Germany’s support for the Israeli occupation and genocide Solidarity under Siege series: Part II
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For decades, (West) Germany has cast its support for Israel as supposed proof of its redemption as a post-genocidal state. It has identified the Israeli state as the stand in for Jewish victims of the Holocaust and turned support for Israel into a symbolic substitute for real denazification. The consequence is deep financial, military, political and ideological backing for occupation, apartheid and now the genocide in Gaza. At the same time, a deliberately vague definition of antisemitism increasingly conflates anti-Zionism with antisemitism and weaponises accusations against critics of Israel’s actions. In this landscape, Holocaust remembrance no longer signals a duty to oppose oppression everywhere, and Germany’s celebrated memory culture now serves to police Palestinians, Muslims, and Jews who refuse to accept the roles the state assigns them.
Photo: Faisal Yassin.
A brief history of Germany’s support for Israel before 7 October 2023
The Federal Republic of Germany’s alliance with Israel began long before it was based on memory culture or official statements about Staatsräson. From the early 1950s, West Germany offered Israel extensive support, first through reparations and industrial equipment, and soon after through covert military aid. At the time, this support had little to do with Holocaust remembrance and more with the political needs of the post-war German state.
In 1952, the Israeli–West German Reparations Agreement (‘Luxembourg Agreement’) was signed, in which Germany agreed to pay Israel 3 billion German marks (roughly €9 billion equivalent in today’s currency1) over the next 12 years, effectively a ninth of Germany’s federal budget.2 The implementation of this agreement in 1953 marked the start of large-scale German aid to Israel. This included not only financial compensation, but also steel, ships, factory equipment and other forms of industrial assistance that helped the state of Israel survive in its early years.3 Germany was Israel’s most important financial supporter in this decade, more so than France, the UK, or the US.4 Israel’s chief negotiator, Nahum Goldman, called the agreement ‘a downright salvation’ for the country.5
In parallel, military cooperation between the two states developed in secret. Following a meeting in 1957 between the West German Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss and the Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres, Germany also began to supply weapons. These included howitzers, helicopters and eventually tanks, some of which were manufactured in the US and delivered through a three-way agreement.6
This partnership allowed West Germany to improve its international image. In reality, the postwar Federal Republic made little effort to hold Nazi perpetrators accountable. Rather, it rehabilitated and reintegrated thousands of former Nazis into public life. In the 1950s, a majority of high-ranking officials in the judiciary, civil service, and police had served under the Nazi regime. By treating Nazi crimes as the responsibility of a few exceptional individuals rather than a state system, West Germany could avoid a structural reckoning with its fascist past. When civil society actors attempted to break this silence, they were often met with hostility, such as the German prosecutor Fritz Bauer, who had played a key role in the 1963–1965 Auschwitz trials.7 By the end of the twentieth century, only 164 individuals had been sentenced for the crime of murder.8
The political class needed a way to prove that West Germany had changed, but without carrying out any meaningful denazification. In this context, West Germany identified the Israeli state as the legitimate successor to the Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust, and support for Israel became a symbolic substitute for real denazification.9 West Germany’s diplomatic and material assistance to Israel allowed it to externalise moral responsibility while leaving domestic power structures largely untouched. As one Israeli official put it: ‘The price Israel had to pay to secure its existence was the absolution of West Germany’.10
There were also strategic reasons for Germany’s early alliance with Israel. As Adam Hanieh, Professor of Political Economy and Global Development at the University of Exeter, argues, the Western post-war support for Israel must also be understood in the context of oil and control over the energy supply chains of the Global South.11 West German elites saw support for Israel as a way to align more closely with the US and secure their own position in the emerging Western bloc. At the same time, they feared that openly backing Israel would jeopardise relationships with oil-exporting Arab states. For this reason, the alliance was kept secret for over a decade.
