Drugs policy: What should we do about cannabis?

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Public policy has failed to prevent large-scale consumption of cannabis in most developed countries. So what, if anything, should we do to change the policy environment? Cannabis consumption is unambiguously harmful in several ways, but this does not automatically justify the prohibitionist policy dictated by the international drugs conventions. This paper sets out the arguments for policy intervention in the cannabis market and reviews the directions of policy change that have been called for. We argue that existing theoretical insights and empirical evidence give little compelling reason to prefer prohibition to the alternative of legalization of cannabis with harms controlled by regulation and taxation. Given this conclusion and the much wider prevalence of cannabis than of harder drugs, a reasonable way forward is to remove cannabis production and consumption (but not trade) from the current prohibitionist UN drug control treaties, to allow countries to adopt their own policies, thus generating new evidence on the potential impacts of a wider range of policy.

— Stephen Pudney
Drugs policy: what should we do about cannabis?

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1. INTRODUCTION

Almost any consumption good can be harmful. King Henry I died from a surfeit of lampreys. We eat too much and suffer obesity-related disease, drive around in cars and die from accidents and lack of exercise, drink excessive alcohol and risk alcoholism and liver damage, smoke tobacco and contract lung cancer, use cannabis, opiates, cocaine and amphetamines and risk dependence and impaired cognitive function. Many forms of consumption are controlled in various ways, with policy instruments ranging from health education campaigns, advertising controls, indirect taxation, controls on product quality, supply restrictions and local consumption embargoes, to total bans on supply and purchase, backed by legal penalties. Complementary to this system of primary policy is the health and social care system, offering treatment for the adverse effects of consumption and services to combat dependence. It is sometimes hard to see evidence of rationality in this area of
policy-making and the policy debate is dominated by strong views on either side, often with little theoretical or empirical basis. The public demand for policy action is as interesting a subject for study as the demand for drugs itself.

Here, we concentrate on the most common illegal substance, cannabis (or marijuana, hashish, etc.), which derives from the hemp plant cannabis sativa, particularly subspecies indica. Products of the cannabis plant are commonly classified into three main forms: cannabis resin and other extracts (hashish or hash oil); ‘regular’ herbal cannabis (marijuana); and preparations of the female flowering tops (sinsemilla, skunk). The primary psycho-active constituent is $\Delta^9$-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) but cannabis has a complex chemical structure and there are many other chemical components, whose physical and psychological impacts are not well understood. One component, cannabidiol (CBD), may have a significant antipsychotic effect, so that the mental health consequences of cannabis use may depend on the relative THC and CBD content (Zuardi et al., 1982).

Cannabis is easily cultivated and widely available in most developed countries, although there are striking international differences in prevalence levels and trends. It is an illegal substance everywhere, although with considerable variation in the rigour of enforcement and severity of punishment. As a consequence of its illegality, consumption measurement is difficult, particularly for the purposes of international comparison. The most reliable source of international comparative data is the ESPAD group of school surveys which use harmonized questions on comparable samples of 16-year-olds in a large number of European countries, and the similar US Monitoring the Future survey. Figure 1 summarizes the proportion of survey respondents in 1995–2007 who reported having used cannabis at any time in the past. Over that 12-year period, prevalence increased in all the former socialist countries, with a recent decline in 14 of the 20 countries. Self-reported prevalence in these school cohorts remains remarkably high – exceeding 25% in eight countries.

Figure 1. Lifetime cannabis prevalence among 16-year-old school students in Europe and the USA (ESPAD school surveys and US Monitoring the Future survey)
Cannabis use tends to start early or not at all. The left-hand panel of Figure 2, based on 2003 cross-section survey data for England and Wales shows the typical pattern of (current) cannabis use by age: a rapid rise from the early teens to a peak in the mid to late teens, followed by a slower decline, with prevalence falling to near zero by fifty. The right-hand panel shows lifetime prevalence, indicating that over half the people interviewed had used cannabis by their early twenties. The decline following that peak is a reflection of the rising macro trend in cannabis consumption over the previous three decades. Few people commence cannabis use over the age of 25, so there is a strong cohort effect: many people in earlier generations were never initiated into drug use. This in turn means that the future decline in cannabis consumption by people currently in their twenties is unlikely to be as rapid as the left-hand panel of Figure 2 suggests. The age profile in Figure 2 is generally representative of the pattern observed in developed countries, except that onset is rather earlier, and peak prevalence higher, in the UK than most other countries. Figures 1 and 2 reveal a relatively early age of initiation into cannabis use for a substantial minority of users and this is a particular concern, given the strong empirical association between early first use and the length and intensity of the period of subsequent cannabis consumption (Pudney, 2004).

Prices are more difficult to measure than consumption: most available price data are a by-product of criminal intelligence and market disruption activity by enforcement agencies and they fall short of the quality standards achievable for other price indexes. Prices derived from surveys of drug users often contain large outliers, in part because, in the absence of a standard marketed product, there is considerable confusion about the physical units involved. However, the general picture in recent years is one of real price stability or decrease at the retail level. For example, in the US, the average cannabis price is estimated to have halved in real terms from 1991.

Figure 2. The age profile of cannabis prevalence (i) within the previous 12 months and (ii) any time in the past (England and Wales Offending Crime and Justice Survey 2003)
to 1998 and to have risen only slightly from 1999 to 2003 (Caulkins et al., 2004). In the UK, price figures gathered by the criminal intelligence service suggest a fall of around 15% in nominal terms over 2000–4 (Pudney et al., 2006), while average prices recorded in an independent internet survey (Independent Drug Monitoring Unit [IDMU], 2009) suggest a slight fall in nominal terms over 2002–6. The picture is similar in Australia, where a 35% fall in the real cannabis price has been reported over the 1990s, mostly occurring in the first couple of years of the decade (Clements, 2002). It is clear that policy has largely failed to bring about a rise in the real price of cannabis, which remains one of the cheapest ways to achieve a ‘high’ – generally much cheaper than alcohol (Kleiman, 1992).

Given the failure of policy to prevent large-scale consumption of cannabis, what, if anything, should we do to change the policy environment? No serious commentator disputes the fact that cannabis consumption is harmful in various ways, but this is not in itself sufficient justification for a prohibitionist policy. In this paper, we set out the arguments for policy intervention in the cannabis market and outline some directions of policy change that have been called for. We then consider the research evidence available as a basis for policy review, concluding that it is hard to find strong theoretical arguments or empirical evidence to support the current regime of prohibition. We argue that there is no compelling reason to prefer prohibition to the alternative of legalization of cannabis with harms controlled by regulation and taxation. Given this conclusion and the much wider prevalence of cannabis than of harder drugs, a reasonable way forward is to remove cannabis production and consumption (but not trade) from the current prohibitionist UN drug control treaties, to allow countries to adopt their own policies.

In addition to reviewing existing evidence and proposing liberalization of the international drug control framework, this paper makes new contributions to the research literature in two important areas: (1) the effectiveness of demand policing policy within a prohibitive legal regime; and (2) the evidence for ‘gateway’ theory which asserts that cannabis use increases the risk of later involvement with hard drugs. On (1) we examine (Section 3.3) the outcome of the British reclassification of cannabis in 2004, which effectively decriminalized cannabis possession. On (2) we investigate (Section 3.4 and Appendices B–C) theoretically and empirically one form of gateway theory – the access gateway – which is often cited as the rationale for the Dutch policy of tacit legalization. We also (Section 2.3 and Appendix A) give a new statistical argument suggesting that existing research evidence for the gateway theory may be spurious to some degree.

2. CANNABIS HARMS AND ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR INTERVENTION

It is useful to distinguish four distinct bases for a given legal position on cannabis: First is the orthodox idea of imperative law as an imposed obligation with legal sanctions imposing costs on wrongdoers, who are thus presented with a disincentive to
use the drug. Second, law may be seen as *education*, the illegal status of cannabis being used to signal the existence of harms to ill-informed citizens. Third, the theory of *expressive law* (Cooter, 1998) sees policy instead as a device for signalling a moral position or social norm, which may influence behaviour either directly, by inducing individuals to internalize that norm and effecting a change in preferences or, indirectly, by highlighting a particular social equilibrium and influencing equilibrium selection. There is some evidence in favour of this expressive role in simple experimental games (Bohnet and Cooter, 2001; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008), where drawing attention to a particular equilibrium without altering incentives has been found to influence outcomes. A fourth role of legislation is as a public *consumption good*. Supporting a law prohibiting specific behaviour can be used to distance oneself from groups which happen to be characterized by that behaviour. Even if the behaviour in question is not especially harmful and the law ineffective, the existence of the law can generate utility for members of the pro-legislation group by reinforcing a positive self-image or expressing distaste.

Given these various roles, how should we view the law on cannabis? The education and expressive roles of cannabis legislation are often emphasized but young people (particularly those with developmental problems making them vulnerable to risky behaviour) are not well represented in, or closely identified with, the institutions of legislative power. For example, Torrey-Purta *et al.* (2001) analyse civic trust among 14-year-olds in 28 countries, finding that only 20–25% ‘always trust’ the courts and police, around 10% national and local government and only 4% political parties (Smith, 1999). It is plausible to argue that society is polarized to some degree, with parallel and antithetic social norms operating in different social groups – particularly so in relation to cannabis, which has a historical association with a counter-culture.¹ Prohibition as expressive law may strengthen adherence to the non-consumption social norm among the ‘establishment’ group, while simultaneously strengthening the dissident identity of the counter-culture group who are at highest risk of starting cannabis use.

Historical anecdote tends to support this idea of polarization and the interpretation of legislation as a public consumption good, particularly given the apparently arbitrary nature of the set of substances identified as the objects of drug policy. In Hogath’s London, gin was the subject of a moral panic leading to calls for tough policy that were met with the introduction of a series of stringent laws (Warner, 2003). Today, gin – preferably with tonic water (which was originally produced as a drug) – is a highly respectable drink consumed by many who deplore cannabis consumption and call for tough drugs policy. The increasing disdain for opiates in Britain at the end of the 19th century stemmed in part from a presumed association of opiates with the recent influx of Chinese immigrants: a view which conve-

¹ This is similar to the point made by Kuran (1998) in the context of ethnic identity.
niently overlooked Britain’s role in promoting the opium trade. The more recent heated debate over cannabis began as a reaction to the counter-culture of the 1960s and has also sometimes been linked to particular minority ethnic groups. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that the expressive power of the establishment group’s support for prohibition is unlikely to be great. We present evidence consistent with this in Section 3.3. Perhaps the most powerful objection to the view of prohibition as effective education or reinforcement of a social norm is its historical lack of success: cannabis was illegal throughout the 1970s and 1980s when cannabis prevalence rose strongly in most developed countries.

The case for intervention in the cannabis market hinges on five main issues. First, the direct internal harms experienced by users themselves and the extent to which the risks are fully considered. This in turn depends on the information available to potential cannabis users and their capacity to make ‘rational’ decisions. Second, the direct external costs of cannabis use incurred by others besides the user. Third, the indirect costs stemming from the additional engagement in further illicit drug use that might be induced by experience of cannabis. Fourth, the potential effectiveness of available anti-cannabis policy instruments; and fifth, the costs of implementing those policies. It should be emphasized that the existence of harm to the user from cannabis consumption is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for policy intervention to be socially desirable. This is an important point, ignored by much of the medical research literature, which concentrates on estimating the magnitude of internal harms, and often appears to assume that the existence of such harms necessarily generates a case for prohibition.

