Crisis in the Pa-O Region A renewed conflict-zone in Myanmar

The peoples of Burma gained independence from colonial rule in 1948, bringing together the Bamar (Burman) population in the central plains and ethnic nationalities in upland areas. But for over 75 years now, the national armed forces known as the Sit-Tat (Tatmadaw) have been relentlessly sabotaging both ethnic and national administrative systems in order to remain in power while promoting an admixture of fascism and Bamar-centred chauvinism. The 1947 and 1974 constitutions, as well as the current 2008 constitution drafted at the National Convention in Nyaung Hna Pin by the military, have all favoured centralised power and provide advantage to the Sit-Tat by such measures as more than 25 per cent of seats or representation in government, legislation and the judiciary system. Such powers allow the Sit-Tat to manipulate Myanmar’s politics and economy, a practice that is continued today by the military State Administration Council (SAC) which controls the Defence, Home and Border affairs ministries directly as well as dominating other government departments. 

A political impasse has long endured. After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the generals of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) effectively staged a military coup, causing civil war to spread, and a people’s revolution was born due to the systematic terrorising activities of the military. In a forerunner of today, this led to the formation of a rival government, known as the National Coalition Government Union of Burma, inside and outside of the country which used international means to try and gain support for the democracy struggle. However, even though the ‘8888’ student-led movement initially had the momentum to stimulate the public in pressing for political change, a lack of leadership on the opposition side and the tactics of division, spies and heavy weaponry on the regime side meant that the Myanmar military remained ahead in the political game. Subsequently, the Sit-Tat created a proxy political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and the 2008 constitution to maintain its rule over the country. 

A quasi-civilian change came between 2011 and 2020 when the Myanmar military continued background rule on the country: first, with President Thein Sein’s USDP government and, subsequently, during the administration headed by State Councillor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), convincing the public as well as the international community to support the Sit-Tat in regime change. Instead, however, of focusing on national equality and the root causes of civil war, both the USDP and NLD administrations concentrated more on national reconciliation between the Bamar-majority people by focusing on prison releases and amnesties from crimes committed by the military. At the same time, after discussion between these parties and the Sit-Tat, they started engaging on talks with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) under the name of ‘peace’. But military leaders focused more on amending the 2008 constitution during these exchanges rather than creating a new federal constitution.

This lack of reform also continued during 2015-2020 when the government was led by NLD, and the importance of ethnic equality, nationality affairs and federal democracy was further marginalised. In essence, the collaboration between the majority-Bamar parties in government and the peace process undermined ethnic nationalities in political reform instead of building a genuine federal system. 

After the 2021 coup, civil war again broke out throughout the country. The military SAC gave the reason that the election was a fraud. But this did not stop the public from protesting in the streets, with peaceful demonstrations met with violent crackdowns leading people to defend themselves. As a result of the coup, human rights abuses, political repression and armed conflict aroused a nationwide response. 

Following the SAC coup, the Myanmar military acted as fascist dictators, launching offensive attacks, human rights violations and the destruction of civilian properties. In order to support another election which, this time, the Sit-Tat could win using electoral ratios that support the Sit-Tat, and the coup leader Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing declared that the SAC will hold another election. Meanwhile the SAC continued sham peace talks with those EAO leaders they could find who are supportive of the coup or prepared to allow the military to remain in power in the name of peace.

In reality, however, the declining number of groups that provide support to the SAC peace process could be paving the way to hand over the country again to the Sit-Tat. Peace processes under previous governments were not based on federal policies. Rather, they focused on drawing up and staying under the 2008 constitution, authoritarian persistence and sharing national resources among the elite authorities. The consequence is to curse a country rich in natural resources and beauty with conflict and poverty.

At the same time, to acquire more weapons and funding for the military, the SAC has been selling natural resources and accelerating business with countries such as China and Russia. In some parts of the country, this is backed up by turning some of the local ethnic armed groups and ceasefire EAOs into Sit-Tat-backed militia (pyithusit) who, for their own self-advantage, will obey orders from the SAC and protect the military’s businesses.

