The Search for Arakan's Security amidst Myanmar's Uncertain Future A Myanmar Commentary by Naing Lin*

The future of Myanmar remains largely uncertain. Having forcibly taken power from the elected government leaders in February 2021, the generals in Naypyidaw are now trying to have a so-called ‘general election’ in order, it seems, to manufacture ‘legitimacy’ under their rules. To back this up, the National League for Democracy (NLD) and key ethnic parties like the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and Arakan National Party have been dissolved or excluded from standing. But even if elections are neither free and fair nor sensible and inclusive, there are observers who believe that actors in neighbouring countries could be ready to ‘recognize’ the validity of the polls. The whole world would like to see stability and political change in Myanmar.

This, however, is not the whole picture. Administering many parts of the country, there are key opposition and ethnic nationality organisations which have publicly stated that they will not support the December elections as, they argue, it is merely an attempt by the Myanmar military to continue in power by illegal and illegitimate means. Leading ethnic resistance movements include the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Organisation, Palaung State Liberation Front, (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, Shan State Progress Party and the United League of Arakan (ULA).

A similar stand is taken by the National Unity Government (NUG) which claims to be the legitimate government of the country – not the military State Administration Council (SAC: renamed in July as the State Security and Peace Commission [SSPC]). This anti-election view is supported by People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) that have been set up in many parts of the country in opposition to the 2021 coup. Meanwhile there are pro-junta proxies, notably in Karen State or the Pa-O National Organisation in Shan State, as well as groups standing by the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), such as the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. These latter parties say that they will cooperate with the SAC-SSPC during the holding of the election.

Clearly, the political and security landscape is extremely complicated on the ground. This leads to the question whether – beyond the inter-party issues of opposition, cooperation and recognition – there is a more realistic likelihood that the elections will only bring more violence, especially against the civilian population. Unfortunately, the current situation warns of worrying trends in that direction. Such actions, it needs to be considered, can happen from more than one side. 

First, in the forefront of repression, the junta is using a combination of ‘legal’ warfare and military punishment to instigate violence against civilians. To support this tactic, the junta released a so-called ‘Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction’ on 29 July this year. As of early October, the BBC Burmese Service reported that at least 64 civilians have been arrested under this law, facing imprisonment terms of between five and ten years.

Second, without any respect for human life and international humanitarian law, the junta has stepped up military assaults and air strikes, deliberately targeting urban, populated and civilian areas where opposition movements administer territory, especially in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), northern Shan and Arakan (Rakhine) States and Sagaing Region. As a result, local peoples have become more vulnerable, with data confirming that the numbers of civilians killed by air strikes has increased proportionally across the country in recent months. These attacks appear to be systemic.

On 8 October, the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) detailed over 108 airstrikes in Sagaing Region alone during escalating attacks between March and May this year, killing 89 civilians. On a broader time and territorial scale, it was also reported that nearly half of verified civilian deaths in Shan State, Sagaing and Mandalay Regions between April 2024 and May 2025 occurred during aerial attacks that targeted civilian infrastructure and locations such as schools and markets. The OHCHR report said that these are potential war crimes. Other international human rights groups documented 1,134 airstrikes between January and May this year, as compared with totals of 197 in 2023 and 640 in 2024, with attacks currently increasing. Paramotors are also being deployed by the junta to avoid resistance defences, and the killing of more than 20 civilians at a Buddhist festival in the Sagaing Region on 7 October made headlines around the world.

Disturbingly, high numbers of civilian deaths are also being reported in similar attacks in other parts of the country. In Kayah (Karenni) State, which is majority Christian, near-daily airstrikes were reported in Hpasawng township during July and August, killing 33 civilians and injuring 94 in the first part of July with a further 32 civilians killed in the deadliest single strike on 17 August in Mawchi. These appeared to be deliberate terror attacks on mining towns and villages.

The same patterns have been reported in Arakan where Narinjara News recorded six major airstrikes between January and September, killing more than 100 civilians. Bombing was especially intense in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships during August and September, confirming the junta’s strategy of launching indiscriminate air strikes against civilian populations as the general election approaches. 

Finally, in understanding the context of violence before the polls, the opposition NUG as well as several other opposition movements have warned that politicians, administrators and officials who collaborate with junta bureaucracies face potential targeting in resistance actions against the polls. Already local incidents have been reported, including abductions and the threat of killings, in which anti-regime groups are involved. It is thus critical that the human rights of all people in Myanmar are protected and respected equally. As the election looms, civilians – wherever they live in the country – face ever more insecurity and violence during the junta’s attempt to rescue its failed ‘power grab’.