2.1. Direct costs internal to the user

The direct internal costs of cannabis use relate to harms experienced by the user alone. They include damage to health, curtailment of life and loss of productivity and earnings. Much depends on the size of these risks, the nature of individual decision-making and the degree to which the risk was appreciated at the time the consumption decisions were made. For economists, the theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988) is the benchmark model of demand for a potentially addictive good. It views demand behaviour as fully informed, forward-looking and risk-free and, despite these unpromising assumptions, is able to predict some of the features of drug-dependent behaviour observed among addicts in practice, including price-responsiveness, ‘binges’ and periods of temporary abstinence. Such behaviour may be a response to adverse external shocks and may be a reflection of great distress, but it is a ‘rational’ response to those shocks and is, from the addict’s point of view, the best possible response. Thus, although policy may have a role through the prevention of events like family dissolution and the creation of employment opportunities, there is no way of improving the welfare of the potential drug user by preventing access to drugs. The Becker-
Murphy view has been challenged in recent theoretical work, which suggests a role for policy as a means of improving the welfare of potential drug users. Box 1 indicates the range of behavioural theories that have been proposed and the corresponding policy implications. Note that the latter assume a baseline world without distortions and the implications of these theories in a world with existing tax distortions and market failures, particularly in the alcohol and tobacco markets, is much less clear. The competing theories differ subtly in their conceptualization of addiction and there remains some doubt about whether cannabis should be regarded as an addictive substance. The work of discriminating between the theories empirically is not well advanced.

**Box 1. Behavioural models of addiction and their policy implications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Internal welfare effects of policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational addiction</td>
<td>Complementarity between consumption of the addictive good in different periods.</td>
<td>No role for policy beyond correction of market failures.</td>
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<td>(Becker and Murphy, 1988)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperfect information</td>
<td>Imperfect information about vulnerability to harm; learning from experience.</td>
<td>Public information improves welfare, particularly if uncertainty relates to characteristics of the commodity rather than individual vulnerability. Efficient tax-funded insurance to fund drug treatment programmes is welfare-improving. Prohibition may increase or decrease welfare.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Orphanides and Zervos, 1995)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temptation</td>
<td>Preferences relate to both consumption bundles and the opportunity set from which they are chosen, with costly self-control. Consumers maximize the sum of ‘commitment’ utility and ‘temptation’ utility.</td>
<td>In the simplest case, welfare gains can only be achieved by eliminating temptation, so a pure tax policy distorts choice without curtailing temptation and is welfare-decreasing. If the commitment utility is maximized with zero drug consumption (i.e. drugs are unambiguously bad), pure prohibition (unaccompanied by any price change) improves welfare; otherwise, prohibition may increase or decrease welfare. In general, welfare need not be increased by policies that reduce drug consumption.</td>
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<td>(Gul and Pesendorfer, 2007)</td>
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<td>Cue-conditioned failures of rationality</td>
<td>Random periods of ‘hot’ non-rational decision-making, induced by environmental cues; occurrence rates raised by past consumption levels.</td>
<td>Policy improves welfare if it either reduces probability of ‘hot’ mode or restrains irrational choices when in hot mode. Taxes distort rational choices in ‘cold’ mode but have no effect on choices in ‘hot’ mode. Prohibition distorts prices causing welfare loss in cold mode decisions and creates supply constraints, with beneficial effects in hot mode but adverse effects in cold mode. Consumption regulation improves welfare by reducing environmental cues and varying behaviour in hot mode.</td>
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<td>(Bernheim and Rangel, 2005)</td>
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Another fundamental issue is the extent to which all individuals have the cognitive abilities required to make the ‘rational’ decisions envisaged by intertemporal theories of demand. This is particularly a concern for drug use in adolescence before decision-making skills are fully developed and for people with learning difficulties or other psychological impairments. There is some evidence from survey data of a lack of awareness of drugs and their effects among young teenagers but, paradoxically, ignorance seems to be greatest among those who report no drug use. There is also evidence to suggest that cognitive ability is related to decision-making capacity in general (Burks et al., 2008) and to drug use in particular (Conti, 2008). However, these findings leave us some way from being able to estimate the share of internal costs which are anticipated and fully considered and therefore irrelevant to non-paternalistic policy.

How great are the potential internal harms in the case of cannabis? Although it is clear that cannabis consumption may have damaging consequences, it is difficult to assemble a strong evidence-based argument that cannabis is more damaging than several other legal forms of consumption (see MacCoun and Reuter (2001) for a very good overview of the evidence). Nutt et al. (2007) construct an explicit ranking of drugs (summarized in Figure 3) based on UK expert opinion, concluding that cannabis is significantly less harmful and less addictive than tobacco and alcohol and, more generally, that the three-group classification of substances used by UK law bears little relation to potential harms.

While there are many people who might be classified on some measurement conventions as being dependent on cannabis, this is essentially a consequence of the large size of the cannabis user group and there is not much evidence of severe dependency problems (Swift et al., 1997). Virtually no deaths are officially recorded as cannabis-related, but this is partly due to the limitations of the recording process. In many cases it is impossible to tell whether cannabis has contributed to death, since the health impacts of cannabis use are possibly wide-ranging and indirect and

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<td>Present-biased decision-making</td>
<td>There are distinct ‘selves’ in different periods and today’s decision may not be optimal for tomorrow’s ‘self’.</td>
<td>Intra-individual externalities between multiple selves justify consumption taxes. If age-specific consumption taxes are impossible, direct regulation of consumption by the young may be justified. No unambiguous policy implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection bias</td>
<td>A tendency to underestimate preference change that will occur in future. Inter-temporal choices are distorted. When craving is strong, future desire is overestimated and quitting is discouraged.</td>
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not easily identifiable in practice. Possible harms to physical health include lung disease, which is a consequence of the most common form of consumption – smoking, often in combination with tobacco.

The effect of cannabis on the incidence of accidents and violent injury is disputed and some experimental evidence has – rather implausibly – suggested that the calming effect sometimes associated with cannabis may reduce the incidence of some types of accident (Smiley, 1986). Most of the available evidence suggests a positive but quantitatively small association between cannabis use and road accidents (Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs [ACMD], 2008), although the evidence is difficult to interpret, not least because many drivers who test positive for cannabis also test positive for alcohol and it is difficult to attribute the excess risk of accident to either substance.

Most attention has been paid to the link between cannabis consumption and psychotic illness. Despite recent publicity, this is best seen as a continued accumulation of evidence supporting a long-standing concern, rather than a newly discovered phenomenon or a newly proved fact (see Arseneault et al., 2004 for a review). It is certainly true that there is a higher proportion of cannabis users among people with poor mental health than in the general population and also that cannabis use tends to precede and to have some predictive power for subsequent diagnosis of psychotic and other mental illness (Van Os et al., 2002). However, this is a research area beset with confounding factors, making it difficult to determine the causality linking cannabis use and mental illness. Linked to the mental health concern is recent evidence of change in the production and nature of cannabis products, with a rising trend in the average THC-content of cannabis seized by enforcement agencies in the US and Europe: for example a rise from 4.5% to 8.1% in seized samples in the US between 1997 and 2007 (National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA], 2008),

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**Figure 3. Subjective expert assessment of relative drug harms (adapted from Nutt et al., 2007)**
largely the result of substitution of domestically produced sinsemilla for imported lower-potency cannabis. Neither for the US (NIDA, 2008) nor the UK (ACMD, 2008) is there much evidence of rising potency within the hashish/herbal/sinsemilla categories, but the market share of sinsemilla has grown over time: for example, the UK Forensic Science Service reports a rise in the sinsemilla share of seized samples from 15% to 81% over 2002–8. A large unknown in the link between potency and mental health is the degree to which users adjust their consumption quantities to variations in potency (‘auto-titration’), which has long been recognized (Mikuriya and Aldrich, 1988). Some volume adjustment is likely (after all, whisky is not generally drunk in the same volume as beer) and it is possible that this effect could reduce some health dangers of cannabis consumption through reductions in the volume of inhaled smoke (Matthias et al., 1997). The lack of any upward trend in hospital admissions for cannabis poisoning matching the trend in potency is consistent with this argument: for example, hospital episodes for cannabis poisoning in England fell over the period 2004–7, at a time when average THC potency appears to have been rising rapidly.

The impact of cannabis use on educational attainment, employment and productivity has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers, but with few clear conclusions. Conditional on being in employment, cannabis use has no detectable impact on earnings (and thus, presumably, on productivity), with positive estimated impacts being as common in the research literature as negative ones. Negative associations are generally found between cannabis use (particularly early use) and subsequent educational achievement and employment, but the interpretation of these associations as causal impacts is disputed. For example, Kandel et al. (1986) found educational attainment to be unrelated to cannabis use after allowing for observed factors such as pre-existing educational aspirations, whereas Van Ours and Williams (2009), using less informative data but allowing for persistent unobservable confounding factors, found strong effects which they interpret as causal. A common finding casting doubt on causality is that drug use is frequently preceded by other signs of behavioural problems, such as truancy and minor crime (Pudney, 2003).

2.2. Direct costs external to the user and policy implementation costs

The few existing estimates of the external costs of drug use vary widely, ranging from 0.2% of GDP for Canada in 1992 and 0.4% for Germany in 1996 to 1.7% in the US in 2002 and 1.8% for the UK in 2000 (UNDC, 1998; ONDCP, 2004). These studies differ widely in coverage and methodology and do not separate cannabis from other drug types. There is no clear distinction between policy implementation costs and other external costs, since many of the latter are a direct consequence of the policy environment – indeed, this is one of the main arguments used by advocates of legalization. These costs are high: for example, the criminal justice system (CJS) cost of action against drugs in the US is estimated to be over
one-fifth of total costs (ONDCP, 2004). Legalization of cannabis would remove CJS costs but (to the extent that demand rises in response), would increase treatment and health care costs. It is difficult to estimate the net effect with any certainty, although the lack of evidence of large adverse health impacts suggests that the net effect of liberalization will usually be a cost saving.

Drug-related crime constitutes a large part of the external costs of drug use. For example, the UK Drug Harm Index (MacDonald et al., 2005) assigns over two-thirds of its weight to drug-related property crime. For Australia, Collins and Lapsley (2008) estimate that crime was responsible for 56% of the tangible costs arising from illicit drugs in 2004/5; the ONDCP (2004) gives a similar estimate for the US.\(^2\) Drugs might influence crime in various ways. If drug use damages educational achievement and employment opportunity, then acquisitive crime becomes more rewarding relative to legal income-generating activity. Drugs (particularly alcohol) might be directly involved in provoking violent responses to external provocation and violence is also sometimes a feature of the working of illicit markets, where legal enforcement of contracts is impossible. Research on the costs of drug use has generally used crude methods to estimate the proportion of crime regarded as drug-related. One approach is to count as drug-induced all crimes committed by drug users (a counterfactual of perfect law-abidance in the absence of cannabis). It is true that cannabis use is prevalent among offenders: for example, 46% of the 2003/4 England and Wales Arrestee Survey sample reported using cannabis within the previous month (Boreham et al., 2006) compared with 11% for the general population British Crime Survey. However, the difference between these figures tells us nothing about the causal impact of cannabis use on crime, since many confounding factors could produce such an association. A better approach is to use survey questions on the motives for criminal activity; for example, Collins and Lapsley (2008) estimate that 41–51% of crime in Australia in 2004/5 was attributable to drug use. This too is open to objection on grounds that criminals may be no better at analysing causation than are researchers and may find it convenient to blame an external factor for their own behaviour. Consequently, it is likely that most estimates of the incidence and cost of drug-related crime are upward biased. There have been few attempts to develop causal behavioural models for simulating crime in a counterfactual drug-free world.

I know of no studies of drug-related crime which separate cannabis from other drug types as a source of crime, partly because many criminals are poly-drug users and it is infeasible to distinguish the separate contribution of each substance. However, there is little reason to believe that the external cost of cannabis-related acquisitive crime is any greater than that of tobacco-related crime, because (like tobacco) cannabis is cheap and available and (unlike tobacco) not believed to be

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\(^2\) These estimates include policing and CJS costs involved in preventing and responding to drug-related crime.
seriously addictive. Unlike alcohol, there is little credible evidence to support a view of cannabis use as a cause of violent or anti-social behaviour.

The public provision of health care and treatment to drug users who experience personal harm from their consumption is a choice made by a society which perceives the social burden of treatment costs as preferable to leaving drug-induced health problems untreated. There has been a sharp rise in cannabis-related treatment in both the UK and US since the early 1990s (for example, Caulkins et al. (2002) report that caseloads almost doubled in the US between 1993 and 1998) and a similar expansion is under way in the UK. This has been largely a planned expansion in the supply of treatment places, much of which originates from the criminal justice system, which increasingly uses schemes trading lighter sentences for enrolment in drug treatment programmes. The cost of US drug treatment programmes is just under a quarter of the federal budget for drug policy ($3.2bn in 2008) and around £0.5bn is budgeted currently by central and local government in England and Wales. It is not possible to allocate these budget totals to individual drugs, but the share of treatment expenditure devoted to cannabis dependency is certainly small.

