prison operator GEO Group, a major contractor for ICE, has former ICE directors on its management team and board of directors.

In Australia, the appointment in 2020 of the former ASIO chief Duncan Lewis, only five months after leaving this position, to the board of Thales Australia is part of a trend in which, according to researcher Michella Fahy, a 'disturbing number of Australia's military personnel, senior defence and intelligence officials and politicians leave their public service jobs and walk through the 'revolving door' into roles with weapons-making and security-related corporations'.³⁶⁹

In Europe, Jorge Domecq, who until 1 February 2020 was CEO at the European Defence Agency (EDA), started a new job as lobbyist for Airbus before having received the required authorisation from the EU, breaking rules on conflicts of interest.³⁷⁰

An extreme example of a reverse revolving door is the appointment of Thierry Breton as European Commissioner for the Internal Market, which includes industry policy, defence and tech. Until his nomination, Breton had been CEO of Atos, an IT company with a broad portfolio, including significant work in the field of defence and (border) security. As CEO he had lobbied on policies for which he would now be responsible, and as Corporate Europe Observatory warns there is a high risk of 'potential privileged access and indeed influence that Atos stands to benefit from its CEO joining the EU Commission'.³⁷¹

DIVESTMENT



Oil and Gas divestment campaigners in Berlin, Germany (Tony Webster/Flickr, CC-by-2.0)

As noted above, companies are financed through a mix of equity (shares or private ownership) and debt (corporate bonds, loans and credit facilities), often partly dependent on investments, such as bank loans and income from shares, to keep their day-to-day operations running. Financiers have to decide where they want to invest, either actively in particular companies or by 'passively' tracking share indexes (as is the case with most Vanguard Group investments, for example). These decisions are primarily driven by the profit motive, but with increasing importance attached to corporate social responsibility (CSR), ethical considerations have also become an increasing part of the decision-making process.

For campaigners in various fields, divestment (encouraging investors to withhold investments from certain companies) makes investors actors who can be encouraged to invest in certain companies (for example, for reasons of sustainability) or withhold money or divest from other companies because of bad human rights or environmental records. In some cases, 'shareholder activism', which presses investors to steer companies towards more responsible policies and practices, is also an effective tool for change. Divestment campaigns make clear that financiers run reputational, and sometimes legal, risks by investing in companies that are implicated in (systematic) human rights violations.

A strategy of pushing for divestment was quite successful as part of the economic boycott against the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1980s or more recently in campaigns against the fossil fuel industry.³⁷² Many international financiers have divested in the large military companies profiled in this report, such as Airbus, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, and Thales, because of their involvement in the development, production and/or maintenance of nuclear weapons. The regular

'Don't Bank on the Bomb' reports published by ICAN / PAX show that every year more financial institutions decide to exclude such companies from their portfolio.³⁷³ Likewise, several financiers have pulled out of Elbit and G4S because of their involvement in Israel's human rights violations against the Palestinians.

To date, there have been fewer campaigns targeted at divestment from the border industrial complex. One exception was a campaign to divest from private prisons in 2018 and 2019. The spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump's anti-immigration policies, gave impetus to this campaign. It resulted in six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. According to the Center for Popular Democracy and other groups involved in the campaign, 'together these six banks represent an estimated \$1.93 billion, or 72% of the total current financing available to private prison companies, CoreCivic and GEO Group'.³⁷⁴ The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies.³⁷⁵ Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of 'public resistance' hit the company financially, criticising the banks as 'clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns pushing false information rather than engage in a constructive dialogue about the facts'.³⁷⁶

In relation to shifting stock ownership, any divestment strategy needs to take into account that passive management now dominates stock markets. As passive asset managers largely track indexes rather than individually choosing investments, achieving divestment requires more than simply asking these companies to move the money that they manage on ethical grounds. Blackrock's much-hyped 'divestment' from coal in January 2020 shows the importance of this consideration, since the small print showed that Blackrock had no intention of applying the policy to the passive funds that account for most of its investments.³⁷⁷

Shifting passive investments away from the border industrial complex requires pursuing companies like Vanguard, Blackrock and SSgA through four main strategies. First, these companies should be pressed to develop investment policies that apply strict Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria to *all* investments (or as many as possible), so that ethical criteria become the norm rather than regarded as a specialist niche market. This, in turn, could be promoted by pushing regulators and law-makers to promote a broad concept of 'fiduciary duty' (investors' legal responsibility to their clients) to ensure that ethical criteria are made more central.