This then leads to the theme of this commentary. Myanmar is undoubtedly in the midst of one the most turbulent periods of conflict and state failure since independence in 1948. Generalisations, though, can be very difficult in a land of ethnic and cultural diversity. Since the coup, ethnic resistance and self-governance have deepened in many parts of the country in opposition to the junta. But this also raises challenges about political goals and the trajectory of these movements. 

As so often in the past, this is especially the case in Arakan (Rakhine State) where a fundamental question is frequently asked: will Arakan, a gateway land on Myanmar’s western frontier, have a different story to tell from the countrywide direction? Certainly, the past four years have seen dramatic and, in many respects, unprecedented change in reshaping the ethno-political landscape.

While the looming elections are a serious question for national politics in Myanmar, Arakan and its peoples are now experiencing a number of different challenges in their daily lives. As of November 2025, the ULA and its military wing, the Arakan Army (AA), have captured 14 out of 17 townships in Rakhine State and Paletwa township in southern Chin State. In support of these advances, the movement has established the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG) as its administrative wing, with 15 departments for daily governance. These include general administration, health, education, humanitarian and social affairs, taxes and customs, forest and environment, agriculture, livestock and irrigation, fishery and water resources, policing, legal affairs, technology and media. At the same time, departments under the ULA’s authority continue to take responsibility as the political wing of the movement for such tasks as public relations, national solidarity, external relations and policy oversight. 

These developments have led to significant differences in the quality of lives and livelihoods in the three remaining towns which are junta-controlled and the 14 townships which are now ULA-controlled. The key reason for their divergent conditions is that the junta authorities hold these towns as their military fortresses with no trust for the local residents and with high restrictions on their freedoms. In both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu towns, the boundaries of the town are planted with landmines, trade and travel restrictions are in place to try and prevent ULA movement, and random security checks are frequently carried out on local homes.

These activities have had a highly detrimental impact on local communities. During times of peace, town residents usually rely on rural villages for rice, fish, vegetables and other basic commodities. But after the junta severed links between their fortress towns and rural areas under ULA control, the commodity prices of goods transported from Yangon have skyrocketed, with social services dwindling. The main victims of these tragedies, however, are the urban poor who have neither the capital nor personal connections to move to Yangon or other parts of the country. This, in turn, has caused community insecurity and social crimes to be on the rise in junta-held towns. 

Adding to these tensions, the Myanmar military are continuing their traditional tactics of ‘divide and rule’ in Sittwe and other areas under their control even if this is fostering instability in regime enclaves. The tactics are very poisonous. The Myanmar armed forces are majority ethnic Bamar. In the state capital Sittwe, for example, Rohingya militants, who are mostly Muslim, have been armed by the junta and used to suppress and patrol ethnic Rakhine wards where the population is mostly Buddhist. At the same time an ALP faction led by Saw Mra Raza Linn, which signed the 2015 NCA, collaborates in the dirty work of the junta against the Muslim residents of the town. Similarly, the junta has allowed Rohingya fishing boats to continue operating, but it has banned Rakhine vessels in order to create distrust and division, hoping to keep control of its diminishing offshore areas. 

A rather different scenario is apparent in most of the towns and rural areas under ULA/AA control. Generally, community insecurity, political violence and restrictions and the human rights suppression of civilians have been on the decline. Although residents in these areas do not have sufficient imports or materials due to blockages, primarily by the military junta, the local populations are comparatively well-off, and travel and trade are very active in regions where fighting has stopped. The general socio-economic situation, however, has not yet returned to the livelihood levels predating November 2023 when the current cycle of conflict began.

The economic and security landscape is also unstable in parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung township in the north of Arakan where Rohingya armed groups, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), are still active and collaborating with the Myanmar military. Recent actions by the Bangladesh authorities have also had negative impact on economic and humanitarian developments on the border, warning of the need for inter-community understanding – not division (see below).

As these events show, there are various challenges in the achievement of security in Arakan, with the social and political landscapes continuing to evolve and transform. Remnant landmines remain a problem. But, in general, social crimes like murder, robbery, rape and theft in most ULA-controlled areas are not presently considered the consequence of organised violence. Rather, local law and order challenges should be addressed as matters of community policing and security. 