2.3. Indirect costs – the gateway effect

Given the limited evidence of large direct harms from cannabis consumption, the case for intervention rests principally on indirect harms, internal and external. The possibility of a causal link between cannabis and subsequent hard drug use is known as the gateway or stepping-stone hypothesis and has been the subject of a great deal of research (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001; Kandel, 2002). The gateway hypothesis holds that the act of consuming cannabis causes an increase in the risk of subsequent use of hard drugs. Note the word ‘cause’ – cannabis and hard drug consumption have a strong statistical association, but the gateway hypothesis goes further than this by asserting that there is a causal relationship responsible for at least part of that association. If a causal gateway does exist, its seriousness depends on the social costs associated with the additional induced hard drug consumption, which are not necessarily large and certainly smaller than the total costs of hard drug use.

The causal gateway effect for a given type of individual can be defined as the difference between two probabilities: the probability of subsequent hard drug use conditional on prior cannabis use and the same probability conditional on no prior cannabis use. Importantly, the two probabilities should also be conditional on the individual’s personal characteristics (observable or unobservable) which are determinants of both types of drug use, so as to isolate cannabis use from these other confounding factors. The problem of causal inference is that, since cannabis use and non-use are mutually exclusive states, only one of the two probabilities can be estimated directly from data – the counterfactual is never observed. There are two...
ways of overcoming this fundamental problem. One is to use (preferably random-
ized) controlled experiments: in this case one would administer cannabis to a treat-
ment group and compare their long-run outcomes with those of a control group
given no cannabis. Both groups would have to be insulated from the world of can-
nabis supply and demand but left fully exposed to all other aspects of real life. This
is both unethical and impracticable. A second-best approach is observational: use
statistical analysis to build a longitudinal behavioural model of the child’s develop-
ment process, including both cannabis and hard drug use as observed outcomes,
and then to use the model to simulate lifetime experience of hard drug use in a
hypothetical world in which the individual does not experience cannabis.

The observational approach requires good survey data and, given the difficulty
of collecting data on illicit drug use, it is surprising that there is such a large num-
ber of surveys containing questions about drug consumption. For example, since
the turn of the century, in the UK at least seven different nationwide surveys have
had some coverage of illicit drug use and, in the US, rather more. There are three
main problems with the available data resources: scope, non-response and response
error. It has been argued convincingly that a good understanding of the demand
for drugs requires a broad picture of the child development and socialization pro-
cess, with drug use treated as one of the outcomes of that process (Heckman et al.,
2006). This implies that we need longitudinal surveys tracking development through
childhood into early adulthood, with full observation of the development path. In
contrast, most of the large national surveys with a specific drugs focus (like the US
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the Australian National Drug Strategy Household
Survey and the British Crime Survey) used for monitoring drug prevalence are con-
ducted as a sequence of cross-sectional surveys. The designers presumably believe
that the first priority for research on drug use is a form of prevalence monitoring
that only requires detailed questions on drug use, rather than the developmental
path leading to drug use – an expensive mistake, in my view.

The problem of poor coverage and non-response stems from the fact that people
engaged in illicit activity are less likely to be covered by, and prepared to partici-
pate in, a survey involving questions about that activity. This can cause large dis-
tortions. For example, figures from the British Crime Survey (BCS), which
interviews people living in private households, suggest that there were around 3.4
million cannabis users in England and Wales in 2003/4. A more comprehensive
study by Pudney et al. (2006), attempted to overcome the problem of incomplete
coverage by the BCS by combining surveys sampling the household population and
police arrestees. The resulting estimates of market size imply a figure of around

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3 The British Crime Survey, Arrestee Survey, Survey of Smoking, Drinking & Drug Use among Young People, British Cohort Survey, Longitudi-
nal Study of Young People in England, Offending Crime and Justice Survey and ONS Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity. The first three are or
were annual cross-sections, the last four are longitudinal.
5.5 m for the number of cannabis users. The third problem is that survey respondents may give inaccurate answers, with the aim of concealing their drug use from researchers whom they may not trust completely. While it is possible to raise survey response rates and improve accuracy with interviewing methods (such as computer-assisted self-interviewing) which avoid questioning by an interviewer, these problems cannot be overcome completely and their impact on research findings is not yet well understood.

Even without these data problems, research is not straightforward because of the difficulty of extracting true causal impacts from the statistical associations which are revealed by survey data. The major problem here is the impossibility of observing all the personal characteristics that might be common determinants of drug use. With good longitudinal data, we can observe some details of the individual’s family history and suitably designed survey questions can give indicators of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities and impairments. Most surveys fall short of this ideal, but even the most comprehensive longitudinal survey cannot hope to observe every relevant aspect of the individual and his or her environment. Consequently, a major theme of the research literature is the role of common unobserved ‘confounding’ factors as a source of spurious association between cannabis and hard drug use. In all survey data that I am aware of, it is true that the vast majority (usually well over 90%) of those reporting use of hard drugs (heroin and powder or crack cocaine) also report having used cannabis – almost always earlier than hard drugs. Consequently, naive statistical models of the dynamics of drug use find a strong positive relationship between hard drugs and past cannabis use. But these are not reliable estimates of a causal effect, since precedence in time does not necessarily imply causation – there may be underlying personality traits or family circumstances which are jointly responsible for both forms of drug consumption, with cannabis use occurring earlier because it is more easily available and cheaper than hard drugs (see Pudney, 2003 for a formal analysis). Applied research (for example, Fergusson and Horwood, 2000) has generally found that the inclusion of variables reflecting socio-economic background and psychological attributes reduces the size of the estimated gateway effect, without eliminating it completely.

Many researchers (see Kandel et al., 1992; Pudney, 2003; Van Ours, 2003) have allowed for unobserved confounding factors by assuming them to be fixed over time. It then becomes possible in longitudinal surveys to use the individual’s own past to isolate this common unobserved heterogeneity and strip it out, leaving an estimate of the remaining causal impact of cannabis use on hard drug initiation. Studies of this kind also give reduced estimates of the gateway effect, but there often remains a significant effect.

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4 The latter figures for numbers of drug users were excluded from the published report by the Home Office, to avoid conflict with the official BCS estimates.
The problem with this approach is that it is not very robust. In particular, the assumption of time-invariant confounding factors is very strong, especially for the group of adolescents and young adults who are the primary concern of drugs research. Recent work on the individual development process emphasizes the development through time of abilities and psychological characteristics such as time preference, risk aversion and self-control, rather than their constancy (see Heckman et al., 2006). If this is the case, then some component of the common unobserved factors will fail to be removed by constant-effect methods and the element of spurious correlation will appear as an apparently causal gateway effect. Studies of this kind can be expected to overestimate the gateway effect. Box 2 summarizes this argument and Appendix A gives a specific technical illustration of the possible bias, using a fixed-effects regression specification as a simple example. The same reservation applies equally to many other areas of drugs research where confounding variables are present, including the impact of drug use on mental health, crime and educational attainment. We return to the gateway hypothesis, particularly its policy implications, in Section 3.4 below.

Box 2. The gateway effect

The gateway effect refers to the causal impact of cannabis consumption on the propensity to use hard drugs in the future. It is also likely that both cannabis and hard drug use are influenced by economic, social and psychological factors that are not observed by researchers. Possible examples of such confounding factors include personality characteristics like self-control, time preference, awareness and aversion to risk; or developmental inputs like parenting quality, composition of the child’s local peer group and school disciplinary control. Given the infeasibility of randomized controlled trials involving the administration of cannabis and monitoring of its long-term consequences, research is mainly based on observational methods that analyze the sequence of cannabis and hard drug use observed over time in surveys, and tries to allow for the existence of unobservable confounding factors ($Q$) which might cause spurious correlation between cannabis use ($C$) and

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5 This developmental view suggests that adverse behavioural outcomes like drug abuse can be seen in part as expressions of developmental problems which may be addressed more effectively by early educational or family interventions than by later drug policy (see Heckman and Masterov, 2007, for a survey.)
and heroin use ($H$). For example, inadequate parenting might predispose the child towards various forms of harmful activity including drug use. Cannabis then tends to occur earlier than hard drugs in the child’s disturbed development because it is cheaper and more easily available.

The research literature relies heavily on the ‘individual effects’ assumption – which asserts that the confounding factor $Q$ is unchanging over time. This allows its influence to be stripped out of the $(C_t, H_t)$ sequence, allowing the remaining association between current cannabis use and subsequent hard drug use to be identified as the causal gateway effect. Panel A shows this for two time periods, where the gateway effect is the link between cannabis in period 1 ($C_1$) and hard drugs in period 2 ($H_2$).

This method is fragile. It breaks down if the confounding factors change over time for reasons unrelated to cannabis use – for example, if there is an unobserved deterioration in the home environment. Panel B shows schematically a case where there is no true gateway effect but the confounding factor evolves through a series of changes $A_1, A_2,...$. If we mistakenly assume that $Q$ remains constant over time, then the ‘individual effect’ method fails to strip out the evolutionary components $A_1, A_2,...$. There then appears to be a link (the dashed arrow) between early cannabis use ($C_1$) and later hard drug use ($H_2$), because $C_1$ captures some of the effect of $A_1$, which is a determinant of $H_2$. But this is an entirely spurious association, not a causal effect. A policy which reduced cannabis consumption without affecting the evolution of $Q$ would not succeed in reducing hard drug prevalence.

### 3. THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY FRAMEWORK AND DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY CHANGE

#### 3.1. The UN drugs conventions

The system of international drug controls has its origins at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the US as the main driver of the move towards international prohibition of drugs for illicit (meaning non-medicinal and non-research) purposes (see McAllister, 2000, for a detailed history). The factors contributing to the development of international narcotics law were far from the rational, evidence-based policy design process generally favoured by economists. The first US anti-drug action came in 1905 with Roosevelt’s reversal of the plan to restore the old Spanish system of licensed opium supply in the Philippines, following a lobbying campaign by missionaries. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the political and moral forces that led to domestic prohibition of alcohol in the US also drove the US pressure behind international drug control initiatives which led to international
acceptance of a drug prohibition objective for both the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations. A constant thread in this policy development is the emphasis on prohibition of non-medical use and criminal penalties for production, trafficking and possession of illicit drugs, which remains the basis of international law on drugs. Cannabis was not originally seen as an object for international drug policy, but was added to the list of proscribed drugs at the League of Nations Second Opium Conference of 1924, following pressure from the Egyptian and Turkish delegations. Cannabis was seen as a minor issue by many of the participants, who were more concerned with controls on the opium trade. Britain and India abstained from the vote, the latter citing cultural and religious reasons for domestic use of the drug. A sub-committee comprising Belgium, Egypt, France, Britain, India, Siam (as was), Turkey and Uruguay produced provisions for the new opium convention, which were adopted unopposed, without significant further consideration. Cannabis has kept its place as an internationally illicit drug since that time, a position not generally reflected in national legislation until rather later.

National governments are currently constrained in their choice of policy on illicit drugs by three UN treaties: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (and its 1972 amendment); the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, whose implementation is overseen by the UN International Narcotics Control Board. The philosophy behind this legal framework was endorsed by the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), which adopted the hugely implausible slogan ‘A Drug Free World – We Can Do It!’ Almost 200 countries are signatories to one or more of these conventions, making them among the most successful international agreements in terms of formal adherence. The treaties cover a large number of substances, classified into four groups intended originally to represent their potential for dependence. The schedule I substances subject to complete prohibition include cannabis, cocaine and opiates and synthetics including LSD, amphetamines, barbiturates and MDMA (Ecstasy); schedules II–IV mainly cover medicinal substances subject to less stringent control. There are also measures directed at drug trafficking, money laundering, production of precursor chemicals, and provisions for extradition and asset seizure. These treaties are concerned mainly with the supply of drugs, but Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention requires nations to make illegal the possession of prohibited drugs for personal consumption under domestic law. Given this international legal framework as a starting point, what are the directions that future policy might take?

