One thing that most South Asian governments like to propagate is the idea that their relations with a hegemonic power like the United States are basically equal, dignified, more or less symmetrical, and based on respect for national sovereignty. Sometimes, even otherwise-sensible people buy this-to protect or soothe their national self-esteem. Strategic analysts of course make a living out of prescribing how best to use relations with the US to maximise national advantage within the framework of "equality".

However, such equality, symmetry or parity is a dangerous delusion especially in regard to Washington's present, nastily belligerent, Neoconservative avatar. Both Pakistan and India discovered this recently on issues that cut close to what their governments regard as their eminent domain: sovereignty and security.

The January 13 US bombing of a village in Bajaur Agency, killing 18 people, delivered a rude message. Washington will do whatever it likes to advance its interests as it seem them; it alone will determine the methods; it wont' bother to consult "friends". In the present instance, the mere suspicion that al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri might have been present in the Bajaur village was enough for the US to rain "Hellfire" missiles from its "Predator" drones.

Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's protest that the action was conducted without Pakistan's consent has had absolutely no effect in Washington. Nor has his insistence that no terrorists were killed-"where are the bodies?" In fact, following his meeting with President Bush, Aziz couldn't give a straight answer to the question as to whether the bombing came up for discussion. Even leaving aside the speculation that the US might have penetrated the Pakistan intelligence establishment, and that the confusion over the incident is the product of divisions within it, it is plain that the Americans don't treat the Pakistanis as equal partners.

This is fully in keeping with US practice even within its close alliance system, NATO. Washington has never accepted the idea that there should be "two fingers on the trigger"-its own, and its ally's. Unilateralism is built into the way the Pentagon conceives and conducts itself. It becomes even more virulent when the US deals with minor or less important allies like Pakistan-never mind the glorified ascription, "Major Non-NATO Ally."

The Bajaur bombing had a precedent in overt and covert actions in South Waziristan in 2004-05. Bajaur will, in turn, set a precedent for future overt actions by the US in other Agency areas, or for that matter, covert activities in Balochistan, the NWFP and Afghanistan too. All assurances by Washington that it respects Pakistan's sovereignty and will consult it in the future, which Aziz and President Pervez Musharraf repeatedly cite, mean nothing. The only issue is whether the government will be able to pacify the widespread resentment in Pakistan at US heavyhandedness.

India's experience with the July 18 "nuclear cooperation" deal with Washington (variously described by its supporters as a "coup", "breakthrough" and a "gift horse") has been equally unpleasant.

The agreement, which makes a one-time exception in the global nuclear order for India, demands that India "voluntarily" separate its military nuclear facilities from civilian ones, and place the latter under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in a "phased manner." But at the end of the third round of talks on fleshing out the agreement, it turns out that the separation is anything but "voluntary" or determined solely by India.

Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, who represented the US in the January 19-20 negotiations in New Delhi, apparently told India that it would have to seriously revise the list of civilian facilities if it is to be "credible" and acceptable to the US Congress, which must ratify the July agreement.

According to reports, there are three stumbling-blocks. First, India wants all "research & development" programmes exempted from safeguards. The most important of these is fast-breeders, special reactors which use fission caused by "fast neutrons" and, theoretically, generate more fissile material than they consume. The US insists that these be put on the civilian list and safeguarded.

Second, India would also like two civilian reactors at the Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS), built in the 1980s, to be exempted from IAEA inspections. The Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) rationale is apparently that they would act as an additional source of unsafeguarded plutonium in a future contingency. It's also possible that the MAPS complex houses testing facilities for the nuclear propulsion reactor which India is developing for its nuclear submarine project. The DAE wouldn't like any foreign inspectors near that "sensitive" facility. The US says no to exempting MAPS.

Third, India would also like to keep out of the civilian list CIRUS, a small reactor built with Canadian and US help in 1960, which produces weapons-grade plutonium. CIRUS was the source of the plutonium used in India's 1974 "peaceful" explosion. It has since been used to produce more fuel for nuclear weapons.

India's case is weakest on CIRUS because it was officially designated for "peaceful purposes" under bilateral agreements which India signed in the 1950s with the US and Canada. Unless these are rescinded, it would be illogical and illegal to exclude CIRUS from the civilian list.

To keep CIRUS in the list, India will demand the "freedom" to build a larger plutonium producer, dubiously citing "economies of sale". It might give up the MAPS demand. But the fast-breeder issue will pose a big problem.

India has made such a mystique out of breeders-and the idea of using them at a later stage to burn thorium, of which India has plenty-that it will find it hard to retreat. India currently has one small operational fast "test" reactor and is building a "prototype" 500 MW reactor. But using thorium as fuel in nuclear-fission reactors is not a commercial technology; it's only a theoretical possibility. India may become a prisoner of its own illusion.

Illusions apart, the current negotiations show that India's assessment of the nuclear deal's implications was unrealistic, even rosy. It really thought this was an equal, reciprocal symmetrical deal, in which India would have "the same responsibilities" and "the same benefits and advantages" as the five NPT-recognised nuclear states.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Parliament on August 3 that the civilian-military separation would not be imposed but would be "decided voluntarily and solely on our own judgment." The identification "will be so phased that our strategic programme is safeguarded."

DAE secretary Anil Kakodkar also clarified that "the determination of what is going to be identified as a civilian nuclear facility is going to be an Indian decision… taken at appropriate points of time… [I]n identifying civilian nuclear facilities, we have to determine that they were of no national security significance. We will do so this in a phased manner. It is not a one-time determination."

But it's amply clear that even identification, leave alone actual separation and safeguarding, won't be done in a "phased manner." That's not how the Americans want it.

The deal is unlikely to be finalised before Bush's visit. It may even fall through, unless India caves in to pressure and follows the American script. So much for "reciprocity" and "equality."