An example of the need for inter-community cooperation, and evidence of how this can be achieved, has recently occurred in Paletwa township. Historically known under the Arakan Hill Tracts, it was designated at Myanmar’s independence in what became Chin State under the 1974 constitution. Here there was some criticism and rejection by local Chin and Khumi communities after the area came under ULA administration after its capture by the AA in January 2024. Fortunately, though, disagreements between Rakhine and Khumi communities and political leaders have not grown to the point of physical violence. Recently, too, the Chinland Defence Force-Paletwa announced in mid-September that, as close ethnic neighbours, they are building an allied relationship with the ULA/AA. Therefore, although the establishment of representative systems of governance is still continuing, the security and stability of Paletwa and its residents are not expected to be a challenging problem in the coming years. 

On another Arakan front, there have also been serious allegations against the AA by diaspora Rohingya organisations, human rights activist groups and UN agencies such as the UN Human Rights Office, including extrajudicial killings, attacks on civilians, arson, mass detentions and arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment and labour, movement restrictions, property destruction, sexual violence and economic coercion. This is not to deny that there should be full and proper examination of all allegations of grave human rights violations. But, for the moment, the majority of these accusations refer to intense battles that took place under complex conditions during 2024 between the AA on one side and the Myanmar military and newly-revived Rohingya groups, notably the ARSA and RSO, on the Bangladesh border.

After, however, the AA gained control of the northern Arakan townships a reduction in violence was experienced in ULA-governed areas, supported by the inclusion of Rohingya community and religious leaders in the new administration. Impartial and independent investigations are therefore needed to establish the truth of what has been happening on the ground, with all parties held to the same universal human rights standards. Accounts with anonymous identities circulated abroad are not sufficient to impartially investigate and confirm the details or context of what has taken place. As a potential step forward, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Mr. Tom Andrews, stated in his latest report in October that ULA/AA leaders have invited him to investigate accusations of human rights abuses, including by visiting the site of the alleged massacre in Htan Shauk Khan village.

The human rights lessons are very clear. In a situation of civil war, all sides to the conflict must guarantee the security and protection of civilians, ensuring that they are not caught in the cross-fire. After decades of military rule in Myanmar, it is vital that a new human rights culture is the foundation of progressive political change, respecting the rights of all peoples.

This leads to the key sources of insecurity in Arakan today which come from the junta and Rohingya militant groups on the Bangladesh border. The following sections seek to identify and address these issues. 

Like many other parts of Myanmar, Arakan is technically a war-zone. The first security threat is the military junta, currently known as the State Security and Peace Commission (previously State Administration Council). The Myanmar military, which calls itself the Tamadaw, has land, navy and air forces. But, with its loss of control in 90 percent of Arakan territory since the 2021 coup, it is the air and navy forces that have become the key perpetrators of crimes against humanity and atrocities which target civilians in the region. 

There are five key battle fronts between the AA and Myanmar junta forces: two near Sittwe and Kyaukphyu; and three on the main land routes along the Arakan Yoma mountain range between Arakan on the west and the three regions of Magway, Bago and Ayeyarwady to the east. While the junta uses land, navy and air forces in the Sittwe and Kyaukphyu battles, only land and air capabilities can be deployed in the mountainous territory on the Arakan Yoma front. Battle news in recent weeks has revealed that Kyaukphyu and the Ann-Padan warzones are more active in attacks and counter-attacks from both sides, while fighting in the other conflict zones is less intense in relative terms. 

Notably, analysts have noted that, unlike the northern Shan, Karenni and Karen fronts elsewhere in the country, the AA is the only group capable of defending and countering recent junta offensives following territorial gains made by resistance groups in the ‘1027 Operation’ launched in October 2023. Generally speaking, this could be due to a variety of factors including geography, technology, organisational cohesion and morale, coordination with allied actors, and local causes that could simply be ‘unknown’ by outside observers. There may be no single reason. To what extent, however, and for how long the ULA/AA can maintain the present status quo is an important and different question. 

Related to this, a key trend in recent months is the increasing launch of air attacks by the junta on populated civilian and urban areas under the apparent cover of claiming security for the looming elections. On 14 September, it was reported that the junta’s election commission has boldly claimed to be arranging elections in the four AA-controlled townships of Ann, Taunggok, Thandwe and Gwa in the south of Rakhine State, ordering former government officials from these areas to be ready to serve in their duties. To back this up, pro-junta media and politicians have been saying that the junta should try and retake these southern townships. This would also have the objective of containing and cutting ULA links to other resistance forces in Magway, Bago and Ayeyarwady Regions as well as securing Tatmadaw manufacturing industries that produce defence equipment and materials on the west of the Arakan Yoma range.