3.2. Supply interdiction and consumption policing

Supply interdiction, both domestic and overseas, is the core of current international drugs policy. The dominant player is the US, whose Federal drugs budget for supply-side measures rose from $5.9bn in 2002 to $8.7bn in 2008 (a rise in the share
of the total drugs budget from 55.1% to 63.5%). Of this, $1.08bn rising to $1.67bn was devoted to overseas interdiction, mostly directed at South American cocaine supply. Many independent commentators regard this as largely ineffective, particularly in comparison with domestic drug treatment initiatives, which have absorbed a declining share of the Federal budget, despite having a much higher estimated benefit-cost ratio (Rydell and Everingham, 1994). The scope for successful supply-side enforcement policies directed at cannabis production is still more questionable. Unlike cocaine and opiates, production of cannabis is highly dispersed geographically, with the proportion of the product produced domestically in small-scale enterprises believed to be rising in many countries.

Supply-side interdiction can be counter-productive. It is much easier to identify and act against a large organization – like the Medellin and North Coast cocaine cartels in Colombia, which were centralized enterprises, led by dominant individuals, using violent methods to maintain market dominance. Effective action against them led to the rise of more distributed organizations with a cell-based structure and to smaller independent producers. Seen from the viewpoint of industrial economics, active supply interdiction tends to have two counteracting effects. First, it increases production costs, by increasing risk and also (since large-scale and consequent low unit cost brings visibility) by preventing exploitation of increasing returns to scale. Second, it acts like an anti-trust policy by disrupting large producers and creating market opportunities for smaller competitors, thus tending to increase production and reduce price. It is not immediately clear how these counteracting tendencies play out in practice. Certainly, there is remarkably little evidence of any major long-term effect of supply interdiction in the cocaine market, despite the large scale of resources devoted to it.

On the demand side of the market, there is also little evidence of a large effect of policing. For the typical cannabis user, the risks of apprehension are very low indeed. For example, it has been estimated (see Section 2.3 above) that 5.5 million people used cannabis in England and Wales in 2003/4; approximately 90,000 people were apprehended for cannabis possession, implying an average annual risk of detection around 1.6%. Of course, detection probabilities may be higher for heavy users, who have a greater exposure to risk of detection, but it seems implausible that demand-side policing could have a substantial deterrent effect unless a much stricter and more costly system of enforcement were used.

3.3. Decriminalization of cannabis use

Terms like legalization, liberalization, depenalization and decriminalization are widely used in the debate on drugs policy, yet they have no clear definitions and

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6 Author’s calculation, from Mwenda and Kumari (2005). The 7% of possession detections where the type of drug was left unspecified have been assumed distributed among drug types in the proportions as those where drug type was recorded.
may, as Pacula et al. (2004) have pointed out in the US context, obscure large differences between formal and informal enforcement practices. There is a great diversity of forms that relaxation of prohibition can take in practice.

The much-cited case of the Netherlands illustrates the difficulty of classifying enforcement practices under the current international prohibition regime. Cannabis possession and supply remains formally illegal in the Netherlands but certain outlets are permitted to make small retail sales (up to 5 gm) for consumption on the premises, with strict monitoring to prevent larger sales, underage consumption and sale of harder drugs. In other respects Dutch drug policing is more severe than in many other European countries. In their careful analysis of the Dutch policy, MacCoun and Reuter (2001) identify two phases: an initial post-reform period during which the new freedom had little effect on cannabis demand, followed by a period of increasing commercial exploitation during which the product was more actively promoted and a significant increase in demand may have resulted. However, there is no certainty about this and the scale of cannabis use in the Netherlands is not above the levels observed in the US or several other European countries.

Liberalization in terms of enforcement of the law on cannabis possession is common internationally. In the US, twelve states are usually identified as decriminalizers of cannabis; Australia, Germany, Italy and Spain have witnessed similar liberalization. Few analyses of the effects of these policy changes have led to anything but moderate or negligible estimated effects of liberalization (MacCoun and Reuter, 2001, ch. 10).

A good example of quasi-decriminalization is the reclassification of cannabis in the UK. Britain has a 3-category classification system for illegal drugs, with assignment to classes C to A intended to indicate increasing potential for harm (see Figure 3 above). Class C drugs include benzodiazepine and anabolic steroids; class B includes amphetamines and barbiturates, while class A includes opiates and cocaine but also, more contentiously, LSD and Ecstasy. Legal penalties are related to this classification, with maximum jail terms for supply offences being life (class A) and 14 years (classes B and C). Sentences for possession can be up to 7 years (class A), 5 years (class B) and 2 years (class C), although actual sentences are often considerably lighter than these, particularly for own-use possession offences, where on-the-spot seizure and informal warning is the most common outcome for class C drugs.

In January 2004, cannabis was moved from class B to class C status and policing guidelines indicated that, in most instances, possession would not be treated as an arrestable offence. This intervention had three essential features: a possible reduction in the public perception of cannabis harms caused by its move to a lower-harm category; a reduction in the risk involved in the purchase of cannabis (but not in its supply); and a change in policing practices, with a new power for police to seize the drug and give an on-the-spot warning rather than a formal caution following arrest. It was widely expected that these changes might have the effect of increasing
cannabis demand and many of us in the research community were waiting eagerly for the availability of survey data from the post-2004 period to analyse the impact of this major policy change. In fact, there is no trace of an upward shift in demand discernible in any of the main UK data sources.

Figure 4 and Table 1 summarize an econometric analysis of the series of annual Surveys of Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use spanning the 2004 policy change. A separate probit model was fitted to each year’s data, including dummy variables for age, gender, ethnicity, welfare receipt (entitlement to free school meals) and any episode of exclusion from school. With all other covariates fixed at the pooled sample mean, Figure 4 plots the age profile of the predicted probabilities of cannabis use, experience of being offered cannabis and acceptability of cannabis, by year. There is a clear fall in these age profiles between the pre-liberalization period (2001 and 2003) and the post-reform period (2005 and 2007). Any positive impact that reclassification had, either through incentives or informational/social norm signals was evidently small compared to the downward trend in demand, which is most probably the result of a flow of publicity relating to the adverse health effects of cannabis, as reflected in the trend in attitudes (Figure 4c). Paradoxically, by drawing attention to cannabis, liberalization may have helped to reduce consumption, at least in prevalence terms. Table 1 gives probit coefficients from a single pooled-sample model for each dependent variable, with a test of the hypothesis of no change over time. The downward drift in prevalence, availability and attitudes is highly significant and is also evident in data from the British Crime Survey, which covers a wider age range and is used officially for policy monitoring.

The change in policing practices associated with the British reclassification of cannabis in 2004 is also interesting and perhaps unexpected. Since reclassification there has been a large increase (73% between 2004/5 and 2006/7) in seizures of small quantities of cannabis and a still larger rise (165% between 2004/5 and 2007/8) in the number of police warnings for cannabis possession, which more than offset the corresponding reduction in the number of formal cautions (Kershaw et al., 2008). Thus, the probability of some penalty – even if only forfeit of the drug and a warning – has risen. One cannot rule out the possibility that this lighter but more extensive pattern of policing contributed to the fall in cannabis prevalence, but the fact that the decline in prevalence began earlier suggests otherwise.

3.4. Market segmentation

It was argued above that it has not so far been possible to estimate satisfactorily the causal gateway effect linking cannabis use to the risk of hard drugs. Nevertheless, it remains at the heart of the policy debate and one particular form of the gateway hypothesis underlies a class of policies which aim to segment the drugs market and separate cannabis use from other more damaging forms of consumption. This type of policy rests largely on the supply-side or access gateway hypothesis, discussed by
Figure 4. Predicted age profile of prevalence, availability and attitudes to cannabis by year (Year-specific probit models for Survey of Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use among Young People, 2001–2007). (a) Prevalence: probability of cannabis use in last year; (b) Availability: probability of ever having been offered cannabis; (c) Attitudes: probability of thinking it is ‘OK to try cannabis just once’
Cohen (1972) and adopted as a rationale for the Dutch policy of tacit legalization. The theory rests on three assumptions: (i) drug users are potentially vulnerable to pressure from others to migrate from cannabis to hard drugs; (ii) a significant number of retail cannabis suppliers are also co-suppliers of harder drugs such as heroin or cocaine; (iii) co-suppliers have a profit incentive to move their clients on from cannabis to harder drugs. Under these conditions, contact with co-suppliers generates a causal gateway effect. As usual in drugs research, it is difficult to find strong evidence on the existence and magnitude of this effect, but it opens the possibility that, within a prohibition policy regime, the structure of drug supply penalties can have an impact on the rate of migration from cannabis to hard drugs. We illustrate this possibility with some figures from the US and UK. The evidence presented here is necessarily weak and should be seen as illustrative rather than conclusive.

Table 2 shows the structure of formal sentences for trafficking of specific drugs by Federal courts in the US in 2003 and all courts in England and Wales in 2004. It should be emphasized that this is a dangerous comparison, since only a small minority of US cases are tried in Federal courts. However, the differences are suggestive. Jail sentences are more common and on average considerably longer in US Federal courts, partly reflecting the greater seriousness of the average Federal court case. However, there is also a substantial difference in the relative severity of sentences for different drugs. In England and Wales a convicted hard drug supplier can expect a sentence 5.5 times longer than a convicted cannabis supplier. In the

Table 1. Coefficients for probit models of cannabis prevalence, availability and acceptability of cannabis (pooled data, Survey of Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use, 1999–2007; n = 53,824)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Used in last year?</th>
<th>Ever been offered?</th>
<th>OK to try once?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1999</td>
<td>-11.04 (1.026)**</td>
<td>-4.953 (0.669)**</td>
<td>-9.062 (1.055)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000</td>
<td>-11.00 (1.029)**</td>
<td>-4.900 (0.671)**</td>
<td>-8.642 (1.053)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2001</td>
<td>-10.88 (1.025)**</td>
<td>-4.922 (0.670)**</td>
<td>-8.642 (1.053)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2002</td>
<td>-10.93 (1.027)**</td>
<td>-4.932 (0.670)**</td>
<td>-8.642 (1.053)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2003</td>
<td>-10.92 (1.024)**</td>
<td>-4.901 (0.669)**</td>
<td>-8.910 (1.054)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>-11.04 (1.027)**</td>
<td>-5.002 (0.671)**</td>
<td>-9.226 (1.055)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
<td>-11.04 (1.026)**</td>
<td>-5.063 (0.671)**</td>
<td>-9.168 (1.056)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2006</td>
<td>-11.19 (1.026)**</td>
<td>-5.206 (0.670)**</td>
<td>-9.448 (1.054)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2007</td>
<td>-11.21 (1.027)**</td>
<td>-5.215 (0.670)**</td>
<td>-9.381 (1.055)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.0112 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed race</td>
<td>0.0958 (0.035)**</td>
<td>0.163 (0.028)**</td>
<td>0.0906 (0.039)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-0.577 (0.041)**</td>
<td>-0.530 (0.028)**</td>
<td>-0.491 (0.037)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.282 (0.048)**</td>
<td>-0.048 (0.037)**</td>
<td>-0.184 (0.055)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.348 (0.060)**</td>
<td>-0.352 (0.047)**</td>
<td>-0.248 (0.059)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not eligible for free school meals</td>
<td>-0.066 (0.020)**</td>
<td>-0.062 (0.017)**</td>
<td>0.018 (0.024)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never excluded</td>
<td>-0.824 (0.020)**</td>
<td>-0.760 (0.018)**</td>
<td>-0.641 (0.022)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.134 (0.153)**</td>
<td>0.310 (0.101)**</td>
<td>0.839 (0.158)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age2</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.006)**</td>
<td>0.006 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.006)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2(9)$ test of equality of year effects</td>
<td>195.0***</td>
<td>320.7***</td>
<td>753.3***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*; **; *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
US Federal courts, the ratio is only 2.8. If we think of this as a relative cost ratio, it
suggests that US cannabis suppliers may have a weaker incentive to avoid the hard
drug market than their British counterparts. Of course, many other factors will be
relevant to these supply decisions, but expected penalties are likely to be important.
This in turn suggests that, if our objective is to reduce the number of cannabis
users who migrate to hard drugs, there may be an argument for decreasing, rather
than increasing, the penalties for cannabis supply in order to separate the cannabis
and hard drug markets and protect cannabis users from pressure from suppliers (a
formal analysis of this proposition is given in appendix B). The Dutch ‘coffee shop’
policy can be seen as an extreme form of this policy, with the cannabis /hard drug
penalty ratio set at zero for controlled outlets.