Second, it is important to apply ESG criteria to the companies involved in the border industrial complex. The main campaigning work here calls for pressure on the regulators and international agencies who set these criteria. For example, a number of ethical funds refer to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the UN Global Compact. PAX has shown how to build a case for divestment from conventional weapons on the basis of SDG16 ('Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'), and sub-criteria that include reducing 'all forms of violence', ensuring access to justice and enforcing non-discriminatory laws may also be operationalised against the excesses of the border industrial complex.³⁷⁸ Similarly, as the UN Global Compact emphasises avoiding human rights abuses, it is a potentially useful starting point for arguing that ethical standards would exclude all of the key corporate players in the border industrial complex.

Third, pressure should be applied not only on investors but also on the companies on the major stock indexes. For example, 176 financial institutions have signed an open letter coordinated by Swiss Sustainable Finance (SSF), which calls on major index providers to exclude producers of controversial weapons from their mainstream index products.³⁷⁹ This initiative would capture some of the key players in the border industrial complex, since Airbus, Lockheed Martin, Serco and Thales are all involved in the production of nuclear weapons. A similar effort on human rights standards might cover a broader range of the companies profiled in this report.

Fourth, shareholder activism, such as requesting the large asset managers to back human rights resolutions at corporate board meetings, could potentially yield results. The big investors could also be pushed to reform and apply their 'stewardship codes'—rules that govern engagement with companies on governance issues, as well as voting on corporate boards—to emphasise the defence of human rights. Evidently, these efforts would be pushing against the tide. The Big Three investors have so far been 'reluctant to exert their power', according to researchers at the University of Amsterdam, who found that these vote in line with the wishes of corporate management 90% of the time.³⁸⁰

BOX 3: Climate Movement and Disinvestment

Disinvesting from fossil fuels has become a rallying cry for the climate movement. Spearheaded by Bill McKibben and a group of students at Middlebury college in Vermont, these campaigns emerged on US campuses in 2011. Thousands of students urged their administrations to turn endowment investments in the fossil fuel industry into investments in clean energy and communities most affected by climate change. To date, the total value of disinvestment projects is over \$14.50 tn, with over 1,308 institutions divesting.³⁸¹ In December 2020, the \$226 bn New York State pension fund cut investment in fossil fuels.³⁸²

CONCLUSIONS

The consulting company McKinsey ended its contracts with ICE in 2018. Its then new global managing partner, Kevin Sneader, said this decision was made after employees, amidst the growing protests against the Trump Administration's detention policies, 'rightly raised' concerns about the work, although he claimed that this had 'never been focused on developing, advising or implementing immigration policies, including the child-separation policy.'³⁸³ Later reports hinted at growing dissatisfaction at ICE with McKinsey as the real reason for the end of contracts, and disputed Sneader's claims about the nature of the work, referring to documents in which McKinsey proposed cuts in spending on food and medical care for detained migrants. It was also noted that the company took up new contracts with CBP, including the drafting of a new border strategy.³⁸⁴

Despite the lack of clarity concerning the real reasons for ending the contracts, this example shows that companies (and investors) can make a choice to end their involvement in border and migration policies and practices that violate human rights. This will become an increasingly urgent issue in the coming years. All the evidence suggests the number of forcibly displaced people will continue to grow. UNHCR has noted that the number of refugees under its mandate nearly doubled between 2012 and 2018.³⁸⁵ Many major 'push factors' of migration—wars, internal conflicts, repression, persecution, lack of employment opportunities, poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, climate change and so on—are all on the rise.³⁸⁶ Specific crises such as the war in Syria, which prompted a surge in refugees, have resulted in further crackdowns against all migrants that then become permanent and accelerate tightening migration control. Most states remain on a steady course of massive budget increases for border security and the introduction of increasing border security and control measures and new technologies, regardless of the actual number of refugees heading towards their borders, fuelled by the underlying narrative of migration as a threat and security problem.