Beyond these political and strategic arguments, many observers believe that the junta leader, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, also has a personal motive for interest in this area. The famous and profitable tourist destination of Ngapali Beach is the native village of his wife, while the mega Tha Htay Chaung hydropower project is located nearby. In addition, some ethnic Bamar nationalists use a centralist historical and ideological justification to argue that southern Arakan (known as Dvaravati) was under ‘the sphere of influence’ of ‘Bamar kings’ even when the great city of Mrauk-U in the north was independent and world-renowned. By this argument, the population in the south of Arakan is more ‘Bamarnised’. 

All such factors combine to suggest why the junta has a strong determination and incentive to mount offensives in these areas. In the coming weeks and months, the schedule and scale of attacks may only be matters of timing and capacity, both in the south of Rakhine State and Arakan more broadly. On the Bay of Bengal seaboard, Arakan is in a prime geo-political position, with the port of Kyaukphyu in the centre as the focus of China’s Belt and Road Initiative ambitions, while lands in the north are integral to the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project with India. Given, however, the scale of popular resistance and rejection of the military junta, it is now clear that the conduct of international projects must be with the participation and consent, as well for the benefit, of local peoples.

Against this backdrop, a disturbing feature of the behaviour of the Myanmar military is the targeting and deliberate air strikes against civilians in urban and populated areas, including markets, clinics and schools. Based upon the tactics of recent operations in northern Shan State, this may escalate in advance of ground offensives. In the case of Thandwe and Gwa in Rakhine State, which are coastal towns, civilians fear artillery shelling from naval vessels which have been attacking villages while roaming along the shoreline beyond the AA’s reach. In response, it is critical for the ULA/AA to avoid bloodshed and protect civilian lives by hindering and counter-attacking junta offensives along the east of the Arakan Yoma, thus preventing military build-up on the ground. 

Meanwhile, in the north of Arakan where there is no active fighting, the junta has also not spared civilians in AA-controlled townships, including Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Paletwa. Rather, recent air strikes have targeted downtown and populated areas, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and many more injuries. The following air attacks resulted in the mass killings of civilians.

Such atrocities now fit into a disturbing pattern. According to the records of the ULA’s Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO), 190 civilians have been killed and 291 injured to date by junta air strikes since the beginning of 2025 in Arakan. Women, children and elderly persons constitute more than 60 percent of the victims, confirming that these attacks are intended to be deadly and targeted against civilian populations, not active combatants or military locations. Equally concerning, the timing of air attacks on villages and towns comes around midnight, thus killing a maximum number of civilians concentrated together while all family members are at home and sleeping.

These are clearly acts of terrorism, not military warfare. For many years, the Myanmar military under the leadership of Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing have been under condemnation for incidents of war crimes and egregious human rights atrocities in investigations conducted by different departments of the UN and such bodies as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), many of which focus on Rakhine State. Such mechanisms and processes, however, do not appear to change or make any difference to the conduct and behaviour of the Myanmar military.

This then leads to the second largest security threat facing Arakan. These stem from the border region with Bangladesh and the behaviour of the Myanmar military and Rohingya militant groups. The following section seeks to analyse these issues. 

In addressing the question of Rohingya militancy, a more complex picture has recently emerged. Unlike the Myanmar junta, these groups are not cohesive actors with a strict hierarchy of command and control. In addition, even though the ARSA and RSO are known as the most active groups, there are other less-noticed actors, such as the Arakan Rohingya Army and Rohingya Islami Miza. Much of their activity originates in the refugee camps where it was reported in January this year that a ‘Four Brothers Alliance’ has been established, engineered by the Bangladeshi authorities with the aim of reducing violence inside the camps. 

In contrast, in recent months Rohingya armed actors outside the camps, especially the ARSA and RSO, have been crossing the border, becoming increasing threats to the ULA/AA and civilian populations residing in mountain areas of Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships along the Bangladesh frontier. The human rights abuses, however, committed by these groups still appear to be happening beneath the radar of UN agencies as well as regional and international media. Even when media groups in Arakan report atrocities in Rakhine, Bamar and English languages, they are largely ignored by international monitoring mechanisms. These failings exacerbate rather than help address inter-community understandings and dialogue.