It therefore needs to be reminded that the Myanmar military is seeking to continue its rule by stepping up its long-standing tactic of providing business opportunities to selected EAOs in order to divide nationality peoples and sabotage the pathway to federalism. For this reason, instead of supporting the military-led election and sham peace process, it can be judged that this is a good opportunity for all peoples to unite and revolt against military rule and join the struggle for genuine federalism. 

In summary, the main objective of the Myanmar military is to maintain central control in governance, legislation and judicial affairs in order to have absolute powers in national politics and the economy. The NLD, too, is comprised of Bamar-majority supporters, many of whom have tended to lead with Bamar chauvinism in the past. Non-Bamar peoples, however, as well as those who believe in real democracy would like to build a federal union where all peoples can have equality and self-determination. That is the challenge which faces our country today.

Pa-O parties have been active in national politics since independence in 1948. The majority of the Pa-O population live in southwest Shan State, where a Pa-O Self-Administered Zone (SAZ), consisting of Hopong, Hsihseng and Pinlaung townships, was demarcated under the 2008 constitution. But there are also smaller communities in Karen and Mon States that are active in politics. Armed resistance first broke out in 1949, but an aboveground Union Pa-O National Organisation (UPNO) also won seats in elections during the parliamentary era of the 1950s. In later decades, an ideological split caused a division in EAO movements between the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO), headed by U Aung Kham Hti, and pro-communist Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organisation (SSNPLO), headed by Tha Kalei. But both agreed ceasefires with the SLORC in the 1990s: the PNO in 1991 and the SSNPLO in 1994.

Subsequently, splits occurred in both groups, with the SSNPLO collapsing and a new EAO emerging in 2009, the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO), led by such figures as Khun Okker, Khun Myint Tun (a former NLD MP-elect) and Khun Thurein. The same year, the PNO – which had built up a large territory of control in the Pa-O SAZ – agreed to transform into a pyithusit militia under Sit-Tat authority as part of the country’s political transition. The PNO also joined in parliamentary politics, winning seats in the 2010, 2015 and 2020 elections. The PNLO, meanwhile, also signed a bilateral ceasefire with the Thein Sein government in 2012, followed by the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), meaning that the Pa-O people were ostensibly at peace.

The existence of such truces, however, can be misleading. As the current breakdown highlights, the Pa-O people have long been ruled by fear, repression, religion and division on a strategic ethnic and political frontline in the country. The ceasefires of the past three decades have not led to sustainable peace or reform. After the PNO ‘exchanged weapons for democracy’ under the 1991 ceasefire, the party came to protect a small group in capitalist wealth under authoritarian rule. Human rights abuses, including land confiscations, occurred throughout the territory, while PNO leaders increasingly recognised and obeyed the military regime as their government.

For its part, the PNLO also initiated development programmes from 2013 onwards in the Kadu Gyi region, Mawkmai township, under the terms of the NCA political dialogue. The PNLO also took part in meetings of the 21st Century Panglong Conference introduced by the NLD-led government. But, as civil society groups complained, socio-economic and political difficulties for the people were increasing even before the 2021 coup. Following the SAC takeover, the PNLO continued to try and work under – and thus validate – the NCA principles, even though the coup was a violation of the accord’s most basic policies. As national breakdown spread, it was long clear that the Pa-O people could not remain immune from the spreading repression and civil war affecting their daily lives.

This is the background of political impasse and state failure in successive generations of government that led to the conditions of crisis and emergency sweeping across Pa-O communities today.