This will result in market growth in all the sectors this report has examined, and presents new profit opportunities for many companies. All the companies and investors identified must realise, however, that these opportunities entail high risks of getting (further) involved in human rights violations. This means that they must ultimately decide whether they want help create a world of walls and deportations or work towards a world of bridges, support for refugees and migrants and help eliminate the causes of forced migration.

ANNEX—TEN LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS IN PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANIES

Information correct at 15 December 2020 on www.marketscreener.com

For non-listed companies: short note on legal structure and/or ownership.

ACCENTURE

- Publicly listed
- Ticker387: ACN
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: IT Services & Consulting
- Largest shareholders:

The Vanguard Group, Inc.	52,897,164	8.35%
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	26,681,351	4.21%
Massachusetts Financial Services Co.	24,214,891	3.82%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	15,379,486	2.43%
Capital Research & Management Co. (Global Investors)	12,471,154	1.97%
Wellington Management Co. LLP	10,536,469	1.66%
Fidelity Management & Research Co.	9,801,236	1.55%
Northern Trust Investments, Inc. (Investment Management)	9,535,688	1.51%
Geode Capital Management LLC	9,473,908	1.50%
Morgan Stanley Investment Management Ltd.	8,623,551	1.36%

AIRBUS SE

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: AIR
- Stock exchange: Euronext Paris
- Sector: Aerospace & Defence
- Largest shareholders:

Government of France	85,835,477	10.9%
Gesellschaft zur Beteiligungsverwaltung GZBV mbH & Co.KG ³⁸⁸	85,709,822	10.9%
Capital Research & Management Co. (World Investors)	40,004,438	5.10%
Government of Spain	32,330,381	4.12%
Capital Research & Management Co. (Global Investors)	31,296,132	3.99%
PRIMECAP Management Co.	16,513,798	2.11%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	16,263,868	2.07%
Invesco Advisers, Inc.	8,925,467	1.14%
Amundi Asset Management SA (Investment Management)	8,695,736	1.11%
Lyxor International Asset Management SAS	8,358,788	1.07%

The government-owned shares of Airbus are based on a 'contractual partnership', which dates from the 2000 merger of mainly German and French companies into the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS, as Airbus was formerly called).

BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON HOLDING CORPORATION

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: BAH
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: IT Services & Consulting
- Largest shareholders:

The Carlyle Group LP (Corporate Private Equity)	15,989,419	11.6%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	13,367,066	9.69%
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (Investment Management)	13,300,185	9.64%
JPMorgan Investment Management, Inc.	7,873,309	5.71%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	3,885,849	2.82%
Senator Investment Group LP	3,680,500	2.67%
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	3,499,938	2.54%
Point72 Asset Management LP (Old)	3,185,104	2.31%
Systematic Financial Management LP	2,959,728	2.15%
Black Creek Investment Management, Inc.	2,890,915	2.10%

CLASSIC AIR CHARTER INC.

- Private company
- Owned by Seven Seas Aero LLC.³⁸⁹

COBHAM LTD.

- Private company

In January 2020 Advent International, a US private equity investor, completed the £4 billion purchase of Cobham, turning it into a private business and delisting it from the London Stock Exchange.³⁹⁰

CORECIVIC, INC.