This under-reporting reflects a longer-term pattern since more systemic investigations began following the 2017 operations by the Myanmar military in which over 700,000 refugees, most of whom identify as Rohingya, fled into Bangladesh. This reporting neglect is only adding to the insecurity among local peoples, including Rakhine, Hindus, Mro, Thet and Khami, who believe that many international bodies do not acknowledge or fail to sufficiently investigate violations against non-Rohingya peoples. In one notorious case, more than 100 Hindu civilians were killed in August 2017 in Kha Maung Seik, Ye Bauk Kyar and Myo Thu Gyi in Maungdaw township. At the time, Amnesty International documented that ARSA militants carried out these attacks. But, to date, no action has been taken, instilling fear into local communities. Human rights groups include non-governmental organisations and the International Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar which has been designated as the responsible body for collecting evidence of crimes committed against civilians. 

As a result of these incomplete investigations, many people in Arakan have come to believe that UN and various other international institutions and mechanisms show bias, selectively focusing on the ways that they report different groups and communities. Rather, they appear to mainly respond to accusations by outside organisations that have their own agendas in their reporting systems. Equally important, the ways in which the character and direction of international reporting has changed during the past two years have proven even more unhelpful in understanding and investigating events in Arakan as they occur on the ground. Human rights  protections and investigations should be impartial and based upon universal principles, not weaponised to support a singular perspective or cause.

Without doubt, it has been the Myanmar military – through laws, state discrimination and such war crimes as the 2017 attacks – which has been responsible for the systemic repression of the Rohingya population over the decades, as it does all nationality peoples in the country, and this was the starting point for the ICC and ICJ investigations over the following years. For this reason, there were Rohingya leaders who supported the countrywide opposition to the 2021 coup, with the NUG rival to the SAC-SSPC appointing a Rohingya minister to its cabinet. It was a development and moment of opportunity that many people hoped would support national inclusion and repair the damaging history from the past, bringing the Rohingya crisis into peace and conflict resolution discussions. In contrast, the junta – in its classic ‘divide and rule’ tactic – has typically pursued an opposite strategy, forcibly conscripting young Rohingya men to serve in the Myanmar military and forcing them to fight against other peoples in the country.

There was thus widespread surprise that, in the battles in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships during 2024, militant groups such as the ARSA and RSO collaborated with the persecutors of the Rohingya and other ethnic groups by receiving training, arms and tactical support from the Myanmar military. After the junta lost the war in north Arakan, these groups then retreated back into Bangladesh, with some still stationed in forest areas along the border. Since this time, they have maintained links with junta officials as well as the Myanmar navy near the Bangladesh border.

In essence, it appears that the Myanmar military – despite its suppression of the Rohingya people and denial of citizenship rights – intends to continue providing Rohingya militants with arms and ammunition if they attack the ULA/AA on the northern border. Such junta tactics, it should be noted, are not rare in Myanmar today. The support or creation of proxy militia to divide local communities is a long-standing stratagem of the Myanmar military, including in Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni) and Shan States today, and this is a tactic that has recently been increasing in advance of the December election.

In the case of Arakan, it is also not possible to neglect discussion about the role of the Dhaka authorities and the activities of their security and military intelligence departments on the border. It should not be doubted that Bangladesh has been a key, and often unacknowledged, victim to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Humanitarian aid is clearly required. But even though the Dhaka government formally claims that Bangladesh does not host Rohingya militants in its territories, it is also an open secret that both ARSA and RSO militants informally control the refugee camps through their networks as a ‘night government’ and that Bangladesh security officials are in close contact with their leaders. 

This basing of Rohingya militants in Bangladesh is a very different situation to the activities of ethnic armed organisations in other parts of Myanmar which do not rely on – nor operate in – neighbouring countries. Rather, the recruitment, training and funding of Rohingya militant groups are taking place inside Bangladesh among the refugee population and other exiles who live outside of the camps. Equally concerning, in a policy that seems to have gained ground during the past two years, the government’s new de facto policy seems to be the strategic use of militant groups, despite their behaviour, to support the ultimate goal of ‘refugee repatriation’ and advancement of Dhaka’s own interests across the Myanmar border.