During the period of Myanmar’s political transition (2011-2020), two armed groups could be found in the political landscape in the Pa-O region: the older and larger movement of the PNO, headquartered in Kyauktalon, Pinlaung township, and which operated largely as a militia under Sit-Tat command, and the more-recently formed PNLO which, following its 2012 ceasefire with the government, was allowed a base area in Mawkmai township closer to the Thailand border. The armed wing of the PNO is the Pao National Army (PNA) but, since 2009, is often referred to as the Pa-O People’s Militia Force, while the armed wing of the PNLO is the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA). There were also two electoral parties, the PNO’s political wing which won seats in the legislatures and Pa-O SAZ working closely with the USDP, and a revived UPNO which claims traditions from the parliamentary party of the 1950s.

After the 1 February coup, there were nationwide protests, and resistance erupted in a Spring Revolution in response to the brutality of the SAC regime. New alignments and forces were formed on the national stage across the country. Calling for an end to military rule and abolition of the 2008 constitution, allies from the pro-democracy side proceeded with the formation of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw of MPs-elect, National Unity Consultative Council, and National Unity Government (NUG). Subsequently, the NUG also started to prepare and implement ‘people’s defence forces’ (PDFs) in support of armed struggle against the regime, often in alliance or cooperation with EAOs such as the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and Karen National Union (KNU) whose ceasefires with the government broke down after coup.

In similar ways, new alliances and movements developed in Pa-O politics. Generally, the PNO stayed under the Sit-Tat authority and close to the SAC, with the Pa-O SAZ chairman Khun San Lwin becoming a council member. The UPNO, in contrast, did not register to take part in elections due to political scrutiny. A new Pa-O National Defence Force (PNDF), meanwhile, was established in Shan State in May 2021, while a Pa-O Peoples’ Defence Force (Kham Daung) was formed in Karen and Mon States in two different locations where they also resisted terrorism and authoritarian activities. Then, following a practice in other ethnic nationality territories in the country, a Pa-O National Federal Council (PNFC) was formed on 11 December 2021, bringing together a diversity of groups in Pa-O politics and society in order to abolish any kind of dictatorship and build a federal democracy.

Pa-O civil society organisations (CSOs), it should be added, were also involved in peaceful protests in the early stages after the coup. However, due to the violent crackdown by the SAC, Pa-O CSOs increasingly worked with the PNLO/PNLA as well as the new PDFs and PNFC to support the struggle against the regime. Within two years of the coup, the structures in Pa-O politics were transformed.

In the immediate post-coup period, the PNO remained as both a militia and political party, collaborating with the SAC. PNLO leaders also continued to stand by the NCA process and principles, holding peace talks with regime officials. During these times, leaders from both the PNO and PNLO often met together, especially after meetings with the military authorities. However, on these occasions, it seems that leaders of the two parties left out the question of territorial disputes.

In taking these positions, PNLO leaders claimed that they were playing an important role in preventing armed conflict in Pa-O territories. The party remained part of the Peace Process Steering Team with the decreasing group of EAOs still standing by the NCA which promised to deliver humanitarian support to Pa-O territories. As a result, the PNLO continued to be represented at occasional peace conferences led by the SAC. But, as pressures increased around the country, PNLO members also started to cooperate with other forces and movements opposing the SAC on the ground. Opinion was growing that the pathway the PNLO walked in the NCA process was invalid. 

Tensions then came out into the open on 15 September 2022, when five PNLA soldiers were abducted and killed by PNA militia in Warpyone Village, Pinlaung township, in unclear circumstances. Both the PNLO and PNFC called for legal action against those responsible. No official announcements, however, followed over how to rehabilitate the victims’ families and bring the perpetrators to justice. In consequence, some actors suggested that this was a plot to create conflict between the PNO and PNLO. At the same time, the two leading organisations in Pa-O politics appeared ‘absent’ during a critical time of national emergency rather than leading according to the public’s wishes. As a result, supporters within these two movements (especially the PNLO) who did not wish to see collaboration with the SAC left their organisations to form new forces. 

Prior to the breakdown of the PNLO ceasefire in January 2024, violence and insecurity were beginning to spread, creating further division in Pa-O politics and society.

