SINCE this clumn discussed the India-United States "123 agreement" two weeks ago, its text has been released. What was earlier reported as a major "breakthrough" is suddenly becoming a hot potato. The agreement, meant to translate the India-US nuclear deal of July 2005 into reality, has more critics than supporters in the Indian political class. India's Left parties now oppose the agreement. As do the Bharatiya Janata Party, its allies, and most regional parties. Virtually everyone barring the United Progressive Alliance seems to be against it. The Left's rationale, stated in a five-page document, has to with the deal's links to a close "strategic partnership" with the US, as well as some differences between "123" and the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress. The Left opposes a strategic embrace of the US for internally consistent reasons. It also says the Hyde Act can be used arbitrarily to terminate nuclear cooperation. The BJP, by contrast, has no principled objection to an intimate India-US alliance-indeed, it advocates it-, but opposes "123" to embarrass the UPA with crude national-chauvinist rhetoric. Most Centre-Right critics of the deal define sovereignty not in terms of independence in policy-making, but strictly in relation to the possession of mass-destruction weapons. To its credit, the Left is worried at the likely impact of "123" on India's traditional advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament. It says that by getting "accommodated in a US-led unequal nuclear order", India's role in championing disarmament is "being given the go-by". The Right is altogether silent on this. Many opponents of the deal make a fine-toothcomb comparison between the "123" text and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's past assurances of strict adherence to the original 2005 deal. They focus solely on a procedural issue: Singh must not deviate from what he told parliament. But it's more relevant to recall another parliament speech by Singh, on May 28, 1998. Singh, then an MP, pilloried the Vajpayee government for Pokharan-II, and passionately pleaded for disarmament. He accused the government of violating India's three-pillared nuclear "consensus". The first pillar is that "nuclear weapons [are] weapons of mass destruction and their use [is] a crime against humanity". So, said Singh, India should "work for a non-discriminatory, multilateral arrangement to have these weapons outlawed... [T]his consensus [is] sought to be disrupted". Singh accused the government of reducing security to its "military dimension" alone, and launching an arms race with an "uncontrollable increase in expenditure on mass-destruction weapons". He warned of threats to "social cohesion" and insecurities arising from "ill-health, illiteracy, ignorance and disease. If we do not attend to these threats, you will have WMDs like the Soviet Union, ... but the Soviet Union still withered away. Therefore, ... think before you weaponise ..." Ironically, "123" formalises weaponisation and its acceptance by the US. Clearly, Singh has travelled a long way. What's the main content of "123"?. The "123" agreement's Article 2.4 says its purpose is "not to affect ...or hinder ...unsafeguarded nuclear activities...". So "123" will help India expand its nuclear arsenal. India will only subject 14 of 22 operating/planned power reactors to inspections. The remaining eight can annually yield 1,250 kg of plutonium-enough for 250 bombs. India can also stockpile as much weapons-grade material as it likes in its military-nuclear facilities, including the "Dhruva" reactor, and other unsafeguarded plants, including the under-construction Prototype Fast-Breeder Reactor. All told, India can annually add 1,600 kg of plutonium to its existing 500-kg stockpile, itself enough for 100 bombs. This is way beyond the professed "minimum deterrent". "123" gives "prior consent" to India's right to reprocess. Article 6(iii) is unambiguous on this. The right will come into effect when India builds a dedicated reprocessing facility. Continuous fuel supply guarantees are also written into Articles 2.2(e), 4.1, 5.6, 14.5, etc. "123" recognises "the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors" and of "corrective measurers" in case of disruption. The US also will help India develop a "strategic reserve" of fuel for the reactors' lifetime. If India tests, the US will terminate cooperation. But India has secured some cushions. Article 14.2 says the US will "take into account whether the circumstances [leading to the test] resulted from [India's] serious concern about "a changed security environment..." [e.g. a test by another country]. The US can then demand the return of exported equipment/material, but must give notice. Article 14.5 recognises that "exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations". "123" mandates obligatory multi-layered consultations, subject to continuity of supply guaranteed under Article 5.6. Nuclear power is costly. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study says its unit costs in the US are 40-60 per cent higher than for coal- or gas-based power. Power from new Indian nuclear plants will cost Rs3-plus. But the coal-based Sasan project will deliver power for only Re1.20. India would court serious trouble by developing nuclear power. The deal will have major strategic-political consequences. India will abandon the fight for global nuclear disarmament. You don't get admitted to the Nuclear Club-and then demand its dissolution! India will also become more vulnerable to pressure to join U.S.-led security arrangements, and to dilute its policy independence. This will detract from a principled commitment to an equitable world free of the scourge of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, India's Parliamentary debate is unlikely to advance principles. Rather, it's likely to be drowned in jingoistic sloganeering, which confuses sovereignty with the ability to cause mass destruction.