The Bangladesh authorities are not unaware of human rights violations. When abuses occur in refugee camps where populations are supposed to be safe-guarded, they are also crimes under international humanitarian law. In 2021, for example, ARSA militants were reported to have killed Mohib Ullah, leader of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights in the camps. But despite the arrest of a top ARSA leader like Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi in March 2025 for the killing of a Bangladesh security official, Dhaka’s policy of backing these groups has not decreased. Rather it has increased over recent months, with tensions growing with the ULA over the challenging question of refugee repatriation. The concerns of Bangladesh are understandable. But an inclusive, peaceful and sustainable repatriation plan has not been thought through.

In summary, different actors and influences in Bangladesh appear to be adding to the instabilities along the border at the very moment that the peoples of Arakan and Myanmar are seeking to achieve regime change and inter-ethnic peace in the face of a brutal military junta that is waging war against its own peoples. The timing is counter-productive and unhelpfully conceived.

To understand the current complexities, it is important to note that relations between Dhaka and the ULA on the border had initially been good following the AA’s capture of Maungdaw in late 2024, with semi-formal trade and informal humanitarian supplies continuing as normal. As a  sign of good ties, the ULA detained and released 188 illegal fishermen along with 30 fishing boats between 5 February and 18 July this year. However there was a sudden turning point in relations when Myanmar junta delegates promised the Bangladesh government during the  BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok last April that it would accept the return of around 180,000 Rohingya refugees. Since this time, although the ULA had taken no part in these discussions, intensive and consistent pressure has been mounting by the Dhaka authorities on the ULA leadership to agree on repatriation terms as soon as possible. 

Consultation and inclusion, however, are vital in any process of repatriation to ensure that the security, human rights and welfare of the affected peoples are protected. It has to be remembered that it was the Myanmar military which drove the refugee population out from Arakan, denying citizenship rights to many Muslims and the majority of the Rohingya population. For their part, the ULA leadership have publicly stated that they respect the human rights and citizenship rights of Muslim residents in Arakan and are in favour of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh.

The situation, though, is not straightforward. Due to the continuing conflict with the junta and Rohingya militant attacks, ULA officials say that they want to make sure that there are conducive conditions, through collaboration with Bangladesh authorities and inclusive participation, for the refugees to safely come back. Preparation and trust-building are essential and, as a way of showing good will, the ULA/AA leader Maj-Gen. Twan Mrat Naing met on 12 September with Muslim community leaders in Maungdaw, permitting the re-opening of an old mosque closed for over a decade by the Myanmar military. Other initiatives are underway, with the ULA seeking to develop inclusive governance in northern Arakan. To date, a district Muslim Affairs Council has been formed, a deputy-level township administrator appointed, and over 5,000 Rohingya staff employed in the administration. 

Regrettably, such constructive steps and approaches seem to be too little for the Dhaka authorities. In part, this may be due to declining humanitarian funds and the deteriorating situation in the refugee camps, and the reported deaths of at least 21 refugees in a boat which sank off the Malaysia coast earlier this month is a tragic reminder. Other factors could also be involved, including the interim Bangladesh government, which wants to promote social and political justice, seeking to take credit for their performance and the personal connection of leading officials in the Chittagong area.

Equally important, since the early 1990s the Dhaka authorities have primarily sought to deal with the Myanmar military to resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis. In each incarnation, however, of military-dominated government in Naypyidaw the situation has become worse, with larger waves of refugee exodus. The post-coup landscape thus offered an opportunity for innovative and inclusive change, with the potential for the peoples of Arakan to resolve their challenges in collaboration with the international community – not through the Myanmar military which has long been the prime cause of conflict, persecution, displacement and instability.

Unfortunately, however, the situation has now moved on further than this, with the Dhaka authorities apparently falling into the political trap set by the Myanmar junta. Since May 2025, the Bangladesh authorities have unilaterally blocked emerging semi-formal trade and the delivery of humanitarian aid by UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations across the border into Arakan. It is a grave and counter-productive error. Already, there are indications that this blockage is more likely to result in the exodus of more Rohingya Muslims into Bangladesh facing socio-economic hardships, including lack of medication and food.

Unhelpfully, too, the so-called ‘humanitarian corridor’ or ‘Rakhine corridor’ highlighted by regional media in recent months appears to be nothing more than an attempt by officials of the interim government in Dhaka to initiate massive refugee returns under the cover of humanitarian aid. In reality, this corridor does not aim for communities facing food shortages and humanitarian crises in northern Arakan. Instead, it appears to be mainly intended for those living in the camps that the Bangladesh government urgently wants to repatriate. And now that they have failed to achieve these objectives, the Dhaka authorities have resorted to increasing the backing for Rohingya armed groups and covertly facilitating the growing links between the Myanmar navy and militant factions on the border. 