Table 3 continues the US–UK comparison, showing results from the US Monitoring the Future survey and the British Youth Lifestyles Survey, both of which contain questions (listed in Appendix C) on cannabis use and perceived ease of access to hard drugs. The comparison is consistent with the idea that cannabis users in the US have greater exposure to the hard drug market than do cannabis users in the UK. Among non-users, the proportion who report that it would be very easy to obtain hard drugs is 18% in the US sample but less than half that in the UK. A similar difference is observed for more regular users: for example in the US, 41% of those who use cannabis 40 times or more a year report very easy access, while the figure for similar cannabis users in the UK sample is around 32%. In interpreting this evidence, one should bear in mind the significant design differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>US federal drug trafficking convictions, 2003&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>England &amp; Wales supply convictions, 2004&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean nominal sentence (months)</td>
<td>No. imprisoned (thousands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>129.2</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean cannabis sentence&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean HCC sentence&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio HCC/cannabis</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Source: USSC (2005), Figure J; figures refer to the period 1 October 2003–24 June 2004.
<sup>b</sup> Source: calculated from Home Office (2005), tables S14–S16 and S21; figures refer to calendar 2004.
<sup>c</sup> HCC = heroin, crack and cocaine combined. Mean sentences are calculated counting non-custodial sentences as zeros. US figures for the number of zero prison sentences are not broken down by drug type: they have all been assigned to the cannabis category, implying the US HCC/cannabis sentence ratio is an upper bound.
between the two surveys and the fact that differences are not necessarily all the result of divergent policies.

Table 4 presents estimates of the average causal impact of cannabis use on reported ease of access to hard drugs, using four alternative implementations of the propensity score matching method, for two alternative definitions of a cannabis user. In general terms, we take each sampled cannabis user and match him or her with a sampled non-user, chosen to be as similar as possible in terms of a large set of personal characteristics, including measures of access to cannabis, location and neighbourhood characteristics, gender, age, education, ethnicity, smoking and drinking and income. It is possible that confounding factors are not fully captured by the set of characteristics used for matching, but, under conditions set out in

**Table 3. Ease of access to hard drugs by frequency of cannabis use, US and England & Wales (weighted sample proportions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cannabis frequency</th>
<th>Access to hard drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA: Monitoring the Future 1990/96/2002 combined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2 occasions</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–5 occasions</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–9 occasions</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–19 occasions</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–39 occasions</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 or more</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales: Youth Lifestyles Survey 1998/9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every couple of months</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or 3 times a month</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice a week</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–5 days a week</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nearest-neighbour matching</th>
<th>Radius matching</th>
<th>Kernel matching</th>
<th>Stratification matching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA: Monitoring the Future 1990/96/2002 combined (n = 5,226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any cannabis use in the last year</td>
<td>0.076 (1.13)</td>
<td>0.155 (3.57)</td>
<td>0.043 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 or more times a year</td>
<td>0.347 (3.51)</td>
<td>0.438 (7.77)</td>
<td>0.328 (5.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales: Youth Lifestyles Survey 1998/9 (n = 3,880)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any cannabis use in the last year</td>
<td>−0.048 (1.17)</td>
<td>0.040 (1.80)</td>
<td>−0.044 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis use at least 2 or 3 times a month</td>
<td>−0.007 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.052 (0.78)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C, bias will at least be reduced by matching. The results are consistent with a supply-side gateway effect only in the US sample and only if cannabis users are defined as those with at least 20 episodes of use in the last year. For that group, the estimated potential gateway effect is large, with an estimated increase in the probability of easy or very easy access to hard drugs of 31–44 percentage points.

If we choose to believe the supply-side gateway story outlined here, then important policy implications follow. One relates to the design of decriminalization policies. It is common practice, when possession for personal use is decriminalized, to maintain or even increase the penalties associated with cannabis supply to demonstrate a continued intention to be tough on drugs. In contrast with the Dutch coffee shop policy, the UK reclassification of cannabis in 2004 is an example, when possession became a predominantly non-arrestable offence but supply penalties were retained by raising the maximum supply penalty to 14 years for class C drugs (thus incidentally raising penalties for supply of drugs such as anabolic steroids). This might have been a missed opportunity to segment the market more effectively by reducing the penalties for cannabis supply alongside those for cannabis possession, but the results from Table 4 do not suggest a substantial role for market segmentation in the UK.

3.5. Full legalization

Prohibition has two effects: on one hand it raises supplier costs, disrupts market functioning and prevents open promotion of the product; on the other, it sacrifices the authorities’ ability to tax transactions and regulate operation of the market, product characteristics and promotional activity of suppliers. The cannabis prevalence rates in Figure 1 above show clearly that prohibition has failed to prevent widespread use of the drug and leaves open the possibility that it might be easier to control the harmful use of cannabis by regulation of a legal market than to control illicit consumption under prohibition. There are no modern parallels for full legalization of cannabis, but the literature on alcohol Prohibition in the US during 1920–33 gives little reason to expect an explosion of demand following legalization (Miron and Zwiebel, 1995).

There is an interesting contrast between the general public welcome for tobacco and alcohol regulation (including bans on smoking in public places) and the widespread unease with strict prohibition policy on cannabis. It suggests that there might exist a body of public support for a policy stance that permits consumption of moderately harmful substances, provided there is a commitment to rigorous regulation of the market and serious attempts to protect the vulnerable.

What might a legalized system look like? Excise taxes would almost certainly be as high as those on tobacco and alcohol and there would be consequent cross-price effects on those markets. There is mixed research evidence on the direction of these effects, but some studies suggest that cannabis is a complement to tobacco (the two are often consumed in combination) and a substitute for alcohol (see Van Ours, 2007), implying
that cannabis legalization would increase the volume of harms from smoking and reduce those from alcohol. However, the magnitude of these impacts is far from clear.

Regulation of a legalized cannabis market could include production and product controls such as bans on publicly accessible production sites and limits on the THC content or (in view of concerns over the possible link with psychotic illness) the balance between THC and CBL content of the marketed product. Product controls of this kind already exist in the tobacco market, where many countries use mandatory testing and disclosure of chemical constituents and Germany and the UK also ban or limit certain tobacco additives (WHO, 2001). Product controls could in principle be imposed on legalized cannabis products, but note that the tobacco industry (the most likely supplier of legalized cannabis) has a record of resisting regulation very effectively.

Supply regulation would include licensing and inspection of retail sales outlets, with age limits on purchasers. Advertising is likely to be banned or limited and countered by warning notices and this has had a significant impact on tobacco and alcohol consumption (Saffer and Chaloupka, 2000; Saffer and Dave, 2002). Consumption in public places would presumably be banned, in line with prevailing policy on tobacco, which has been found to have at least a temporary impact on smoking rates in most countries.

A major advantage of a legalized market is that health information would be separated from political institutions and may consequently become more effective, since there is a much higher level of trust in health workers and advisers than in political institutions and policy-makers. This may be very important: the evidence for the effectiveness of drug prevention programmes under current conditions suggests some limited effect (Caulkins et al., 2002), but there is occasional episodic evidence that drug demand is potentially very sensitive to certain kinds of signals about health risk that do not originate from government.7

Legalization would not eliminate the black market completely, since taxation and other controls create opportunities for illicit profit. Illicit trading in tobacco and alcohol is significant in most countries – in the UK, for instance, it is estimated that the market share of smuggled cigarettes has ranged from 20% in 2001/2 to 13% in 2006/7 (HM Revenue & Customs, 2008, mid-range estimates). However, the aim of smuggling is generally to evade taxation rather than direct controls on advertising, product quality and consumption, so policy remains partially successful even in the presence of a sizeable black market. Smuggling and the related phenomenon of ‘drug tourism’ are serious issues when there are large international policy differences, particularly in the EU countries which have freedom of movement and little internal border control.

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7 The most celebrated example is the death in the US of basketball player Len Bias in 1986 reported by the press to have resulted from his first use of cocaine, followed within a few days by the death of an NFL player, Don Rogers. The media exposure led to an unparalleled single-year drop in the proportion of 12th grade students reporting cocaine use and a simultaneous jump in the proportion seeing great risk in using cocaine once or twice (Johnston et al., 2006). These effects appear to have persisted for many years.
It is very difficult to predict the outcome of a legalized cannabis market with a system of taxation and regulation in place. It is generally assumed that prices would fall in real terms and consumption rise, although this is not certain. MacCoun and Reuter (2001) have argued in the context of Dutch policy that cannabis use was largely unaffected by the introduction of tacit legalization in 1976 but may have risen since as a consequence of commercial exploitation by retailers of the market thus created. That is a credible conclusion which suggests that the design of market regulation is a critical issue for the legalization option. It is likely but not inevitable that legalization would increase the consumption of cannabis by vulnerable young people but it is not impossible that effective prohibition for the young might prove easier under a legalized system with age controls and effective health information, if commercialization leads to the curtailment of the illicit supply sector.

4. THE QUALITY OF EVIDENCE – AND A PROPOSAL

The major conclusion from a review of the evidence on cannabis markets is – disappointingly – that the evidence is just not good enough to support very strongly any particular view about the best policy to adopt. There certainly are harms from cannabis use but attempts to evaluate them on the basis of individual-level data are frustrated by unobservable confounding factors, misreporting by survey participants and low rates of participation in surveys by groups likely to be particularly vulnerable. The supply side of the market is particularly hard to observe systematically. Experiments with changes in enforcement policy have been made but they are generally local, with cross-contamination between areas and no experimental control and their nature is sometimes unclear in practice, partly because the official policy of prohibition must be maintained for conformity with the UN drugs conventions. For this last reason, policy experiments have also been timid. It has been impossible for any country to take the route of full legalization with policy focused on taxation and controls on advertising, product quality and location of consumption.

Existing evidence on demand management policy, particularly the decriminalization of possession and personal use, does not suggest a large effect for this type of policy within a prohibitionist framework and our analysis of the 2004 reclassification of cannabis in the UK found no trace of the anticipated rise in the prevalence of cannabis use among young people following from the more liberal new regime. The pre-existing declining trend in cannabis use continued unchecked through 2004 to 2007.

We should be careful not to think of policy in unduly simple terms, since the incentives created by policy may not operate in the obvious way. An important example is the access gateway hypothesis, which argues that cannabis use brings consumers into contact with suppliers who have an incentive to encourage their clients to migrate to hard drugs – an argument often used to justify the Dutch
policy of tacit legalization, which segments the drug market by separating cannabis retailing from the market for hard drugs. In contrast to the Netherlands, other countries have usually decriminalized possession and consumption while maintaining high penalties for cannabis supply offences. We have argued that maintaining a higher penalty for retail supply of cannabis than is warranted by its potential harms may amplify the access gateway effect by failing to create a disincentive for dealers to co-supply cannabis and hard drugs. Our comparison of experience from the US and the UK (where the penalty for cannabis supply offences is lower relative to those for hard drugs) is highly speculative but consistent with a story that access to hard drugs by US cannabis users is easier partly because of the weaker incentive that US cannabis suppliers have to avoid co-supplying hard drugs. However, the available evidence on supply behaviour is very thin, so we are far from a clear understanding of the impact of policy on supply behaviour.