Two incidents stood out. The first occurred in March 2023 in Namneng (Nam Neint) village, Pinlaung township, during a time when Sit-Tat forces, sometimes backed by the PNA, were losing ground against Karenni and PDF forces in Moebye and Pekhon townships on the Shan and Kayah State borders to the south. At least 23 civilians were killed, including three Buddhist monks, sheltering in a Buddhist monastery when fighting broke out between SAC and PDF forces around the village.

First reports blamed the massacre on Sit-Tat troops. But the SAC subsequently sought to turn allegations around, blaming the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force, KNPP and their allies, a charge the PNO supported.1 The PNLO also issued a statement of condemnation without mentioning any names. The electoral UPNO, meanwhile, made no announcements. Anti-SAC groups, instead, accused the regime of seeking to create racial conflict, and the local PNDF (Kham Khoung [KK]) visited the site to gather documentation, subsequently releasing a statement that the perpetrators were SAC troops. With this evidence, the PNFC announced that they would take further action to try and bring the perpetrators to justice through international law.

The second incident occurred two months later in May when a convoy of ASEAN diplomats and representatives of its humanitarian arm, the AHA Centre, were fired upon by unknown gunmen when travelling from Taunggyi to Hsihseng township. According to ASEAN’s five-point consensus to support peaceful transition, the military government is responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance. The SAC claims that it is fulfilling this commitment although, in reality, there is no such implementation on the ground. For its part, the PNLO was collaborating on this project, and the SAC allowed the AHA team to visit the site. The vehicles, however, were attacked in a PNO-controlled area. Subsequently, the SAC accused ‘revolutionary’ groups of coordinating the attack, even though there were no active movements in that area. Instead, PNLO leaders said that the ambush was orchestrated by PNA militia, and the PNFC put out a statement condemning the attack.2

In theory, the Pa-O region was still a ceasefire territory. But many communities were living with growing division and uncertainties every day.

The SAC and PNLO remained in the NCA agreement until clashes broke out between the two sides in Sam Hpu village, Hopong township, on 21 January 2024. Tensions then rapidly escalated when fighter jets dropped two bombs on Nawng Htaw where the PNLO maintains its headquarters. In response, the PNLO and joint alliance forces seized Hsihseng town, and fighting was intense. To the despair of local communities, the Sit-Tat had created a division during this descent into conflict by employing its usual tactics, seeking to repress the PNLO while supporting the PNO and ordering its leaders to recruit more militia members, creating a scenario for turning the Pa-O people against one another. 

In the first weeks, conflict was largely centred in Hsihseng township, which had been a conflict zone between the Myanmar military and SSNPLO in the past. During these earlier struggles, the local people had experienced mass murder during the Sit-Tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ operations on many occasions, causing displacement which spread on extensive scale across the Pa-O region. Around 50 per cent of the Hsihseng population today are descendants of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Mawkmai township. Land-grabbing and human rights violations, however, continued during the 1990s and 2000s despite the hopes for stability following the PNO and SSNPLO ceasefires, leaving farmers without their lands and with a lack of employment and livelihood opportunities in Pa-O territories. As a result, many young Pa-O people sought work in Thailand, a pattern that continues until today. Currently, many of the people displaced in the recent fighting are families who have lost their homes for a second or third time.

For this reason, land issues remain a key element in the renewed conflict.3 Land confiscation from farmers has occurred in Hsihseng township since 1992 and, until today, these families are struggling to get back their lands. Seizures began with the Sit-Tat Light Infantry Battalions (LIBs) 423 and 424 which confiscated 2400 acres of land to build temporary and permanent posts, taking both east and west sides of the road between Hsihseng and the Kayah State capital, Loikaw. These lands were owned by the people of Hsihseng and six villages along the way. Since this time, farmers have been paying taxes to LIBs 423/424 to be allowed to work on their own lands.