Tensions are continuing to mount. In a choice between the ARSA and RSO, Bangladesh security and border officials favour the RSO more by openly engaging with them in public events. In private, however, they also acknowledge the borderland utility of the more radical group of the ARSA which has a historical record of committing serious human rights violations, especially against non-Muslim people, based on their religious motivations.

This is already having impact on recent conflict and deployments on both sides of the Arakan border. Previously, the ARSA concentrated its activities along the Wailar and Mayu mountain ranges in the borderland clashes in Maungdaw township during 2024, while the RSO was more active along the Naf River adjoining Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh. But recent reports and photos have recorded a shift in the RSO’s presence, with its members now mainly active in Bandarban district in the borders and acting more like proxy patrol forces for the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) inside Bangladesh.

As evidence, the AA recently issued a statement drawing attention to the links between the BGB, ARSA and RSO, revealing at least five training camps near BGB outposts in Bandarban district and claiming that these are the bases from which ARSA has conducted cross border attacks on the AA as well as arresting and killing local people from ethnic Rakhine, Mro and Daingnet communities. On 29 September the BGB publicly denied AA claims that it is backing Rohingya groups carrying out these attacks, citing the arrest of the ARSA chief and others. But the evidence is clear that, buoyed by the apparent ability to operate from Bangladesh, an ARSA campaign against other nationality peoples was launched last year.

Based on HDCO sources, the number of civilians documented as killed during ARSA activities in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships during the past two years come to a total of 36 killed (32 males and four females) and another 24 males arrested, presumed to have been killed afterwards. Such events are deepening community tensions. Documented incidents include the killing of seven Khami people from Gandhari internal displacement person (IDP) camp, the deaths of six Rakhine IDPs in a car ambush on the road to Maungdaw, the arrest and murder of two Rakhine residents of Buthidaung near Gone-Nar village, and the abduction of four Khami villagers from Guppi village who were killed by ARSA members in a staged video.

It should be noted, then, that neither the ARSA and RSO are political parties or representative of the local people: rather, they operate as armed bands. After decades of repression, civilian and civil society organisation is very weak. The ARSA, in particular, claims that civilians killed, injured or arrested by its members are ‘collateral damage’ in fighting with the AA. And, tragically, it is indeed the case that there have been civilian fatalities and casualties in fighting between the AA on the one hand and Myanmar military, ARSA and RSO on the other. But ARSA’s choice of targets show that its aim is to spread division and fear based on nationality and religious identities. This is evidenced by its civilian victims who include both Rakhine and Rohingya as well as other local minority groups including Mro, Khami and Daingnet. In this conflict landscape, the ARSA appears more radicalized and religiously motivated in committing human rights violations against civilians. But the RSO is also reported to abduct local non-Muslim civilians working for their livelihoods in the mountains inside Bangladesh.

Against this backdrop, it becomes difficult to understand and analyse the policies and rationale of the Bangladesh authorities in allowing these events to happen. Even though Dhaka and BGB officials are not directly responsible for the crimes committed, these outcomes are uncontrollable and indirect consequences of a political game that appears to have been started. This in turn raises further questions about what is now intended.

First, even though it cannot evidently be proven that actors in Bangladesh are trying to develop an ‘invasion plan’ into north Arakan by using these groups to enforce refugee repatriation, it can clearly be seen that at least some Dhaka officials in their current policies want these militant groups to grow and become more active along the border and inside Arakan in the hope that they will gain more political leverage over the ULA leadership in any repatriation negotiations. It would appear a very dangerous support of violence, harming civilian populations. Sadly, the reality is that this is already taking place.

Second, even though it cannot be proven that there is a basic formal agreement between the authorities in Dhaka and Naypyidaw over the role of these militant groups, there seems to be an understanding that their presence and activities against the ULA/AA are politically beneficial to both. For Dhaka, it is political leverage on its borders in addressing a refugee crisis that officials wish to resolve; and for Naypyidaw, it is putting the ULA/AA in the position of facing two war-fronts at the same time with increased offensives expected against southern townships in Rakhine State during the coming months. 