Despite the absence of conclusive evidence, it is fair to say that, in policy terms, cannabis looks quite different to most other substances covered by the international prohibition treaties. It is much more prevalent than drugs like cocaine and heroin and is used routinely (and usually transiently) by a very large number of people who appear to know what they are doing and who suffer no detectable harm. The policy stance on cannabis looks out of line with tobacco and alcohol, which have comparable harms and scope for dependence, and on which there appears to be a strong public consensus in favour of a legal market with excise taxes and strict controls on promotional activity by suppliers and on public consumption. Intensive cannabis use, particularly by very young people, undoubtedly causes personal harm but many of this group of users exhibit other earlier problematic behaviour, suggesting the existence of deeper developmental sources of their problems. There is little evidence to suggest that liberalization would greatly expand this group of potentially vulnerable young people and it can be argued that it might be easier to protect these people in a legalized setting where there is some control over the nature of the product and where health information is separated from prohibitionist authority.

I would argue that the best way to begin putting policy on a clearer evidential basis is to allow more variation in policy-making, including the legalization option. This could only be done if domestic supply and consumption of cannabis were to be removed from the international drug prohibition treaties, while retaining the existing ban on international trade in the drug. At the moment we are limited to decriminalization unaccompanied by the instruments of regulation available for legal markets, so that the potential benefits of a non-prohibitionist approach are largely precluded. The removal of cannabis from the UN treaty structure would pass the responsibility for cannabis policy back to national governments, with freedom of action to pursue independent policies. Some will choose to stick to the present prohibitionist framework, others will choose decriminalization or legalization. We will certainly learn more about the effects of policy.
Discussion

Jérôme Adda
University College London

I found this paper very well written and documented. It reviews evidence from an impressive number of fields, including medical science, epidemiology, law and international law, crime and policing, public policy as well as economic theory and applied economics.

The paper deals with a topic that is not easy to tackle. First, there is a lack of comprehensive data on cannabis usage. Because consumption is banned in most countries, users are reluctant to report its usage. In contrast with more licit drugs such as tobacco or alcohol, it is difficult to get reliable data on prevalence rate over a large period of times or countries. Furthermore, even if one can obtain data on usage, it is even more difficult to get reliable data on prices, as cannabis is sold on the illegal market. Hence, the literature is mostly confined to cross-sectional results or local studies, where establishing causality is a serious and problematic issue. On the policy side, views are often extreme, passionate and sometimes irrational, making rigorous policy design difficult.

This paper tries to review and summarize the literature on cannabis in order to question current policy practice. It is therefore a nice addition to this literature.

Arguably, there are still many areas of uncertainty, which makes policy recommendations difficult. The medical and epidemiological literature often confuses correlation and causality. Given the nature of the data, it is hard to disentangle the causal effect of cannabis from the effect of confounders. Drug users probably differ from non-users in many ways, some of which are not directly observable. Second, it is not clear what would be a counterfactual world without cannabis. The connection between cannabis and other risky behaviour such as tobacco, alcohol or other drugs is not yet well understood. Finally, even if one could resolve the problems detailed above, it is questionable that policies would be very efficient. For instance, the current literature investigating the effect of prices on tobacco consumption shows that the price elasticity is not as high as previously thought, especially among young consumers (DeCicca et al., 2002), or that smokers compensate by changing the type of cigarettes (Evans and Farrelly, 1998) or the way they smoke it (Adda and Cornaglia, 2006).

The paper first lists the five main issues which form the case for public intervention, stressing that self-harm is not in itself a sufficient reason. The second part of the paper reviews various policies, which have been or may be implemented. The first one is supply interdiction, which has been widespread in many countries. One important question is the effectiveness of such policies. More precisely, how is the trading or the consumption of drugs affected by police crackdown? Are policies that make the apprehension of suppliers (or users) more efficient than those that increase
the penalty incurred? Some studies (e.g. Lee and McCrary, 2005) suggest that criminals are surprisingly myopic when it comes to variations in the severity of the penalty.

Another policy is decriminalization. It has been tried in the Netherlands for many years and in parts of the United Kingdom (in fact a borough of London) during a limited time. From Figure 1 in the paper, there are no noticeable effects on consumption. The prevalence in the Netherlands is neither lower nor higher than many other countries where cannabis use is illegal. However, such a policy may have undesirable effects, if it is implemented locally, as it could attract crime. There is evidence that the decriminalization of cannabis in Lambeth in 2001 led to a marked increase in robberies and theft (Adda et al., 2009). Finally, full decriminalization would offer more instruments to regulate usage of cannabis. Drawing on knowledge of tobacco consumption, it does not imply we should expect a marked decrease in usage. The long-run decrease in tobacco consumption seen in developed countries is probably more due to the gradual perception of the health risks linked with smoking rather than the effect of smoking bans, price increases or the banning of tobacco advertisement.

A second factor which would limit the scope of public policy is the fact that cannabis is often home grown and therefore difficult to tax. Finally, it is possible that cannabis consumption is innocuous for most users, but that it puts a small segment of society at risk of greater harm. The question is then how to weight potential heterogeneous effects of policies.

Jan Boone
Tilburg University

The topic of cannabis is interesting and clearly policy relevant. The Dutch government, which is often seen as rather progressive when it comes to cannabis policy, released a report this month (July 2009) by Van de Donk and others evaluating the Dutch drugs policy in the past decades. The report echoes some of the conclusions in Pudney’s paper, but deviates from Pudney’s analysis in other parts (as explained below).

One of the most striking points in Pudney’s paper is how little we actually know about key aspects of drugs demand and supply. Is cannabis a stepping stone for hard drugs, like cocaine? If so, is this induced by cannabis suppliers? Are vulnerable young people better protected from harmful drugs by a combination of legalization and regulation of cannabis? Given that (some) policy-makers routinely make strong statements about drugs policy, understanding this lack of knowledge is sobering. In this discussion I summarize the potential advantages and disadvantages of legalizing cannabis use. Then I point out the questions that still need to be answered before we can actually trade off these advantages and disadvantages. I relate this discussion to the Dutch experience in the past years.
Pudney gives the following arguments in favour of legalizing cannabis. First, this would save money currently spent on the prosecution of offenders. Not only is this prosecution unsuccessful, it may even be counter-productive by stimulating small-scale, dispersed production of cannabis which is harder to control. Second, it would help research into the effects of cannabis as legalization would facilitate truthful revelation of cannabis use in surveys. Third, if cannabis is legal, it can be regulated by the government. Examples of regulation include: age limits for people buying cannabis, taxation on cannabis and regulation of advertising. Another argument given by Pudney is that quality regulation can be more effective if cannabis is legalized. The idea is that then parties other than the government can play a role in quality certification. The Dutch experience suggests that this type of credible quality regulation does not necessarily call for legalization. At so-called ‘house parties’ where people (manage to) buy illegal XTC pills, ‘Adviesburo Drugs in Amsterdam’ organized a stand where these pills could be tested. In case the quality could not be guaranteed, people were advised to throw the pills away and not consume them. This was generally seen as a big success.

The final reason for legalizing cannabis is the market segmentation argument. This is also seen by Van der Donk et al. (2009) as one of the cornerstones of the Dutch policy. The idea is the following. By legalizing cannabis, suppliers of cannabis have an incentive to only supply cannabis. If they would in addition sell, say, cocaine, they would risk being caught. This would not only lead to the loss of the illegal cocaine sales but also to the loss of the legitimate and profitable cannabis business. If cannabis sellers do not supply other (illegal) drugs, it becomes harder for cannabis users to move on to these other (and often more damaging) drugs. Although the segmentation is successful in the Netherlands on the retail level, there is no segmentation higher up in the supply chain. The production and trade of cannabis is in the hands of organized crime. Further, the supply of (capital) goods needed to produce cannabis (like seeds and lamps) is also arranged by criminals. Hence, although (potentially) fewer people move on from cannabis to harder drugs in the Netherlands, the problems associated with organized crime (like assassinations, corruption and trafficking) are not reduced by legalizing cannabis.

Disadvantages associated with legalizing cannabis include the following. First, it can make cannabis more easily available to vulnerable young people. In the Netherlands, several cities have closed down ‘coffee shops’ which were located near schools to reduce this effect. Second, if not all (neighbouring) countries legalize cannabis, there will be substantial problems with drug tourism. This problem has become so severe in Dutch cities near the borders, that the local governments have closed down ‘coffee shops’ in these cities. Finally, once people start experimenting with cannabis, they may decide to move on to harder drugs (stepping-stone effect).

In order to evaluate these advantages and disadvantages, we need to weigh one against the other. However, as argued by Pudney we do not have the relevant information to do this. I will discuss two issues and the information needed to
resolve them. First, for the market segmentation argument to make sense, we need to know that cannabis users are vulnerable to pressure from others to move to other drugs and that co-suppliers of cannabis and other drugs are motivated and well placed to ‘upgrade’ their cannabis customers. However, it should not be the case that cannabis use itself invites migration to other drugs (without intervention by suppliers). In the latter case, legalizing cannabis would inevitably expose more people to cannabis and then to other drugs. Hence, we need to know whether people want to use/experiment with hard drugs after using cannabis. To evaluate this, we need micro data tracking individuals over time from childhood till early adulthood. In this way, we may be able to control for other individual characteristics. The point is that some people may be ‘prone’ to use hard drugs and start with cannabis and alcohol as these are easily available. Up until now such panel data tracking people over time is missing. I fully agree with Pudney’s recommendation to start gathering this type of data.

A second issue is whether a combination of legalizing cannabis with regulation will protect minors better than a prohibition of cannabis. In order to determine this, we need data from countries with different regimes. Then we can compare the performance of these different countries on prevalence of cannabis use under minors and its implications for treatment and health care costs. Pudney suggests that this type of data becomes available once we allow countries to experiment with cannabis legislation. Here the Dutch experience suggests that more coordination may be needed. As mentioned, although ‘coffee shops’ are legal in the Netherlands a number of cities close to the border have decided to close down ‘coffee shops’ due to the nuisance caused by drug tourism. This suggests that – at least within Europe – is does not make sense for a country to liberalize cannabis while neighbouring countries stick with repressive drug regimes. It seems reasonable to assume that travel time and cost reduce drug tourism. Hence it will be useful to coordinate drugs policies within Europe such that neighbouring countries have similar policies. To illustrate, if the Netherlands would choose full liberalization, Belgium should have a rather liberal cannabis policy as well and only Spain could be allowed to have a repressive system where cannabis use and sale are illegal. Whether such a set up is politically feasible, remains an open question.

Panel discussion

John Hassler opened the discussion enquiring if the author could provide some explanation for the large cross-country differences in cannabis use presented in the paper. He believed the factors (i.e. social, cultural, economic etc.) that drive these differences in cannabis use could lead to very different effects from legalizing cannabis across countries. Therefore, one would expect the necessary policy responses
to differ across countries. Bas Jacobs praised the paper for bringing more rationality into the discussion on drug policy. He wondered if it was possible to conduct a cost benefit analysis on drug prohibition policies. He admitted that calculating the benefits of drug prohibition would be difficult as it required value judgments on using drugs but considered the estimation of social costs to be more straightforward and believed such analysis would provide important information to policy planners on the cost of introducing certain polices. His expectation was that analysis would show there are large costs associated with drug prohibition policies. Caroline Hoxby was impressed with the comprehensive nature of the paper but felt that more of a discussion on the effectiveness of potential policy levers could be included. Although a drug prohibition regime excludes the use of policy levers such as taxation, supply limits and age restrictions, she believed it is not clear how successful such instruments would be in reducing cannabis use and whether they would provide a meaningful alternative to a prohibition regime.

