Does India have a coherent policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have major implications for its security? Going by recent developments, the honest answer is no. India is repeatedly losing opportunities to help stabilise this critical part of its neighbourhood.

The Istanbul and London Conferences on Afghanistan showed India’s marginalisation. All the major players want a deal with the Taliban, and to cut their losses and run. India’s plea against making a distinction between the “good” and “bad” Taliban failed. American and British generals believe that they can’t win the war and want to withdraw their troops by 2011-12. President Hamid Karzai’s controversial election has weakened him. Politically, he’s becoming increasingly isolated and had to drop his cabinet nominees following legislature vetoes. He too wants a deal with the Taliban. Pakistan is keen to play the broker between the West and the Taliban. It stands to gain influence especially if the Taliban play hard to get.

All these are short-term, myopic calculations and lack a long-term vision. The Anglo-American tactic is to spend their way out of the war that is hard to win by funding defections from the Taliban and involving its rank and file in reconciliation. Later, Taliban commanders and governors would be integrated into the civilian fold. This would lead to power-sharing with the Quetta Shura and full reconciliation between different groups in the country’s fractured and tortured politics.

The crucial assumption here is that many Taliban would defect to the Afghan National Army despite its low pay and morale. But, a significant defection is unlikely given that the Taliban are winning battles and confidently advancing in Afghanistan. Even reconciliation between organised groups wouldn’t prevent mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and many other warlords like him from making trouble, undermining the civilian regime and returning Afghanistan to chaos.

But the US and Britain aren’t thinking long-term. They probably don’t care that they might leave Afghanistan worse off than when they invaded it. This spells trouble for our whole region.

India could have given some sober advice to the US-led coalition had it adopted a firmly independent stance right from 2001 instead of tailing Washington on the “Global War on Terror”. A non-military strategy would have meant treating Al Qaedaand its Taliban allies as criminals under the International Criminal Court. This would have greatly weakened their domestic base and strengthened the forces of democratisation.

The US-led coalition failed to provide adequate assistance to rebuild the Afghan people’s war-ravaged lives, promote development and create governance institutions. Instead, it propped up Karzai and various other warlords, who neither had the will nor the ability needed for reconstruction. When misgovernance and corruption under Karzai became embarrassing, the coalition dumped him. But it continued ignoring the people’s basic needs.

India has run Afghanistan’s best civilian assistance programme, based on a good understanding of desperate poverty and lack of infrastructure. Indian aid has been delivered with few middlemen—unlike Western aid, which goes through layers of sub-contractors; only a fraction trickles down. India has built hospitals, schools and roads, including the Zaranj-Delaram highway to the Iran border which would enable access to the sea. It is training Afghan civil servants, diplomats, legislators, judges and policemen. This has earned India tremendous goodwill.

However, India has failed to translate goodwill into influence because of unsound policies based on unrealistic assumptions about Pakistan, the US, and the Taliban. It has taken an “all-Taliban-are-terrorists” stand. And it insists that the US stay on in Afghanistan and force Pakistan to act against the 2008 Mumbai attackers and destroy the jehadi infrastructure. Nevertheless, the US has no real Afghanistan strategy beyond “surge and scuttle”. Its alliance with Pakistan is geopolitical, with limited leverage over Islamabad. India’s insistence against “good-Taliban–bad-Taliban” differentiation belies its own experience with insurgent groups, marked by grades of extremism.

There’s also an overlap between Pashtun and Taliban identities. Many Pashtuns feel poorly represented under Karzai and sympathise with the Taliban—although they don’t support mindless violence. India has long been excessively identified with the Northern Alliance composed of Tajik, Uzbek and other non-Pashtuns, and backed by Iran and Russia. The Alliance is seen by many Pashtuns as a collaborator in the invasion of 2001. India must rebuild its bridges with the Pashtuns, which were historically strong, as the Badshah Khan-Gandhi relationship testifies.

India must adopt a regional approach to Afghanistan. It must recognise that Pakistan is critical to this. Pakistan has a legitimate interest in Afghanistan’s stability and in Pashtun representation and welfare. Islamabad, too, must recognise India’s stake in Afghanistan in containing extremism and promoting stability. India has had ties with Afghanistan since the Gandhara civilisation to now, based on culture, trade, languages, music and food.

India and Pakistan should acknowledge their respective and joint stakes in stabilising Afghanistan. This can best happen if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh convenes a regional summit in New Delhi with Presidents Asif Ali Zardari and Hamid Karzai to discuss peace-building, trade and transit, political cooperation, action against jehadi extremism, people-to-people exchanges, and economic cooperation. The summit would help allay Pakistani fears that India might corner Pakistan through covert operations from its numerous consulates in Afghanistan.

A precondition is that the India-Pakistan dialogue must be resumed quickly. India’s refusal to discuss with Pakistan issues relevant to both states and peoples is counter-productive. It has strengthened Pakistan’s hawks. Mature diplomacy demands that India talks to Pakistan and encourages it to act strongly against jehadis. India and Pakistan have drastically reduced the number of visas issued to each other’s citizens. The number of cross-border visitors has fallen by 80 per cent-plus. The sufferers are divided families, and civil society groups which stand for peace, firm action against jehadi extremism and cultural exchanges to promote better mutual understanding. The latest casualties are Pakistani publishers and booksellers, many of whom were denied visas for the World Book Fair in Delhi. Also, the India Premier League’s decision to boycott Pakistani cricketers is a disgrace to cricket and to public decency. New Delhi wasn’t responsible for this. But it didn’t help when the Ministry of External Affairs superciliously told Pakistan to “introspect the reasons which have put a strain on relations between India and Pakistan” and adversely affected peace and regional stability. Such statements can only fuel anti-India sentiments in Pakistan. The less engagement there is between India and Pakistan, the less can New Delhi defend its legitimate interests. The wider the two countries diverge, the more mutually hostile they become.

There’s no reason why the Siachen and Sir Creek issues cannot be quickly settled. India’s best bet to get Islamabad to act against terrorism lies in resuming a dialogue with action on the ground to assure Pakistan that India doesn’t want to overwhelm, corner or marginalise Pakistan. The time to correct course and resume dialogue is now. India must seize the opportunity at the forthcoming SAARC Home Ministers’ meeting. Why, India should take the initiative by proposing a Foreign Minister-level dialogue.

Last July, at Sharm-al-Shaikh, Manmohan Singh made a tentative offer to resume dialogue. But he instantly retreated when criticised over a reference to Balochistan in the joint statement with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. Singh must pick up the thread. It would also help if there were no statements from Islamabad about India’s “confused” policy, and worse.