In summary, current trends on the Arakan and Bangladesh borders are not a good sign for the local peoples, communities and the ULA/AA at a time when much of Arakan territory is free from junta rule. Unless these warnings are addressed, this achievement of liberation from Myanmar military domination will not be of any advantage to the peoples of Arakan who are truly desirous of political breakthroughs and reform. Stakeholders that urgently need peace and justice include Rakhine, Rohingya and all nationality peoples who inhabit the borderland areas, and it should include the Bangladesh government as well.

As history has long shown, the greater the border instability and insecurity, the more difficult it will be to resolve conflict and for repatriation efforts to succeed. In contrast, while division is supported by outside interests, the only beneficial actor could be the Myanmar military. Not only has it long been the instigator of repression and displacement, but it is hoping to profit from its ‘divide and rule’ policies once again. As the peoples of Arakan and Myanmar continue to work for regime change, it is vital that their endeavours to support political breakthroughs and national reconciliation are constructively supported. 

As observed above, the search for Arakan’s security remains a difficult and essential issue. Even if the ULA/AA now controls 90 percent of Arakan’s territory, junta air strikes bring insecurity to the whole population, especially in more urbanized and populated areas like Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U and Minbya. At the same time, villages and towns along the coast, such as in Thandwe and Gwa townships, are frequently subject to artillery shelling by the Myanmar navy. And in the case of villages in Pauktaw, Ponnagyun and Rathedaung townships close to Sittwe, artillery shelling is often launched from junta military bases into the surrounding villages, inflicting civilian casualties. Meanwhile in Kyaukphyu township in the centre of Rakhine State, local communities face multiple threats, including artillery shelling from military bases and the navy, supported by  drone strikes on civilians in ULA-administered areas.

All these incidents illustrate that the life and properties of the civilian population in ULA-controlled areas remain under serious threat from the SAC-SSPC junta which is desperate for its survival. But that does not mean that there has been no progress or improvement in freedoms following popular rejection and territorial retreat by the Myanmar military since the SAC coup. Repression continues in junta-controlled areas. But in most other parts of Arakan civilians are no longer subject to political suppression, random security breaks into houses, forced labour and portering for military operations, and compulsory recruitment into the Myanmar military to fight on various conflict-fronts around the country.

In the case of security threats from Rohingya militant groups, the situation is also unstable. During 2023 and 2024, the junta openly collaborated with such groups, committing human rights abuses against civilian populations in urban, semi-urban and well-connected rural areas of Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships. Today, however, their activities are mainly restricted to mountain, forest and borderland areas with Bangladesh after the junta was defeated in northern Rakhine State during 2024.

As a result, militant activities are now concentrated in the north of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships rather than in the south of these territories. Attacks and ambushes targeting both civilians and AA troops still continue on the borderline. But, apart from these hard to predict provocations, civilians from all communities are now living in relatively safer conditions when compared with 2023 and 2024. The major worry is the growing presence, training and activities of these groups on the Bangladesh side of the frontier, with the threat of increasing cross-border attacks against local civilian populations and AA camps. 

It is thus vital that a new cycle of violence and conflict division does not begin. Recently, there has been much discussion in UN and international circles of new approaches to Myanmar, Arakan and the Rohingya crisis. Certainly, it has long been true that enlightened change is essential. But, as this commentary seeks to show, this must be based upon understanding the causes of conflict, state failure and humanitarian emergency.

In the present landscape there are opportunities. But there are also many risks. Security remains an essential requisite. But this can only be achieved by an end to junta rule and the systemic violence and human rights violations of the Myanmar military. And, in the case of Arakan, the challenges have to be looked at holistically and through participation, dialogue and inclusion which involves all the peoples. Conflict will not be resolved by selective, non-partial and arbitrary processes that divide rather than bring peoples together.

Next month’s general election, orchestrated by the junta, will only exacerbate countrywide tensions and divisions. Thus it should not deflect attention from the long-standing challenges of conflict resolution and political reform in the country. For this reason, as the contemporary experiences of Arakan warn, focus on security, peace-building and an end to military rule will all mark important starting-points, providing the platforms from which civilian resettlement, community rebuilding, respect for human rights and addressing humanitarian needs can sustainably progress. To this end, international policies should heal not support division.

* Naing Lin is a freelance political analyst and researcher writing about peace, democracy and community relations in Rakhine State, Myanmar.

This commentary reflects the opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of TNI.