**APPENDIX A: AN ALGEBRAIC EXAMPLE OF THE FRAGILITY OF ESTIMATES OF THE GATEWAY EFFECT**

Analyses of the gateway effect are usually rather complex, employing methods such as duration analysis (Van Ours, 2003), multi-state transition models (Pudney, 2003) or other kinds of limited-dependent variable models. These studies allow for unobserved factors specific to the individual and assume them to be time-invariant. The time-invariance assumption is rarely discussed but it is critical to the validity of results from these models. A simpler linear panel regression model will serve to illustrate the issue. Suppose cannabis ($C$) and hard drug ($H$) consumption evolve as follows, with no gateway effect present:

\[
C_t = \beta X_{it} + Q_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (A1)
\]

\[
H_t = \gamma X_{it} + \lambda Q_{it} + \eta_{it} \quad (A2)
\]

where $X_{it}$ is a set of observed covariates and $\varepsilon_{it}$ and $\lambda_{it}$ are serially independent random disturbances, which we assume to be uncorrelated. $Q_{it}$ is a strongly persistent (but not necessarily constant) individual effect. If $Q_{it}$ is time-invariant, then fixed-effects regression offers a good, robust estimator, since it is unaffected by correlation between $Q_{it}$ and $X_{it}$. Extending the hard drug equation to allow for the possibility of a gateway effect, this involves a regression of $H_t - \bar{H}_t$ on $X_{it} - \bar{X}_t$ and $C_{it-1} - \bar{C}_i$, where $\bar{H}_t$ and $\bar{X}_t$ are sample means for individual $i$ of observations 1...$T$ and the superscript $l$ indicates that $\bar{C}_i$ is the mean of the lagged variable, calculated from data in periods 0...$T - 1$. If $Q_{it}$ really is time-invariant, this gives a consistent estimate of the true gateway effect of 0.

However, if there is some time-variation in $Q_{it}$, the lagged consumption variable $C_{it-1} - \bar{C}_i$ contains a random component $Q_{it-1} - \bar{Q}_i$ which is, in general, correlated
with the term $\lambda(Q_{it} - \bar{Q}_t)$ which appears in the within-group transformed residual of the hard drugs equation. This correlation is important because the bias in the estimated gateway effect (the coefficient of $Q_{it-1} - \bar{Q}_t$) has the same sign. However, the correlation is complex and depends on the length of the panel, $T$, and the autocorrelation structure of the process \{Q_{it}\}. If we assume that $Q_{it}$ follows a first-order autoregressive process with parameter $\rho$, the correlation between $Q_{it-1} - \bar{Q}_t$ and $(Q_{it} - \bar{Q}_t)$ can be derived as a rather messy function of $T$ and $\rho$. To illustrate its implications, Figure A1 plots their correlation against $\rho$ for $T = 2, 4$ and 6.

The conclusion is that, for strong but not perfect persistence of the individual effect ($\rho$ in the neighbourhood of $0.5$–$0.8$), the correlation is positive for $T > 2$ and increasing in the length of the panel. Thus, the longer the period spanned by the data, the more serious are the consequences of a departure from time invariance of the individual effect, and the greater the likelihood of finding a spurious positive gateway effect.

**APPENDIX B: THE SUPPLY-SIDE GATEWAY EFFECT AND SUPPLY BEHAVIOUR**

Consider a simple fixed-price model in which potential dealers choose between being suppliers of cannabis or hard drugs or both or neither.\(^8\) Dealers face ‘standard’ penalties $\tilde{p}_c$ and $\tilde{p}_h$ for cannabis and hard drug supply offences respectively. However, actual penalties are random, since both detection and sentencing are uncertain; $\tilde{p}_c$ and $\tilde{p}_h$ are thus parameters of the distribution of actual penalties. Potential dealers make their participation decision on the basis of discrete choice

---

\(^8\) We abstract from the effects of changes in drug prices that might result from supply responses to changing legal penalties.
stochastic utility maximization, where \( U_0, U_c, U_h \) and \( U_{ch} \) are the indirect utilities associated with non-supply, cannabis supply only, hard drug supply only and co-supply of cannabis and hard drugs. Let \( s \) be time devoted to legal income-generating activity; \( c \) and \( h \) are time devoted to cannabis and hard drug dealing, \( l \) is non-market time and \( y \) is income. \( \Omega_{ch} \) is the regime-specific budget set:

\[
\Omega_{ch} = \{ s \geq 0, c > 0, h > 0, l = T - s - c - h, y = ws + \Pi_c c + \Pi_h h \} \tag{B1}
\]

where \( T \) is the time endowment and \( w \) is the wage. \( \pi_c \) and \( \pi_h \) are the rates of profit on cannabis and hard drug dealing activity and \( \pi_c, \pi_h \) are the parameters of the distribution of profit rates. Let \( p \) be the actual penalty, equal to 0 if unconvicted and some random positive amount if convicted. Consider a co-supplier with \textit{ex post} utility function \( V(y, p) + \varepsilon_{ch} \), where \( \varepsilon_{ch} \) is an unobservable factor specific to the co-supply regime. Then the supply decision is based on the following indirect expected utility:

\[
\max_{\Omega_{ch}} E(V(y, p)|s, c, h, l, w, \pi_c, \pi_h, \hat{p}_c, \hat{p}_h) + \varepsilon_{ch} = \hat{V}_{ch} + \varepsilon_{ch}. \tag{B2}
\]

Similarly, the other three participation regimes, with suitably defined regime-specific budget sets, yield expected indirect utilities: \( \tilde{V}_0 + \varepsilon_0, \tilde{V}_c + \varepsilon_c, \) and \( \tilde{V}_h + \varepsilon_h, \) where \( \varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_c \) and \( \varepsilon_h \) are factors varying randomly across individuals. They could, for example, represent moral attitudes towards soft and hard drugs.

Write the conditional probability that a potential dealer chooses co-supply as \( \Gamma \). Then \( \Gamma = F(\hat{V}_{ch} - \tilde{V}_0, \tilde{V}_c - \tilde{V}_h, \hat{V}_{ch} - \tilde{V}_{ch} \), where \( F(.) \) is the joint distribution function of the three differences \( \varepsilon_{ch} - \varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_{ch} - \varepsilon_c, \varepsilon_{ch} - \varepsilon_h \). Now consider a reform in the Dutch direction, involving a marginal reduction, \( d\hat{p}_c \), in the penalty for cannabis supply. Its impact is:

\[
d\Gamma = (F_1 + F_2 + F_3)\partial \hat{V}_{ch} / \partial \hat{p}_c - F_2 \partial \hat{V}_c / \partial \hat{p}_c d\hat{p}_c \tag{B3}
\]

where \( F_j \) is the partial derivative of \( F(.) \) with respect to its \( j \)th argument.

This reform reduces the extent of co-supply if \( d\Gamma / d\hat{p}_c > 0 \). Since \( F_j > 0 \), \( d\hat{p}_c \partial \hat{V}_{ch} / \partial \hat{p}_c < 0, \partial \hat{V}_c / \partial \hat{p}_c < 0 \) this requires:

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{V}_{ch} / \partial \hat{p}_c}{\partial \hat{V}_c / \partial \hat{p}_c} < \frac{F_2}{F_1 + F_2 + F_3}. \tag{B4}
\]

The left-hand side of (B4) is the ratio of the marginal expected (dis)utilities of the cannabis penalty in the co-supply and cannabis-only regimes, while the right-hand side is the marginal response of the co-supply probability with respect to \( \tilde{V}_c \) as a share of the responses to \( \tilde{V}_0, \tilde{V}_c \) and \( \tilde{V}_h \). Consequently, for a given individual, the likelihood of co-supply can be reduced by a cut in the penalty for cannabis supply provided cannabis supply is a significant alternative to co-supply (in the sense that \( F_2/(F_1 + F_2 + F_3) \) is large) and that marginal disutility of the penalty is substantially higher in the cannabis-only than the co-supply mode. A necessary
condition for (B4) to be satisfied is that \(|\partial V_{ch}/\partial \tilde{p}_c| > |\partial V_i/\partial \tilde{p}_c|\). This is not automatically implied by concavity. For example, consider the simple case where penalties have a cash equivalent, so that \(V(y, p) = V(y - p)\). Assume there are regime-specific income levels \(y_c\) and \(y_{ch}\) (with \(y_{ch} > y_c\), known with certainty, a constant conviction probability \(\theta\) and, following conviction, known penalty levels of \(p_c\) and \(p_{ch}\) (where \(p_{ch} > p_c\)). Then \(|\partial V_{ch}/\partial \tilde{p}_c| > |\partial V_i/\partial \tilde{p}_c|\) if and only if:

\[
(1 - \theta)(V'(y_{ch}) - V'(y_c)) + \theta(V'(y_{ch} - p_{ch}) - V'(y_c - p_c)) < 0. \tag{B5}
\]

This will be satisfied if \(V(.)\) is concave and \(y_{ch} - p_{ch} > y_c - p_c\), but also in cases where \(y_{ch} - p_{ch} < y_c - p_c\), provided the conviction probability, \(\theta\), is sufficiently small.

Note that the number of hard drug dealers will rise since \(F^*(\tilde{V}_h - \tilde{V}_0, \tilde{V}_h - \tilde{V}_c, \tilde{V}_h - \tilde{V}_{ch})\) is increasing in \(\tilde{p}_c\), where \(F^*\) is the distribution function of \((\varepsilon_h - \varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_h - \varepsilon_c, \varepsilon_h - \varepsilon_{ch})\), so increased competition in the hard drug market may lead to some increase in demand by hard drug users, induced by price falls.

Now assume that consumers of cannabis are vulnerable to social influence by their suppliers, who have a financial incentive to sell hard drugs in preference to cannabis (since \(\pi_h > \pi_c\)). Each cannabis user locates a source of cannabis supply through a random matching process in which suppliers are drawn at random from the population of dealers offering cannabis. If the dealer turns out to be a co-supplier, there is then a probability \(Q\) that the consumer will subsequently succumb to pressure and make the transition to hard drugs; otherwise, the consumer remains a cannabis user only. Let the probability of being a cannabis user be a decreasing function, \(\varphi (R)\) of the penalty \(R\) for cannabis possession. Then the number of cannabis users who move to hard drugs is proportional to \(\varphi (R)Q E(\Gamma)\), where the expectation is with respect to the distribution of \(w, \pi_h, \pi_c\) in the population of potential dealers. The effect on the prevalence of hard drug use of simultaneously varying the penalties for cannabis possession \((dR)\) and cannabis supply \((d\tilde{p}_c)\) is:

\[
d \Pr \text{ (hard drug use)} = Q\{\varphi'(R)E(\Gamma)dR - \varphi(R)\}d\tilde{p}_c. \tag{B6}
\]

Hard drug prevalence will decline if:

\[
d \ln (R) > \left[\frac{\partial \ln E(\Gamma)/\partial \tilde{p}_c}{\partial \ln \varphi(R)/\partial R}\right] d \ln \tilde{p}_c. \tag{B7}
\]

A reform in the direction of the British 2004 reclassification, leaving unchanged the penalty for cannabis supply \((d\tilde{p}_c = 0)\) but reducing the penalty for possession \((d \ln R < 0)\) will unambiguously increase hard drug prevalence under these assumptions. A reform in the Dutch direction reduces both penalties \((d \ln \tilde{p}_c, d \ln R < 0)\) and can therefore reduce prevalence provided the term in square brackets in (B7) is positive. This in turn requires that \(\partial \ln E(\Gamma)/\partial \tilde{p}_c < 0\), which is satisfied if the condition for co-supply (B4) characterizes a sufficiently large part of the potential supplier population.
APPENDIX C: THE MATCHING METHOD

Define measures of cannabis consumption, \( C \), and hard drug access, \( A_h \). These are constructed as binary variables respectively indicating: consumption of cannabis above a specified threshold frequency; and easy or very easy access to any hard drug. Define a pair of latent outcomes for access to hard drugs, \((A_{1h}, A_{0h})\) which respectively would be realized in the circumstances of cannabis use \((C = 1)\) or abstention \((C = 0)\). Only a single outcome is actually observed: \( A_h = A_{1h} \) if \( C = 1 \) and \( A_h = A_{0h} \) if \( C = 1 \).

For cannabis users, the impact of their cannabis consumption on their exposure to hard drugs is:

\[
\Delta = E(A_{1h} - A_{0h} | C = 1).
\]

In the terminology of programme evaluation, \( \Delta \) is the average effect of treatment on the treated, where we interpret treatment to mean cannabis use. Follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in assuming \( A_{1h}, A_{0h} \) are independent of cannabis use \( C \), after conditioning on a suitable set of observable covariates, \( X \). Under these conditions, the expected value in (C1) is:

\[
\Delta = E(E(A_{1h} | C = 1, p(X)) - E(A_{0h} | C = 0, p(X)) | C = 0)
\]

where \( p(I(X)) = \Pr(C = 1 | X) \) is the propensity score, defined as the conditional probability of cannabis use.