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: CXW
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: Specialised REITs
- Largest shareholders:

The Vanguard Group, Inc.	18,940,963	15.8%
Epoch Investment Partners, Inc.	6,445,518	5.39%
Pershing Square Capital Management LP	4,417,100	3.69%
QMA LLC	4,147,010	3.47%
Marcato Capital Management LP	3,967,355	3.32%
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	3,946,556	3.30%
JANA Partners LLC	3,534,195	2.95%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	3,341,191	2.79%
Capital Research & Management Co.	3,250,000	2.72%
Orbis Investment Management Ltd.	2,865,955	2.40%

DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU LTD.

- Private company.

Deloitte describes itself as a 'global network of member firms, and their related entities (collectively, the 'Deloitte organization'). DTTL (also referred to as 'Deloitte Global') and each of its member firms and related entities are legally separate and independent, which cannot obligate or bind each other in respect of third parties. DTTL and each DTTL member firm and related entity is liable only for its own acts and omissions, and not those of each other.³⁹¹

ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD.*

- Publicly listed.
- Ticker: ESLT
- Stock exchange: Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
- Sector: Aerospace & Defense
- Largest shareholders:

Michael Federmann	19,580,342	44.3%
1832 Asset Management LP	1,552,713	3.51%
Fidelity Management & Research Co.	1,041,726	2.36%
Altshuler Shaham Mutual Funds Management Ltd.	714,225	1.62%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	608,510	1.38%
KSM Mutual Funds Ltd.	373,670	0.85%
William Blair Investment Management LLC	344,994	0.78%
Psagot Mutual Funds Ltd.	273,239	0.62%
Gilder, Gagnon, Howe & Co. LLC	269,380	0.61%

Michael Federmann is an Israeli businessman and chair of the Board of Directors of Elbit.³⁹²

*19 October 2020: It was brought to our attention that Kennedy Capital Management, originally named here, didn't actually hold shares of Elbit. After verifying with other sources we found that there was indeed a mistake on the website we used as a resource for this.

EURASYLUM LTD.

- Private company³⁹³

G4S PLC

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: GFS
- Stock exchange: London Stock Exchange
- Sector: Business Support Services
- Largest shareholders:

Credit Suisse Securities Europe Ltd. (Market-Maker)	129,412,325	8.34%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd.	116,327,811	7.50%
Harris Associates LP	106,247,631	6.85%
Mondrian Investment Partners Ltd.	72,720,019	4.69%
Morgan Stanley Investment Management Ltd.	55,811,000	3.60%
Marathon Asset Management LLP	53,493,399	3.45%
Macquarie Investment Management Europe SA	47,270,159	3.05%
St. James's Place plc	44,590,339	2.87%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	40,775,219	2.63%
Jarislowsky, Fraser Ltd.	38,724,477	2.50%

In December 2020 G4S announced it had agreed to a takeover offer from US company Allied Universal Security Services, and recommended shareholders to accept this offer.³⁹⁴

THE GEO GROUP, INC.

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: GEO
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: Specialised REITs
- Largest shareholders:

The Vanguard Group, Inc.	18,268,979	15.4%
Cohen & Steers Capital Management, Inc.	5,759,102	4.75%
Artemis Investment Management LLP	5,322,944	4.39%
Elliott Management Corp.	4,836,003	3.99%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	3,974,532	3.28%
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	3,794,730	3.13%
QMA LLC	3,532,505	2.91%
George Christopher Zoley	3,254,852	2.68%
Rainier Investment Management LLC	2,983,725	2.46%
Pzena Investment Management LLC	2,966,296	2.45%

George Zoley is CEO, Chairman of the Board of Directors and founder of the GEO Group.³⁹⁵

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION (IBM)

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: IBM
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: IT Services & Consulting
- Largest shareholders³⁹⁶:

The Vanguard Group, Inc.	70,163,693	7.87%
SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	52,983,332	5.95%
BlackRock Fund Advisers	42,804,913	4.80%
Geode Capital Management LLC	13,057,810	1.47%
Charles Schwab Investment Management	11,628,307	1.31%
Northern Trust Investments, Inc.	10,999,396	1.23%
Norges Bank Investment Management	8,981,778	1.01%
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC	7,604,383	0.85%
BlackRock Investment Management	7,334,267	0.82%
Mellon Investments Corp.	6,275,256	0.70%