By the time the US became Israel’s main international backer after the 1967 war, Germany had already provided financial, diplomatic, and military support. It is worth mentioning that West Germany itself was only able to re-attain its powerful position in Europe thanks to US financial support through the Marshall Plan, which channelled US$13 bn in economic aid to Europe (the equivalent today of about US$ 140 bn), 10% of which went to West Germany.12 Its support to Israel was partially a result of its desire to prove to the US that it had rehabilitated itself, was ready for its sovereignty to be restored, and become a fully integrated part of the US imperial project as well as a NATO member, which it did in 1955.13
It was only by the mid-1980s that the form of dealing with the Nazi history changed from simply financial transfers to Israel and survivors and the state-sponsored Memory Culture began to crystallise.14 The 1985 speech by President Richard von Weizsäcker marking the 40th anniversary of Germany’s defeat was widely seen as a turning point, as it framed the memory of Auschwitz as integral to Germany’s moral rehabilitation.15 Yet this moral framework quickly became less about universal responsibility and more about loyalty to Israel. As will be discussed later, Germany has gradually abandoned the idea that Holocaust remembrance entails a duty to prevent oppression everywhere, and replaced it with a singular duty to defend Israel.16
The situation in East Germany was different. Until 1989, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) officially supported anti-colonial liberation movements, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).17 The GDR recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 and maintained an explicitly anti-Zionist line, framing Israel as an imperialist project backed by the West.18 This position was not rooted in solidarity with Palestinians per se, however, but in Cold War geopolitics and the GDR’s efforts to position itself against West Germany. After reunification, the East German political legacy was quickly dismantled, including its support for Palestine. The unified German state fully adopted the US/West German line, consolidating support for Israel across all parties and institutions.
The Construction of Staatsräson
The German government’s claim that Israel’s security is part of its Staatsräson (raison d’état/national interest) has become a cornerstone of political discourse, which allows the German state to present this alliance as both morally necessary and politically untouchable. But the principle is not based on international law or a treaty obligation but is rather a self-declared doctrine – and a fairly recent one. The term Staatsräson, applied to Germany’s relations with Israel, became central to official policy only in the early 2000s, after the collapse of the Oslo Accords and during the Second Intifada. In 2005, Rudolf Dressler, then Germany’s ambassador to Israel, argued that a solution to the ‘conflict’ could be achieved only by guaranteeing Israel’s security against terror – Israel’s security, in his words, had to become central to Germany’s raison d’état.19
The principle was elevated to government doctrine three years later, when Angela Merkel stood before the Israeli Knesset and declared in German: ‘The security of Israel is part of Germany’s Staatsräson’.20 The doctrine stifles any political discussion of German support for Israel or suppression of Palestinian solidarity even before it starts. As the Professor of Law Florian Meinel writes: ‘She [Merkel] uses Staatsräson essentially as a synonym for what in other policy areas is called no alternatives. […] Staatsräson is not a genuinely political decision, but precisely the morally motivated refusal to make one’.21
There is no comparable principle in German foreign policy for any other country. Germany never declared that the security of Bosnia, Rwanda, or Ukraine is part of its raison d’être, or even that of Namibia – where, as the colonial power, Germany committed a genocide, officially recognised as such in 2021.22 The doctrine of Staatsräson is thus not about preventing future atrocities. It is about protecting Germany’s alliance with Israel at all costs.
Relacionados
Solidarity under Siege Germany’s repression of the Palestine Movement
Photo: Faisal Yassin.
The conflation of Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism
Germany realised that they could atone for their sins if they offer unconditional support to the state of Israel. Now, if the state of Israel is in any threat whatsoever, this also impacts their own history and their own, let's say, atonement. It really has nothing to do with antisemitism, or with a decolonial approach to combating extremely racist infrastructure, because the German state believes antisemitism is its own distinct prejudice that has nothing to do with racism as a whole.
And this distinction is why you see extremely racist tendencies against Palestinian people – because if they had a decolonial approach to how they dealt with the Holocaust or how they deal with their past colonial crimes, they wouldn't use the same almost Nazi rhetoric to describe migrants, Muslims and Palestinians.