In 2017, in an apparent bid to defuse criticism, the Sit-Tat handed back 200 acres of land back to local farmers. But the location was not ideal for plantation. Thus 500 farmers joined a protest march on 1 May 2019 to try and regain the rights to their own lands. A year later, the farmers also tried to start planting again on the east side of the highway where the military had arbitrarily seized their lands. But on 20 May, the Sit-Tat arrested 73 farmers, confiscated their tractors and began to sue them. After this, the farmers continued going to court appointments, but on 4 June 2023 the court made an unfair decision, with the farmers losing their case. 

The Pa-O people have continued to face such hardships in Hsihseng township for many decades. Today, according to official statistics, there are six wards, 13 village tracts, 322 villages, 31,748 households and a 154,615 population. The weather is also generally hot, wet and humid, which is ideal for growing rice, corn, peanuts, sesame and pigeon peas to support local livelihoods. But since the end of January this year, sufferings and land loss have escalated once again, with LIBs 423/424 and the PNA militia fighting against the PNLA and alliance forces for control of the town. 

At the same time, while media reporting concentrates on the struggle for Hsihseng, conflict and displacement have swept across the Pa-O SAZ and a much larger area of southwest Shan State. Already sheltering a large population of refugees and IDPs from Kayah State, by the beginning of March around 100,000 civilians were reported to have been displaced, 40 killed and many wounded. Within six weeks, the Pa-O region had become a new epicentre of conflict.

21-23 January 

Clashes first occurred between the Sit-Tat, PNA and PNLA in Sam Hpu village, Mae Nae Taung region, Hopong township, over the issue of weapon transportation by the PNLA. Fighting broke out on 21 January after arguments escalated between these groups, destroying 27 houses and inflicting civilian casualties. The same night, the PNLO/PNLA liaison office was raided by the SAC’s Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs. Three PNLA liaison officers were arrested: Major Khun Min Thein, Captain Khun Thait Di and Lt. Khun Hla Win. After negotiations, they were released the following morning. But later the same day, between 7 PM and 8 PM, the Sit-Tat used fighter jets to drop two bombs on Nawng Htaw, where the PNLO HQ is located, injuring two people and killing one IDP. In response, on 23 January the PNLA and allied forces seized four Sit-Tat and PNO/PNA road-gates and stations without opening fire.

24-25 January 

On the morning of 24 January, local people from Hsihseng started to relocate to Hopong and Taunggyi due to the deepening tensions. Others remained trapped in the town. At about 5 PM, the SAC used fighter jets to open fire on Hsihseng and reinforced their troops. The PNLA and allied groups, meanwhile, also reinforced their positions. The same day, the PNLO/PNLA released a statement informing the local people that they were there to patrol, providing protection to the town and not to harm them. The following day, more residents were helped to escape from their homes, but many of the IDPs reaching Taunggyi were unable to find a place to stay and faced hardship. Fighting then started at about noon in Hsihseng itself, with fires breaking out in some of the wards. The remaining people advised one another to leave for nearby villages. That night, the SAC used fighter jets to bomb non-stop in Nawng Htaw, Nawng Yin, Hsihseng and surrounding areas. 

26-29 January 

Fighting escalated between the SAC and PNO/PNA on the one hand and PNLA-allied joint forces on the other at about 10 AM in the morning as LIB 423/424 reinforcements were attacked by drones. In response, the SAC used fighter jets and heavy artillery around Hsihseng and four nearby villages. At about 12:20 PM PNA troops led by U Nay Win Tun met with PNLA and allied joint forces on the west side of Lwe Htwe village, Hsihseng township. Subsequently, the PNO called on Pa-O young people to join the PNA to protect local territories and prosperity. The PNLO also released a statement calling on the people to join the cause to end military dictatorship once and for all and build a federal democratic state as a brotherhood. The PNFC welcomed this announcement, calling on the PNO to cooperate and avoid conflicts between Pa-O people.