The choice of variables, \( X \), to include in the selection model is important. The matching estimator only controls for selection on observables, so it is important to use covariates that capture as far as possible any unobservable factors which connect the decision to become a cannabis user with the availability of hard drugs. In this sense, the approach to modelling selection is unusual, since it should aim to use variables ‘endogenous’ to selection. The selection model should not be thought of as a structural behavioural model, where we would normally seek to avoid endogeneity bias. Assume that observable variables \( Z \) and unobservables \( U \) influence both cannabis use, \( C \), and hard drug availability, \((A_{1h}, A_{0h})\). Our objective is to determine whether realized access \( A_h \) is also influenced directly by \( C \). Assume that a further set of variables, \( W \), is also determined by \( Z \) and \( U \) and is, in that sense, endogenous. However \( W \) is known \textit{a priori} not to be directly influenced by \( C \).

The formal assumptions corresponding to this causal structure are:

\[
A_h \perp C | Z, U; \quad W \perp (A_{0h}, C) | Z, U
\]

where \( \perp \) denotes statistical independence. If we use \( X = (Z, W) \) as covariates in the matching analysis, then there will be no bias if we can show that \((A_{0h}, A_{1h}) \perp C | Z, W \). For simplicity, assume that \( U \) is discrete and consider the distribution \( P(C, A_{0h}, A_{1h} | Z, W) \), which can be written:
\[ P(C, A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, W) = P(C, A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, W) / P(W \mid Z) \]
\[ = \frac{\sum_u P(C \mid Z, u)P(A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, u)P(W \mid Z, u)P(u \mid Z)}{\sum_u P(W \mid Z, u)P(u \mid Z)} . \quad (C4) \]

The conditional independence property \((A_h^0, A_h^1 \perp C \mid Z, W)\) is then satisfied if (\ref{decomposition}) can be written as the product of two components: one a function of \(C, Z, W\), the other a function of \((A_h^0, A_h^1, Z, W)\). Apart from the trivial case where \(C\) or \(A_h^0, A_h^1\) are independent of \(U\), there are two alternative independence assumptions that will generate independence conditional on \(W, Z\).

**Assumption 1.** At all points in the support of \(W, Z\), there exists a unique function \(\bar{u}(Z, W)\) such that \(P(W \mid Z, U) = 0\) for all \(U \neq \bar{u}(Z, W)\).

Assumption 1 essentially states that, given \(Z, W\), \(U\) is an exact, invertible function of \(U\). In this case there is only a single non-zero term in the sums in numerator and denominator of \((C3)\), so \(P(C, A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, W)\) reduces to \(P(C \mid Z, \bar{u}(W, Z)) P(A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, \bar{u}(W, Z))\). The alternative assumption is more complex. Define a variable:

\[ \lambda(u \mid W, Z) = \frac{P(W \mid Z, u)P(u \mid Z)}{\sum_{u'} P(W \mid Z, u')P(u' \mid Z)} \quad (C5) \]

**Assumption 2.** At all points in the support of \(W, Z\), there exists a pair of functions \(\lambda_c(u \mid W, Z), \lambda_a(u \mid W, Z)\) such that \(\lambda_c = \lambda_c \lambda_a\) and:

\[ \sum_u (P(C \mid Z, u)\lambda_c(u \mid W, Z) - \mu_c) (P(A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, u)\lambda_a(u \mid W, Z) - \mu_a) = 0 \quad (C6) \]

where \(\mu_c(C, W, Z) = \sum_u P(C \mid Z, u)\lambda_c(u \mid W, Z)\) and \(\mu_a(A_h^0, A_h^1, W, Z) = \sum_u P(A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, u)\lambda_a(u \mid W, Z)\).

Under Assumption 2, \(P(C, A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, W) = \mu_c(C, W, Z)\mu_a(A_h^0, A_h^1, Z, W)\), which implies conditional independence of \(C\) and \((A_h^0, A_h^1)\). Note the role of the variables \(W\) here. If \(U\) influences \(C\) and \((A_h^0, A_h^1)\) positively (say), then without the terms \(\lambda_c\) and \(\lambda_a\) assumption \((C5)\) would be violated. However, use of the variables \(W\) makes it possible to introduce negatively covarying \(\lambda_c\) and \(\lambda_a\) which offset the positive covariation between \(P(C \mid Z, u)\) and \(P(A_h^0, A_h^1 \mid Z, u)\). Thus, suitable ‘endogenous’ covariates can be effective in reducing the extent of selection bias.

In our implementation of the matching estimator, \(X\) includes variables describing behaviour closely related to cannabis use (including smoking, drunkenness and various illicit behaviours) and also access to cannabis, \(A\). These are almost certainly endogenous, in the sense that they are influenced by the same unobservable personal factors that affect cannabis consumption and accessibility of hard drugs.
However, it is plausible to assume there is no direct impact on them of cannabis use. Drinking, smoking and low-level illicit behaviour generally pre-date cannabis consumption (see Pudney, 2003) and accessibility of cannabis is logically prior to its consumption.

Provided we can match each cannabis user to a non-user with a similar value of the propensity score, the contribution of cannabis use to hard drug exposure is estimated as the difference between the means of the observed variable $A_h$ for the treatments and controls. Thus, in the simplest case of one-to-one matching, we can estimate (G1) as:

$$
\hat{\Delta} = A_1^1 - A_0^0
$$

where $A_1^1$ and $A_0^0$ are the sample means of $A_h$ among the sampled cannabis users and the matched non-users respectively.

We use the Becker and Ichino (2002) implementation of the matching estimator. The first stage of this process involves estimating the propensity score using a probit model. This is then tested, using the region of common support of the treatment and control cases, to check that the balancing property $C \perp X \mid \rho(X)$ is satisfied. One version of the analysis defines $C$ as an indicator of whether there has been any cannabis use in the last year; in the other, $C$ indicates whether there has been at least 20 episodes of use in the last year (MtF) or use at least 2 or 3 times a month in the last year (YLS). The probit models used to generate the propensity score are set out in Tables C2 and C3; all satisfy the balancing property.

An important issue is the degree of overlap between the treatment and control groups. To ensure at least one match for all treatment cases, we need the condition $N_t f_t(\rho) \leq N_c f_c(\rho)$ where $N_t$ and $N_c$ are the numbers of treatment and control cases and $f_t(\rho)$ and $f_c(\rho)$ are the densities of the propensity score in the two groups. This condition is generally satisfied, except for the region of large (above 0.5 for the MtF or 0.75 for YLS) propensity scores for the ‘any cannabis use in the last year’ definition of $C$. The implication of this exception to the common support condition is that members of the control group with large propensity scores are used to match more than one treatment case. There is only a small region where $f_t(\rho) > f_c(\rho) = 0$ (implying that there are no matches at all). Thus, when we impose the common support restriction, which discards treatment cases with no acceptable match, we lose a negligible number of cases from the analysis and the results are not perceptibly affected.

### The MtF and YLS drug availability questions

The principal survey questions about cannabis use and access to drugs in the MtF and YLS (identified by their codes in the survey documentation) are as follows.
MtF questions

V2116 ‘On how many occasions (if any) have you used marijuana (weed, pot) or hashish (hash, hash oil) during the last 12 months?’
The responses are coded as: 1 ‘0 occasions’; 2 ‘1 or 2 occasions’; 3 ‘3–5 occasions’; 4 ‘6–9 occasions’; 5 ‘10–19 occasions’; 6 ‘20–39 occasions’; 7 ‘40 or more’

V2464 ‘How difficult do you think it would be for you to get each of the following, if you wanted some? A: ‘Crack’ cocaine

V2465 ‘How difficult do you think it would be for you to get each of the following, if you wanted some B: Cocaine in powder form

V2309 ‘How difficult do you think it would be for you to get each of the following, if you wanted some H: Heroin

Table C1. MtF and YLS weighted sample characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>MtF data (n = 5226)</th>
<th>YLS data (n = 3880)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample mean/proportion</td>
<td>Sample mean/proportion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>Yorkshire &amp; Humberside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>North West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-medium town</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>East Midlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large city</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>West Midlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 18 or over</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>East Anglia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B grade school work</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>South East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A grade school work</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>South West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father high school</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father college</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>Deprived area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father education not recorded</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent parent</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>Born in UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoker</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>Left school at or before 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinker</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>University/college student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>74.64</td>
<td>Still in full-time education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero income</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>Years since education completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>Ever expelled from school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>Ever in care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Father unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deprived neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Family trouble with police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Currently smokes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ever been drunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dislikes school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hangs around town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Little parental supervision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Conditional mean for respondents who have completed full-time education.
The responses to V2464, V2465 and V2309 are separately coded as: 5 'very easy'; 4 'fairly easy'; 3 'fairly difficult'; 2 'very difficult'; and 1 'probably impossible'. We then construct a variable equal to the maximum of these scores over the three questions.

**YLS questions**

*CFREQ2* ‘How often have you taken Cannabis (Marijuana, Grass, Hash, Ganja, Blow, Draw, Skunk) in the last 12 months?’
The responses are coded as: 0 Not at all; 1 Once or twice this year; 2 Once every couple of months; 3 Once a month; 4 Two or three times a month; 5 Once or twice a week; 6 Three to five days a week; 7 Every day.

*CACCESS2* ‘If you wanted to get cannabis (...) and you had the time and money to do so, how easy would it be?’
The responses are coded as: 1 Don’t know or very difficult; 2 Fairly difficult; 3 Fairly easy; 4 Very easy.

### Table C2. Propensity score probit model for US MtF data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Any cannabis use in last year</th>
<th>Use at least 2 or 3 times a month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Std. Err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very easy cannabis access</td>
<td>−1.869</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly easy cannabis access</td>
<td>−1.170</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly difficult cannabis access</td>
<td>−1.025</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very difficult cannabis access</td>
<td>−0.500</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>−0.142</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>−0.239</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large city</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 18</td>
<td>−0.050</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-grade school work</td>
<td>−0.180</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-grade school work</td>
<td>−0.261</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>−0.021</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father high school</td>
<td>−0.064</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father college</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s education not recorded</td>
<td>−0.078</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent parent</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoker</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinker</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero income</td>
<td>−0.211</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>−0.280</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>−0.090</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−0.674</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common support</td>
<td>(0.00664, 0.94324)</td>
<td>(0.00228, 0.73393)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Variables listed in Table C1 which do not appear above were insignificant at the 10% level and were dropped from the model.
‘And how easy would it be for you to get heroin (smack, skag, ‘H’, brown)?’

‘And how easy would it be for you to get cocaine (coke)?’

The responses to these last two variables are coded into a single variable on the basis of whichever drug has the easier availability: 4 Very easy; 3 Fairly easy; 2 Fairly hard; 1 Very hard or don’t know.

Table C3. Propensity score probit model for England & Wales YLS data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Any cannabis use in last year</th>
<th>Use at least 2 or 3 times a month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Std. Err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very easy cannabis access</td>
<td>1.432</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly easy cannabis access</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly difficult cannabis access</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/age</td>
<td>-3.998</td>
<td>0.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10/age)&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still in full-time education</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left school at or before age 16</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-0.549</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent parent</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprived neighbourhood</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoker × (10/age)</td>
<td>2.091</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has been drunk × (10/age)</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislikes school</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangs around town</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little parental supervision</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since leaving education</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common support</td>
<td>(0.00071, 0.96256)</td>
<td>(0.00110, 0.87722)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Variables listed in Table C1 which do not appear above were insignificant at the 10% level and were dropped from the model.

CACCESS6 ‘And how easy would it be for you to get heroin (smack, skag, ‘H’, brown)?’

CACCESS3 ‘And how easy would it be for you to get cocaine (coke)?’

The responses to these last two variables are coded into a single variable on the basis of whichever drug has the easier availability: 4 Very easy; 3 Fairly easy; 2 Fairly hard; 1 Very hard or don’t know.

REFERENCES


