Critical Raw Minerals in Morocco An opportunity for industrialisation or a geopolitical battlefield between China and the West?

Morocco has become a prime destination for large-scale investments in the refining of strategic and critical minerals that are used in the production of electric vehicle batteries, with Chinese companies taking the lead in this regard. How do we explain the sudden influx of billions of dollars into electric battery production in Morocco? Is it driven by an internal need within the Moroccan economy? Is it in alignment with the state's declared ambition to ‘green the economy’? Alternatively, could it be part of a broader and longstanding strategy pursued by Moroccan big capital and the state to take advantage of shifts in global capital strategies to secure a strategic position for itself? How does Morocco fit into the geo-strategic rivalry between China and the imperial West over strategic and critical minerals? And, finally, does this competition create opportunities for Morocco to industrialise its economy and achieve sustainable economic development from a green perspective?

The world is witnessing an unprecedented movement towards a green economy, driven by dual movements for climate justice and for a fair environmental transition, on the one hand, and by capitalists' quest to adapt to an environmental crisis they themselves have created, on the other hand. Within this context, a frantic quest is taking place to capitalise on green solutions, while integrating them into the existing economic model.

This feverish movement is also being fuelled by the rivalry between traditional hegemonic powers (the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan) and so-called ‘rising’ powers (mainly China). In this process, it is evident that the latter are using the same mechanisms as have been used by the former since the late 1970s, under the rubric of ‘neoliberal globalisation’: free trade, free export zones, free industrial zones, outsourcing, investment liberalisation, corporate takeovers and mergers, etc.

In the midst of this frantic race, intense competition is taking place over who will dominate the global manufacturing and supply chain for strategic and critical minerals, which form the backbone of the electric vehicle batteries sector. In the face of China’s dominance of these minerals, the US and the EU are working to break their dependence and to advance their national production capabilities. The US is currently reinforcing its strategic partnerships with its allies on critical metals, and, as part of its trade war with China, Joe Biden enacted the Inflation Reduction Act (2022). After Trump's inauguration, he launched his promised trade war, imposing 25 % trade tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese-made equipment, electronics, and advanced devices, including cars. China responded with countermeasures, imposing 25 % tariffs on 128 items of US imports to the Chinese market. On 4 April 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced restrictions on the export of seven rare metal elements to the United States, namely Samarium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium, Lutetium, Scandium and Yttrium. In the EU, the European Commission introduced the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2023.

These mechanisms vary, but they share two main points. Firstly, they rely on public policies and state intervention to support companies’ investments in the electric vehicle batteries sector. This has brought to the fore debates regarding countries’ industrial policies and has also stimulated discussion of green industrial policies at the global level. Secondly, they point to a general trend where the US and the EU (on the one hand) and China (on the other) are competing on the same playing field for domination of the supply chain for critical and strategic minerals and electric vehicles in the global market. This rivalry is fuelling an age-old debate about the nature of China’s rise: is China still a country that is seeking to disengage from imperialism, or has its rise been the result of its imperialist character?

The paper argues that China has itself become an imperialist power that is seeking to secure its share of global hegemony, using the same mechanisms as other imperial powers (free trade, free export zones, industrial free zones, subcontracting, investment liberalisation, corporate takeovers and mergers, etc.)

Amid this competition, countries of the Global South are scrambling to join the ongoing, frenzied efforts to commercialise green solutions and to compete for resources. Like other such countries, Morocco is seeking to exploit the opportunities presented by global crises to improve its position in the international division of labour, by taking advantage of this competition and offering itself as a safe country for investment, as well as applying the solutions advanced by global capital to solve its own crises.

Since the early 1980s, Morocco has applied a structural adjustment programme that has resulted in the complete opening of its economy to global capital. This has led to the maintenance of the nation's long-established role within the international division of labour, which dates back to the colonial period (from 1912 to 1956), even as Morocco has sought to enhance its position within that division. In the area of green energy, Morocco presents itself as a promising location for the development of plants for such energies (wind, solar, and green hydrogen). Similarly, it is seeking to attract massive foreign investment to monetise strategic and critical minerals found within its territories, for the manufacture of batteries for electric cars. All of this is taking place within the framework of what is termed a ‘green industrial policy’ and the pursuit of ‘green growth’.

Morocco's green growth ambitions are primarily directed towards the EU. Given that the EU has long been the primary market for Moroccan capital (exports and imports), Morocco is required to adapt, both temporarily and structurally, to changes in the EU market. Thus, after the EU announced its Green Deal, with its ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, Morocco quickly sought to attract investments in wind, solar, and green hydrogen farms within the country, with the aim of supplying renewable energy to European markets. This strategy was further reinforced in the aftermath of the Russian gas crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. When the EU announced CBAM, Morocco announced a Green Growth Programme to greenify its industry, under which it asked Moroccan exporters to adapt to CBAM so as to ensure continued access to the European market.

It is within this context that Morocco is seeking to attract investments in critical and strategic minerals for the manufacture of electric batteries. The US–China trade war and the resulting geopolitical tensions, especially after Joe Biden's announcement of the Inflation Reduction Act, have left China in need of countries with open access to the US market, which means countries that have a free trade agreement with the US. One such country is Morocco. China is thus using ‘friends-shoring’: taking advantage of free trade agreements between the US and other countries (including Morocco) and establishing partnerships at various levels of the supply chain with companies in nations allied with the US. It is in this context that several Chinese companies have set up electric car battery projects in Morocco. These include CNGR, Gotion High-Tech, Shinzoom, Youshan, and Huayou Cobalt.