As the struggle for control of the town continued, clashes spread in the early morning of 28 January from Nam Aw to Hti Man villages. In the afternoon and evening, the SAC again used fighter jets and heavy shelling in attacks on Hsihseng as fighting intensified between LIBs 423/424 and allied resistance forces, leading to the destruction of markets and houses. On 29 January, there were no skirmishes on the ground, but artillery shelling and fighter jet bombing resumed. The PNLO leader, Gen. Khun Thurein announced the movement’s stance on revolution to Buddhist monks and the Pa-O public. The same day, the PNO also announced their position to the people. With arms and ammunition supplied by the Sit-Tat, the PNA began issuing weapons to local people and ordered residents aged between 18 and 35 as well as veterans from PNA training batches 1 to 7 to join the PNO militia by registering their names.

30 January – 3 February

Artillery shelling and jet fighter bombing continued, with the Sit-Tat seeking to regain control of LIB 423/424 camps captured by the PNLA and allied forces. Resistance troops, however, remained present in Hsihseng town. Pressures meanwhile increased on the local population. Sit-Tat and PNA militia were reported to be preventing local people from leaving Hsihseng, while residents were afraid to go back to their homes due to the fighting. Internet connections were cut off and, apart from MYTEL (owned by the Sit-Tat and Vietnamese military company Viettel), there were no other official communication services. Meanwhile the PNO began recruiting young people as soldiers in Taunggyi, the Shan State capital, and on 3 February the PNLO/PNLA published a statement reaffirming their commitment to abolish military dictatorship.

4-6 February 

On 4 February, the SAC launched heavy artillery around 6:30 in the morning. Fighting intensified with the PNLA and alliance forces, with Sit-Tat units reported to have fired shells about 50 times that day. Two fighter jets flew over Hsihseng town. The following day, fighting involving the Sit-Tat, PNA and PNLA/alliance forces continued from 5 AM to 8 PM, with many casualties on both sides. Sit-Tat units were reported to have fired heavy artillery over 100 times. A travel ban was imposed in Hsihseng town and Kaung Mu Bar and Hti Man villages, phone connections were cut off in the Ling Pay village area, and two local men from Wah Taw (Wartaw) and Naung Eh villages were killed, with several injured. On 6 February, fighting started again before dawn with clashes intensifying during the day. Around 10 AM, Sit-Tat units began continuously shelling Lwe Pyut (Loi Putt) village to the north of Hsihseng, causing local people to flee.

With no end to the fighting, the number of IDPs was reported to have passed the 70,000 mark, including Karenni IDPs who had previously fled fighting in Kayah State. Those displaced were unable to return home, more houses were destroyed, and soldiers from both sides were preparing new positions in Hsaik Hkawng, Hopong, Mongpon (Mong Pawn) and Loilem townships. Tensions were reported to be increasing on a wide front, and troops from the ceasefire Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) were reported to have arrived to Cho Kham (Hkio Hkam) in the Mongpon area where the SAC was reinforcing its troops. More local residents made preparations to flee. On the third anniversary of the 2021 coup, the SSPP – a member of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee – released a statement saying that it would join with resistance forces to ‘put an end to the autocracy, chauvinism and expansionism’ of the military regime.

7-14 February

Hsihseng remained the main battleground, with the SAC accused of a total of 263 bombardments, including 500-pound bombs, and firing 311 rounds of artillery shells, inflicting civilian casualties and destroying over 70 buildings during the first two weeks of fighting. Outside the town, the PNLA was reported to have closed the main road between Hsihseng and Hsaik Hkawng to the north as well as smaller country roads. Many IDPs were reported to be sheltering in the forests, while growing numbers continued to seek sanctuary in Shwenyaung and Taunggyi. Here the SAC stepped up the recruitment of young men into the Sit-Tat following the announcement of the People’s Military Service Law on 10 February.