IDEMIA

- Private company

IDEMIA is owned by the private equity firm Advent International. In 2017 Advent International, which was already the majority shareholder of Oberthur Technologies, acquired Safran Identity & Security (Morpho) to create OT-MORPHO (formerly IDEMIA).³⁹⁷

LEONARDO

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: LDO
- Stock exchange: Italian Stock Exchange
- Sector: Aerospace & Defence
- Largest shareholders:

Government of Italy	174,626,554	30.2%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd.	11,685,372	2.02%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	11,378,669	1.97%
T. Row Price International Ltd.	7,683,728	1.33%
Norges Bank Investment Management	7,163,283	1.24%
Banca d'Italia	5,857,052	1.01%
Boston Partners Global Investors, Inc.	5,033,343	0.87%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	4,857,344	0.84%
BlackRock Investment Management LLC	4,574,682	0.79%
Dimensional Fund Advisors LP	4,283,169	0.74%

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: LMT
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: Aerospace & Defense
- Largest shareholders:

SSgA Funds Management, Inc.	42,225,887	15.1%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	20,845,412	7.45%
Capital Research & Management Co. (World Investors)	16,779,234	6.00%
Putnam LLC	14,876,263	5.32%
Wellington Management Co. LLP	10,699,145	3.82%
Capital Research & Management Co.	8,338,200	2.98%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	5,967,810	2.13%
TCI Fund Management Ltd.	5,696,062	2.04%
Managed Account Advisors LLC	5,031,345	1.80%
Geode Capital Management LLC	4,078,052	1.46%

MITIE GROUP

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: MTO
- Stock exchange: London Stock Exchange
- Sector: Business Support Services
- Largest shareholders:

Silchester International Investors LLP	210,021,726	17.9%
Brandes Investment Partners LP	61,296,207	5.23%
Northern Trust Global Investments Ltd. (Securities Lending)	60,740,000	5.19%
FIL Investment Advisors (UK) Ltd.	36,506,546	3.12%
Heronbridge Investment Management LLP	35,634,354	3.04%
Harris Associates LP	35,317,544	3.02%
Fidelity Management & Research Co. LLC	35,082,135	3.00%
Norges Bank Investment Management	33,075,000	2.82%
Standard Life Investments Ltd.	28,414,019	2.43%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	23,359,000	1.99%

PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC.

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: PLTR
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: Software & IT Services
- Largest shareholders:

The Founders Fund Management LLC	128,964,328	8.76%
Peter Thiel	114,159,686	7.76%
Sompo Holdings, Inc.	107,526,881	7.31%
Disruptive Technology Solutions LLC	50,290,069	3.42%
UBS AG (New York)	29,956,276	2.04%
Point72 Asset Management LP	29,904,230	2.03%
Eight Enterprises LLC	28,233,725	1.92%
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board	24,156,607	1.64%
BlackRock Advisors LLC	20,875,518	1.42%
Soros Fund Management LLC ³⁹⁸	18,457,516	1.25%

Thiel is President of Palantir and a partner of the Founders Fund, a venture capital firm. Eight Enterprises LLC is another venture firm run by Joe Lonsdale, one of the founders of Palantir, who is also affiliated with Disruptive Technology Solutions LLC.³⁹⁹

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

According to the company, 'PwC is the brand under which the member firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PwCIL) operate and provide professional services. Together, these firms form the PwC network. [...] PwC member firms do not and cannot currently operate as a corporate multinational. The PwC network is not a global partnership, a single firm, or a multinational corporation, [but] consists of firms which are separate legal entities.'⁴⁰⁰

SERCO GROUP

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: SRP
- Stock exchange: London Stock Exchange
- Sector: Business Support Services
- Largest shareholders:

FIL Investment Advisors (UK) Ltd.	72,987,939	5.92%
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd.	65,737,670	5.33%
Jupiter Asset Management Ltd.	61,545,694	4.99%
RWC Asset Management LLP	61,187,686	4.96%
Marathon Asset Management LLP	58,353,594	4.73%
Majedie Asset Management Ltd.	55,965,452	4.54%
UBS Asset Management (UK) Ltd.	55,340,604	4.49%
Orbis Investment Management Ltd.	54,510,229	4.42%
Franklin Templeton Fund Management Ltd.	46,780,000	3.79%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	36,716,858	2.98%

SOPRA STERIA GROUP

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: SOP
- Stock exchange: Euronext Paris
- Sector: IT Services & Consulting
- Largest shareholders:

Sopra GMT SA	4,034,409	19.6%
Amundi Asset Management SA	1,360,083	6.62%
Fidelity Management & Research Co.	688,387	3.35%
Oddo BHF Asset Management SAS	677,654	3.30%
DNCA Finance SA	639,791	3.12%
JPMorgan Asset Management (UK) Ltd.	573,420	2.79%
Norges Bank Investment Management	494,482	2.41%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	397,664	1.94%
BNP Paribas Asset Management France SAS	390,029	1.90%
Kirao SAS	295,325	1.44%

Sopra GMT SA is a financial holding company with investments in Sopra Steria and Axway.⁴⁰¹

THALES

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: HO
- Stock exchange: Euronext Paris
- Sector: Aerospace & Defense
- Largest shareholders:

Government of France	54,788,714	25.7%
Dassault Aviation SA	52,531,431	24.7%
T. Rowe Price International Ltd.	5,921,128	2.78%
Thales SA Employees Stock Ownership Plan	4,228,846	1.98%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	2,923,934	1.37%
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd.	2,702,315	1.27%
DNCA Finance SA	2,370,871	1.11%
Ostrum Asset Management SA	2,195,817	1.03%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd.	1,996,593	0.94%
Fidelity Management & Research Co.	1,975,394	0.93%

Dassault Aviation SA is a French aerospace and defence company, which is largely owned by the Dassault Family (through the Dassault Group). Airbus also holds 9.91% of the shares.⁴⁰²

THOMSON REUTERS

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: TRI
- Stock exchange: Toronto Stock Exchange
- Sector: Professional Information Services
- Largest shareholders:

The Woodbridge Co. Ltd.	327,604,940	65.9%
Royal Bank of Canada	39,352,033	7.92%
Jarislowsky, Fraser Ltd.	8,874,616	1.79%
Fidelity (Canada) Asset Management ULC	8,338,449	1.68%
Harris Associates LP	7,837,810	1.58%
MFS Investment Management Canada Ltd.	7,759,395	1.56%
BMO Capital Markets (Canada)	7,026,125	1.41%
RBC Dominion Securities, Inc. (Investment Management)	5,699,196	1.15%
ValueAct Capital Management LP	5,111,947	1.03%
Great-West Capital Management LLC	4,876,834	0.98%

The Woodbridge Company is a private holding company for the Thomson family.

UNISYS CORPORATION

- Publicly listed
- Ticker: UIS
- Stock exchange: New York Stock Exchange
- Sector: IT Services & Consulting
- Largest shareholders:

Fidelity Management & Research Co. LLC	8,082,268	12.8%
The Vanguard Group, Inc.	7,927,238	12.6%
Neuberger Berman Investment Advisers LLC	3,211,965	5.10%
Perry Corp. (New York)	2,500,000	3.97%
Towle & Co.	2,395,352	3.80%
SsgA Funds Management, Inc.	2,048,610	3.25%
Boston Partners Global Investors, Inc.	1,992,953	3.16%
BlackRock Fund Advisors	1,736,471	2.75%
ArrowMark Colorado Holdings LLC	1,707,381	2.71%
Cambiar Investors LLC	1,568,597	2.49%

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This report highlights the key financial investors in 23 leading border industry and immigration enforcement corporations in the EU, US, and Australia. It examines their co-responsibility for the human rights violations that result from border militarisation and assesses the prospects for a divestment campaign.



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