This participation in Chinese friend-shoring is what the Moroccan state and capital refer to as ‘seizing opportunities’ to better position themselves within the international division of labour, which – it is claimed – will power the long-awaited industrial take-off. As far as Morocco is concerned, China's investment in the critical minerals sector in Morocco is a historic opportunity to secure its long-awaited industrial leap.

Moroccan capital and the Moroccan state have set them- selves ambitious goals, but the achievement of these goals faces obstacles in the form of major structural issues. The most significant of these are the country’s political economy (i.e. the monarchy's undemocratic control over economic decision-making), the issue of financing (a reliance on public finances and debt due to the lack of private sector initiative), and lastly, the issue of technology transfer, particularly the Moroccan economy's dependence on imperial centres, hence the tiresome repetition of the word "sovereignty" in recent state documents: "economic sovereignty", "energy sovereignty", "food sovereignty", etc.

The state (and large capital) relies on foreign investments to overcome the second and third obstacles, while the first obstacle (Morocco’s political economy) is accepted by large Moroccan and foreign capital and international financial institutions, as the monarchy is the guarantor of political stability and social peace in a country located in a tense region. Nevertheless, the Moroccan monarchy is doing its best to mitigate any risks by reducing Morocco’s dependency, through diversifying the country’s so-called ‘partners’ – hence the country’s openness to China.

It can thus be concluded that Morocco’s strategy of positioning itself within the global strategies of various capitalist groupings and capitalising on the competition among the major powers will merely improve the country’s position within the existing international division of labour. This contrasts with the bold claims made in state documents and propaganda, according to which Morocco is a rising power and will achieve industrialisation. The reality is that Morocco's large (globalised) capital, which relies on the monarchy, has already a guaranteed share in the investments in critical and strategic minerals, and thus it has no interest in imposing conditions on them (e.g. technology transfer) that could yield increased industrialisation, especially in the context of intense competition among the Global South countries to attract such investments. As such, Moroccan capital remains a ‘subcontractor’, and the most it can hope to achieve through current policies is to become a ‘joint contractor’.

The social benefits of these investments (and of this strategy of positioning itself at the centre of the strategies of global capital and of exploiting the rivalries between its forces in general) are questionable. Permanent employment is one of the conditions for a fair green transition, but Morocco’s experience thus far (including in its free industrial zones, in which cars, aircraft, and electrical wiring are assembled/produced) has shown that recent job creation in the country has largely been based on outsourcing/ subcontracting. The jobs that are created are precarious, under flexible labour laws that were first introduced 20 years ago (not to mention the context of fierce repression of union activities in Morocco). Furthermore, most major projects, such as renewable energy plants, are capital-intensive and so mainly offer job opportunities during the construction and development phases. Once these stages are completed, most of these positions vanish, leaving behind only a limited number of high-skilled jobs.

The same applies to the impact of these investments on local communities, particularly in areas that are rich in underground resources (especially minerals). Practical experience has confirmed that these investments are harmful to local communities, as they deplete their resources (minerals, water, forests), while in return they offer only a very small number of jobs and a few crumbs of what is referred to as ‘social development’. This explains why numerous protests have taken place involving the residents of affected communities, such as Imider and Bou-Azzer in the Ouarzazate region, and Taghighacht and Akanouanin in the Midelt region.

Economic and social development and environmental sustainability only figure on the agenda of the monarchy and Morocco's big capital for propaganda and publicity purposes. All these actors care about is securing their share of the pie. The primary objective of Moroccan capital and of the Moroccan state in adopting green discourse is to obtain internationally pledged green funds, to signal its adaptation to the transformations taking place in its northern neighbour (especially after the EU’s adoption of CBAM) and to avoid any obstacles that may hinder Moroccan companies’ ability to enter the European market.

The paper concludes with a set of recommendations, acknowledging a volatile global context that is far from favourable, including the rise of the far right in Europe and Trump’s victory in the US elections. It underscores that while energy (regardless of the source of that energy) can contribute to building a greener and more socially just future for Morocco, energy is not independent of the world’s economic structure, its social framework, its state institutions, and the various forms of oppression that permeate them – class, racial, gender-based, and so on. Therefore, a sustainable green world cannot be dreamed of as long as capitalism persists.

In its recommendations, the paper emphasises the need for a green industrial policy that is based on local demand and that ends the prevailing export-based strategy and the country's dependence on imperialist centres (old and new). This is not a call for nationalist isolationism. We believe in ever greater cooperation among peoples, but this does not mean that the peoples of the southern shore of the Mediterranean should continue to bear the financial, environmental, and social costs of sustaining the northern shore, as they have done throughout history. The paper emphasises that the recommended green industrial policy necessitates cooperation among the countries of the Maghreb to leverage the integration of their natural resources as well as their financial and institutional potential. This regional cooperation must serve as a bridge between national policies, with the ultimate goal being ecological socialism, which can only be realised on a global scale. To support this green industrial policy, the paper’s recommendations focus on the energy sector, transportation, the financial and banking sector, and employment policy. The paper emphasises that only a public policy that is subject to the oversight and supervision of citizens (including labour and popular communities) can transform these sectors into effective instruments for achieving a green industrialisation policy that ensures a just economic, environmental, and social transition.