15-20 February

As the struggle for Hsihseng continued, LIBs 425/426 based in Ban Yin village were reported to be shelling nearby villages, killing a baby and local man in Htam Yan village on the night of 17 February as well as injuring seven civilians, including the baby’s parents, in nearby Hti Tam village the following day. No PNLA troops were reported in these villages at the times of these attacks. A heavy barrage was continued by LIB 423 on Hsihseng throughout the night of 18 February. The next day, eight IDPs travelling in three vehicles were wounded by artillery fire near Wah Taw village when they tried to return to the town to retrieve their belongings. In response, the PNLO warned civilians not to attempt further returns until they receive safe warnings. On 17 February, Brig-Gen. Win Zaw Moe, vice commander of the Sit-Tat Eastern Command, handed over more weapons to the PNA, while individuals authorised by the PNO were witnessed conducting patrols in military clothing, armed with guns, in the Hsihseng area. 

21-29 February

Fighting escalated in Hopong township. A clash was reported on the 21st morning between a combined Sit-Tat/PNA force and PNLA/allied troops near Mongpon, causing residents of local villages to flee. The following day the Taunggyi-Hopong-Mongpon-Loilem road was closed, with the Sit-Tat positioning an artillery unit at Htam Sam Shwedagon Pagoda Hill which began shelling Meh Nel mountain and the surrounding area. On 23 February a combined Sit-Tat/PNA force were reported to have attacked a PNLA column in the vicinity. The following day, PNLA troops responded by seizing a military camp near Loi Woe Tok village, issuing a statement urging the PNO to abandon its alliance with the SAC and join the PNLO in the struggle for freedom. There were also reports that the SSPP was supporting the PNLA in its battle with the PNA, with the Sit-Tat moving more reinforcements to the area.  

1-6 March

On 2 March the SAC claimed to have reopened the road between Hopong and Mongpon after 16 military engagements with the PNLA and allied forces, but clashes continued, with civilians moving to Loilem or nearby villages for shelter. Artillery shelling continued, while the PNLA was reported to have dropped bombs from drones on the LIB-517 base, causing a number of casualties. Fighting, meanwhile, continued in the Hsihseng area, and it was estimated that around 100,000 civilians, including 25,000 Karenni war refugees, had been displaced from 120 villages and six wards in Hsihseng, Hopong and Loilem townships since conflict began in January. 

7-14 March

Fighting continued in Hsihseng and Hopong townships, with the PNLA accusing the SAC of two new tactics: ‘kamikaze’ drones and ‘chemical’ bombs, in addition to ‘flame’ bombs, to try and break PNLO-allied resistance. The Sit-Tat was reported to be coordinating actions with the PNA militia from Sike Khaung (Sai Khao), north of Hsihseng. Nearly 400 artillery strikes were counted in a one-week period. A particular escalation was reported, amidst intense clashes, on 10 March when fighter jets dropped over 100 bombs on wards in downtown Hsihseng, and Sit-Tat drones destroyed the Buddhist monastery and local homes in an attack on Pinlyam village, Hopong township. By the calculation of the Pao Youth Organisation (PYO), there had been more than 400 airstrikes and 1,500 artillery attacks by the Sit-Tat during a 49-day period since the ceasefire breakdown, resulting in the destruction of nearly 200 homes and other structures. During this time, 49 civilians had been killed and 60 injured. Of combatant casualties, there are no reliable estimates or figures.
 

Villages and Wards Displaced in the Hsihseng battle

**Village Tract

Within the first two weeks of conflict, more than 63,300 people from an estimated 12,000 households were reported to have been displaced from six wards in Hsihseng town and 46 villages, including Karenni IDP populations who had been taking refuge there since 2021 to escape the fighting in Kayah State. By 26 February, the PYO calculated that these numbers had increased to 94,300, though more remained to be counted on the ground; forty civilians had been killed and 51 injured during the fighting in Hsihseng; and 97 houses or civil buildings had been damaged as well as 12 religious buildings.

Initially, most residents thought that there would be no conflict outside the immediate area. They therefore left their homes without adequate preparation. The elderly, women and children fled to such places as Taunggyi, Hopong, Kakku, Ayetharyar, Mawkmai (Ho Nam) and Pyawbwe, while young adult males ran away to villages and forests to the west of Hsihseng town. Most of the population of the surrounding villages also fled their homes. Around 30 per cent of those displaced have been calculated as elderly over the age of 50, while 15-20 percept are children under the age of 10.