Hebh Jamal, Palestinian journalist
Distorted memory culture
Germany’s official memory culture – sometimes lauded as a model for post-genocidal reckoning – has gradually hardened into a tool for disciplining dissent, particularly concerning the question of Palestine. As Udi Raz has pointedly observed: ‘These days in Germany you can fight anti-Semitism only if you support genocide’.23
The dominant narrative that emerged equated remembrance with loyalty to Israel. The result is a paradoxical ideological position: Germany claims to be the society most devoted to Holocaust remembrance, while using that same history to avoid addressing the violence it enables today. Within this framework, Israel is no longer treated as a state like any other. As the Palestinian-US intellectual Edward Said had warned, it has been transformed into an ‘idea’ or ‘talisman’ that absorbs any and all moral urgency.24
German elites and society at large have failed to cultivate a genuine antifascism regarding the Holocaust or decolonial reckoning in relation to German colonialism. As Hebh Jamal points out, Germany has constructed antisemitism as a standalone, apolitical sin, disconnected from racism or structural power.25
The notion that Germany must protect ‘Jewish life’ by policing Jewish dissenters, silencing Palestinians, and shielding Israeli war crimes from critique reflects a deep betrayal of historical memory. The result is an absurd self-understanding in which German authorities proclaim themselves experts on the Holocaust and guardians of Jewish identity, while simultaneously refusing to listen to Jews who challenge Israeli policy.
Legal underpinnings before 7 October
Germany’s state doctrine has long rested on a deliberately widened and distorted definition of antisemitism. Germany adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in 2017. The IHRA is an international organisation composed of 35 member countries with the mission to advance Holocaust education worldwide. This definition has since become a key international tool for delineating what constitutes antisemitism in public discourse, with more than 45 countries officially adopting it by autumn 2025.26 The definition runs as follows:
‘Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities’.27
It includes 11 illustrative examples, seven of which pertain to the State of Israel.28 Originally developed as a non-binding guideline for data collection and education, the definition was never intended for legislative or disciplinary use. Indeed, Kenneth Stern, the original lead drafter, has maintained that the IHRA definition was not meant to silence speech.29
Yet Germany has not only adopted the IHRA definition but augmented it with a national appendix that states ‘Furthermore, the state of Israel, being perceived as a Jewish collective, may be the target of such attacks’, cementing the conflation of Jewish identity with Israeli statehood.30 This institutionalised a logic in which criticism of Israeli policies, particularly those related to occupation, apartheid, and the ongoing genocide in Gaza, are treated as attacks on Jewish life itself.
Antisemitism itself is not punishable under German law. Rather, it usually seen as falling under Volksverhetzung (§130 of the German Criminal Code), which criminalises incitement to hatred against segments of the population, or Beleidigung (§185), which penalises certain insults against individuals.31 While these laws aim to protect against hate speech and defamation, they have now become key tools in state violence against Palestine solidarity protestors.32 In a political culture where the very concept of Palestinian resistance is categorised as antisemitic, state officials, commentators and even ordinary citizens frequently assert that Palestinians are not fighting against Israel because of occupation or apartheid, but because they are inherently antisemitic.33 This narrative ignores or erases the political and legal contexts of Palestinian struggle, reducing it instead to irrational hatred.
Who gets to be Jewish?
I grew up in Haifa in Palestine. I moved to Germany in 2010, among other things because the place where I come from became too dangerous for me. A good friend of mine was murdered for being queer, and I, myself also a self-identifying queer, felt that I needed to find a safer place for myself.
When I first arrived in Germany, I was so deeply impressed by how advanced I thought Germany was in this regard. Of how pluralistic and truly committed to the sense of humanity. I looked up to Germany precisely because of all those legacies that I thought Germany’s political elite had internalised – to ensure that ‘never again’ truly means never again to everyone. So, you can imagine how shocked I was to realise that it was not the case. Germany was terrorising the most vulnerable population of Germany – those who dared to speak up in favour of those legacies.
It was thanks to Gaza that we understood that our liberation is entangled with the liberation of Palestine. I received countless criminal charges, which I carry with honour.
The entire discourse – the reason why politicians justify an ongoing genocide – is allegedly in order to protect Jews. And it’s quite remarkable to keep in mind that there is nothing more racist, more antisemitic than speaking about Jews instead of speaking with us. The liberation of Palestine is also the liberation from Zionism –it is also the liberation of Judaism from Zionism.
- Udi Raz, Activist with Jewish Voice for Peace
In public discourse in Germany, Jewish identity is increasingly reduced to state-aligned Zionism.34 The result is not only the marginalisation of dissenting Jewish voices, but the redefinition of Jewishness itself by overwhelmingly non-Jewish German authorities. Not one of Germany’s ‘Antisemitism Commissioners’ is Jewish, yet these figures routinely accuse Jewish dissidents of antisemitism.35 This reduces Jewish life to something the German state must define and defend – provided that it conforms to its own understanding. The only ‘acceptable concepts of Judaism’, as one Jewish writer put it, are those ‘non-Jewish Germans explicitly sign off on’.36
In Germany, where Jews constitute only 0.3% of the population and most have never knowingly met a Jewish person, this absence has enabled a state-driven ‘memory culture’ to generate over-identifications in which non-Jewish Germans assume the authority to speak as or for Jews.37 Within this framework, Zionism and Israel are conflated with Jewishness, erasing the diversity of Jewish identities and long traditions of Jewish anti-Zionism. The logic that once depicted Jews as inherently dangerous is thus inverted, recasting Jews as inherently innocent, eternal victims who cannot themselves be perpetrators.38
This erasure is particularly violent towards Jews who speak out, many of whom have been ‘beaten up, detained, arrested, spit on, fired, doxxed, and denounced in the press’39 along with other Palestine solidarity protestors, as this report shows. According to data compiled by the journalist Emily Dische-Becker, a third of those cancelled for alleged antisemitism in Germany are themselves Jewish.40 Many, like the Israeli film director Yuval Abraham, have been detained, fined, or fired. ‘The German establishment doesn’t count Yuval as a Jew because he doesn’t support Israel’, says Wieland Hoban from Jüdische Stimme (Jewish Voice for Peace).41
In this climate, antisemitism is no longer understood as antisemitism, but as dissent from German memory politics. Jews who reject this are not only dismissed, but are actively targeted. Paradoxically, these attacks are not recognised as antisemitic.
Photo: Faisal Yassin.
German support to Israel after 7 October 2023
The aftermath of 7 October 2023 saw Germany redouble its long-standing military and political support for Israel, reinforcing patterns of cooperation that stretch back over decades. It reaffirmed its role as Israel’s key European ally, most visibly through the intensification of arms transfers.
Arms transfers
Germany has long played a central role in arming the Israeli military, being its main destination for arms exports from the early 1960s, when German arms support made up 16% of Israel’s military budget.42 Since 2003, it has consistently been Israel’s second-largest arms supplier after the US.43 From 2020 to 2024, 33% of arms exports to Israel came from Germany, the US accounting for 66%.44
After 7 October 2023,45 Germany dramatically accelerated arms exports to Israel. Whereas in 2022 the value of authorised arms transfers stood at €32.3 million, this rose tenfold to €326.5 million in 2023.46 From 7 Oct 2023 to 13 May, 2025, Germany approved individual licences to permanently export military equipment to Israel worth a total of €485,103,796.47 Germany artificially divides its arms exports into two categories, ‘weapons of war’ and ‘other military equipment’, such as military trucks, optics, communications systems, and spare parts for weapons systems. Only a small fraction of its 2024 exports to Israel (€32,449 between January and August 2024) was labelled as ‘weapons of war’, to avoid stricter regulations and public backlash.48 Despite these semantic gymnastics, most support from Germany comprises critical components for Israel’s most advanced weapons systems.
| Export | Company | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Gearboxes and more than 1,000 tank engines for Merkava tanks and Namer Armed Personnel Carriers | Renk | Used in Gaza’s urban warfare zones; core component of Merkava mobility |
| Diesel engines | MTU Friedrichshafen | Used in Merkava and Namer vehicles; via US Israeli licence |
| 120 mm tank cannons | Rheinmetall | Same calibre as Leopard 2; used in Merkava tanks |
| Targeting systems | AIM (Diehl + Rheinmetall JV) | Integrated in tanks and drones; critical for targeting |
| Roem howitzer | Rheinmetall + Elbit | Entered Israeli service in summer 2023 |
| Submarine components | ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems | For Dolphin-class submarines; most likely nuclear-capable; co-financed by German taxpayers |
| Sa’ar 6 corvettes | ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems | Built in Germany; operational for the first time during the genocide in Gaza |
| 76mm naval gun | Leonardo (Italy); German-built platform | Mounted on Sa’ar 6; used in Gaza |
| Heron TP drones | IAI (via Airbus deal) | Returned to Israel by Germany; reportedly used in Gaza |
| portable anti-tank weapons RGW 90 (‘Matador’) | Dynamit Nobel Defence | Used in the Gaza genocide |
Source: Solidarity under Siege, Transnational Institute (2025)
Political and financial support
From the very first days following the 7 October 2023 attacks, Germany positioned itself not merely as an ally of Israel but as one of its most committed political and diplomatic defenders. On 12 October, when Israel had killed close to 1,500 people in Gaza49, former Chancellor Olaf Scholz told parliament: ‘In this moment, there is only one place for Germany: at Israel’s side’. He described this position as stemming from Germany’s historical responsibility and promised support for Israel’s ‘existence and security’ as a permanent obligation of the German state.50 This speech was echoed by parliament in a rare display of unanimous, cross-party support. Scholz travelled to Israel twice in the months following 7 October. Even as Israeli ministers openly promoted ethnic cleansing and the military violated Protocol IV of the Geneva Convention by bombing homes, schools, mosques, churches, refugee camps and hospitals, he doubled down on Germany’s narrative orthodoxy: ‘Israel is a country that is committed to human rights and international law and acts accordingly’.51 The former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock from the Green Party made nine visits to Israel following 7 October (see Table 1), and other high-ranking officials, including the defence, education, economic, and development ministers, followed suit, making Germany’s political presence in the region almost continuous.52 The Health Minister, Karl Lauterbach, approvingly retweeted a video by an English far-right agitator who claimed the Nazis were ‘more decent’ than Hamas.53
| Date(s) | Visitor → Host | Who / Role | Purpose / Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 Oct 2023 | Germany → Israel | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | First post-7 October solidarity visit; meetings including with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen. |
| 17 Oct 2023 | Germany → Israel | Olaf Scholz, Chancellor | Solidarity visit; joint statements in Tel Aviv. |
| 19 Oct 2023 | Germany → Israel | Boris Pistorius, – Defence Minister | Meetings with Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant; pledged support. |
| 20 Oct 2023 | Germany → Israel | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Meetings with FM Eli Cohen and opposition politician Benny Gantz. |
| 10 Nov 2023 (incl. Israel stop) | Germany → Israel (regional trip) | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Regional tour (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel). |
| 26–27 Nov 2023 | Germany → Israel | Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Bär, Federal President; Bärbel Bas, President of the German Parliament | Official visit; meetings with Israeli President Herzog in Jerusalem, solidarity meetings including in the Knesset. |
| 7 Jan 2024 | Germany → Israel (regional trip) | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Fourth visit to Israel; meetings, including with Foreign Minister Israel Katz. |
| 14–15 Feb 2024 | Germany → Israel | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Fifth visit; talks with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Katz. |
| 26 Mar 2024 | Germany → Israel (regional trip) | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Meeting with Foreign Minister Katz. |
| 8 Apr 2024 | Israel → Germany | Amir Ohana, Speaker of the Knesset | Berlin meetings, including with President Steinmeier; parliamentary diplomacy. |
| 16–17 Apr 2024 | Germany → Israel | Annalena Baerbock – Foreign Minister | Visit following escalation with Iran; meetings, including with Prime Minister Netanyahu. |
| 24 Jun 2024 | Germany → Israel | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | Speech at Herzliya Conference; bilateral meetings. |
| 4–6 Sep 2024 | Germany → Israel (regional trip) | Annalena Baerbock, Foreign Minister | 9th Israel stop since 7 October; meetings with Foreign Minister Israel Katz and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. |
| 10 May 2025 | Germany → Israel | Johann Wadephul, Foreign Minister (new) | First trip to Israel as Foreign Minister; meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar. |
| 11–13 May 2025 (12 May official day) | Israel → Germany | Isaac Herzog, President of Israel | State visit marking 60 years of ties; meetings with President Steinmeier, Chancellor, German parliament leadership. |
| 14–15 May 2025 | Germany → Israel | Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal President | Return leg of ‘two-way’ visit; joint visit with President Herzog to Kibbutz Be’eri. |
Source: Solidarity under Siege, Transnational Institute (2025)
In January 2024, the German government announced it would intervene as a third party at the ICJ to defend Israel against South Africa’s genocide case, although it has yet to submit a formal intervention.54 Germany is the only country to do so, even though dozens of Global South states supported South Africa’s case. German officials simultaneously lobbied the International Criminal Court (ICC) to block arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, further entrenching their alignment with Israel’s impunity.55 Meanwhile, when the UNGA repeatedly passed resolutions calling for a ceasefire, Germany either abstained or voted against them.56
Germany also extended its support through symbolic acts and disinformation. In a Bundestag speech in October 2024, Baerbock defended Israel’s targeting of civilians in Gaza, stripping Palestinians of their fundamental right to protection under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), falsely claiming that ‘when Hamas terrorists hide behind schools, even civilian sites may lose protected status’.57 This would clearly be a violation of IHL, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention (Arts. 18–19) and Additional Protocol I (Arts. 48, 51, 52, 53). She also falsely claimed to have seen video footage of rape committed by Hamas on 7 October – footage that does not exist, according both to Israeli sources and UN investigators.58
Germany initially suspended funding to UNRWA in January 2024 following Israel’s unproven claims that some staff had links to Hamas. Despite a UN-commissioned independent review finding no credible evidence for the allegations, Germany was one of the last countries to restore funding.59
Legal challenges to German complicity
In parallel to growing international condemnation, a number of legal challenges have been made regarding Germany’s material and political support for Israel’s genocide. The most prominent of these is the case filed by Nicaragua at the ICJ on 23 January 2024, which accuses Germany of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions by providing weapons, financial aid, and political support to Israel while knowing they are being used to commit genocide in Gaza.60 The application cites not only Germany’s arms exports but also its suspension of UNRWA funding, its intervention in Israel’s defence at the ICJ, and its political support under the banner of ‘historical responsibility’. Nicaragua requested urgent provisional measures to halt German weapons exports and reinstate humanitarian aid, though these were not granted in the interim ruling.
There are also legal cases within Germany. On 23 February 2024, a group of lawyers filed a criminal complaint with the German Federal Prosecutor, accusing Chancellor Olaf Scholz and members of the Federal Security Council of aiding and abetting genocide by authorising weapons transfers to Israel.61 This case targets the inner circle responsible for arms policy, including the ministries of defence, economy, and foreign affairs. It alleges that by continuing to issue export licences in full knowledge of Israel’s actions, Germany has breached both its domestic and international legal obligations. The European Legal Support Center, the Palestine Institute for Public Diplomacy and the UK-based Law for Palestine are among the civil society organisations (CSOs) backing the case. In September 2025, a collective of lawyers filed a criminal complaint against 11 German Government officials and arms trade executives at the Office of the Federal Prosecutor.62 The complaint urges investigations for Aiding and Abetting Israel’s Genocide in Gaza.
Conclusion
Germany’s relationship to Israel exposes a state that has turned remembrance into a tool of power rather than a safeguard against it. Germany has recast “historical responsibility” as unlimited backing – financial, military, political and ideological - for the Israeli genocide and as a licence to police those who protest against it. Problematically, once again, Germany is claiming the power to define what it means to be Jewish. Criticism of Israel is routinely categorised as antisemitism, even when it comes from Jewish anti-Zionists, while racist and Islamophobic agitation has become routine in the name of combating such ‘antisemitism’. At the same time, the voices of those who resist racism and genocide, in Germany and beyond, show that memory can also be claimed against the state.
This is the second longread in a series of five based on the Transnational Institute’s report Solidarity under Siege: Germany’s Repression of the Palestine Movement. The first part can be found here. The report draws on the insights of interviews with seven activists from the Palestinian solidarity movement, including Palestinians and German, Muslim and Jewish people, among other (overlapping) identities, who shared their trust, stories and time with the author. At their request, pseudonyms have been used for some of these activists.
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