Given the lack of planning, the local IDPs were ill-prepared to cope with humanitarian emergency, and many children have not been able to continue with their education. Current needs are especially cash to buy food, temporary shelter and warm clothes due to the cold weather, with some groups still seeking shelter in caves and the forests. CSOs, young activists, village leaders and religious groups have been working day and night to address food, shelter and basic health needs. Most of the IDP families have corn plantations. But, due to the continuing conflict, local farmers have been watching the situation closely and not sold their crops yet. It was also initially impossible to transport their produce due to insecurity and road blockages, such as the broken bridge at Tabet stream which was destroyed by bombs.

In early February, the different armed organisations allowed some of the local people to return to Hsihseng to collect their belongings, but a number who did so were injured in bombings. For this reason, as long as conflict continues, it will be impossible for local people in the township to rely on collecting their food stores and crops. Fortunately, food and other essential items have been available in most of the places they have been displaced. But the price of products is getting expensive, and hardships are still increasing. Meanwhile conflict has also spread into Hopong township, with more people displaced and seeking sanctuary until conflict subsides.

In overview, the Pa-O conflict is delicately poised, and Pa-O communities are now added to the growing number of peoples suffering and displaced from their homes since the SAC seized power. In just two months, the Pa-O region has become a war-zone, the political landscape is precarious, and the likelihood of an imminent end to conflict presently appears bleak.

Under previous dictatorships, the Pa-O people approached military regimes with peace, despite their dominant nature. The achievement of justice, however, was not successful. Therefore we have to learn lessons from the past in the current situation and be stronger than the ‘powerful one’ – i.e. the Myanmar military – in order to reach our goals. This means that the Pa-O people need to be united in the current state of conflict to abolish any kind of authoritarianism. And, related to this, we need to work as Pa-O nationals alongside all ethnic peoples in the country in order to build a federal democratic state.

Presently, we can see that three options derive from the SAC coup as follows: 

1. Are we going to combat the SAC? 
2. Are we going to have peaceful dialogue with the SAC? 
3. Are we going to collaborate with the SAC for benefit? 

Among the three choices, for option (b) and ‘peaceful dialogue’, we have had 77 years of experience and lessons learned without successful conclusion. For option (c) and ‘collaboration’, we have seen that it allows authoritarians to grow in power and for the benefit of individuals rather than for the country’s development and its peoples. But we also know that, as long as we are together in Myanmar, the affairs of Pa-O nationals are the country’s affairs, and the country’s affairs are also the Pa-O’s affairs. Therefore, the following recommendations are suggested. 

1. Protection and assistance to be provided to IDPs 
2. Short and long term support for IDPs 
3. Preparation for safety and protection, health services and rations  
4. Avoid fighting Pa-O against Pa-O and find common ground to abolish the military dictatorship 
5. Promote political discussions between the PNLO and PNO and PNFC 
6. Work with the public to build stronger governance in Pa-O territories 
7. Build trust and understanding among Pa-O young people based on truth, justice, system change as well as Pa-O culture and society rather than blind faith in individuals or organisations 
8. Prepare to have a dialogue to establish a Pa-O Federal Army 
9. Support cooperation, including military fronts, with ethnic alliances that share common objectives 
10. Build unity and justice among the Pa-O people.

The conclusion is clear. The lessons from our history and experiences from the present crisis are binding resistance forces and the people together in order to abolish military authoritarianism and support the pathway to the achievement of a federal democratic state. 

* Khun Oo was born in Hsihseng township, southern Shan State. He is former chairperson and presently vice-chair of the Pa-O Youth Organisation, working with farmer communities and youth in Pa-O society and in collaboration with diverse ethnic groups. He is coordinator of the Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG).