Challenges for Change in Myanmar Reflections on TNI’s 50th anniversary

It was with the perspective of the great, but unaddressed, potential for socio-political change that TNI’s Myanmar programme began in the mid-1990s. The narrative that only the Tatmadaw is capable of governing the country was one that never historically fit. Rather, after decades of conflict, military rule has long been an integral part of the problems, opposition has never been defeated, and the desire for democratic freedoms can always be witnessed in communities in every part of the country. In essence, post-colonial Burma/Myanmar is a classic example of the paradigm ‘weak state, strong societies’.

During the late 1980s, evidence of these tensions and contradictions began to mount, highlighted by three events in quick succession: the 1988 ‘democracy uprising’; the collapse of Gen. Ne Win’s ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’; and the landslide victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 general election. Subsequently, the Tatmadaw generals kept Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other key democracy leaders in prison or detention. But this did not mean the end of opposition. A diversity of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) continued to administer large territories around the country’s borders where they maintained very different political visions to the pseudo-nationalism of the Myanmar military in the Bamar-majority centre. After 1989, the Tatmadaw initiated a ceasefire policy towards EAOs along the China border. But in other areas, principally on the Thailand and India-Bangladesh borders, armed conflict and refugee flight still continued.

This was the entrenched cycle of conflict that TNI sought to address. In one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia, the promises of equality and union agreed at the Panglong Conference in February 1947 had never been allowed. Compounding the crisis, the arrested nature of government meant that solutions were no longer being discussed – let alone tried. Yet, for all the Tatmadaw’s domination, an often vibrant cultural and social life continued among peoples across the country with many movements and activists never giving up on the struggle for human rights and democratic change. Repression, loss of life and refugee suffering continued. But it was also clear that the Tatmadaw could never ‘win’. 

In response, TNI’s aim has always been to support conflict resolution by a participatory approach that promotes debate and understanding of the challenges at national and grassroots levels. Over the decades, suppression, censorship and conflict division have continued to limit discussion of local dynamics and political aspirations. But this has never meant an end to community action and social networking on the ground. After 1988, this was especially evident in the field of civil society, the theme of TNI’s first book on the country, Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs, published in 1999. The peoples of Myanmar were not immune to the hopes for progressive change in the post-Cold War era. The 1990s, in fact, witnessed the fastest decade of growth in non-governmental movements in the country’s history as the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC: subsequently State Peace and Development Council [SPDC]) reneged on its promises to introduce democratic reforms.

In the following decade, two events further highlighted these trends: the 2007 Saffron Revolution supported by Buddhist monks; and the terrible tragedy of Cyclone Nargis the following year when an estimated 140,000 people died and the humanitarian response of community, faith and non-governmental groups outmatched that of the military regime. Since this time, the increasing space found by civil society (CSO) and non-governmental organisations (NGO) has played a key, and better acknowledged, role in addressing local needs as well as supporting progress in the challenges of social and political change.

In parallel with this focus, TNI also began supporting workshops and research on other areas of socio-economic urgency, notably the narcotics trade and social impact in Myanmar and regional context, a subject that it has expertise on under its Drugs and Democracy programme. One of the two major illicit opium/heroin producers in the world (along with Afghanistan), Myanmar has also become a leading producer of methamphetamines during the past three decades. Suffering communities in poppy-growing regions on the ground have always been desperate for change, a challenge examined in a 2009 analysis on the Kokang and Wa regions. As today, however, conflict, impoverishment and military rule meant that sustainable policies consistent with human rights and harm reduction principles are difficult in illicit trades in which many actors are complicit. 

All the time, the socio-political impasse continued. Myanmar’s 1997 accession to ASEAN made no political difference, while various UN strategies at international mediation ended in failure. But finally, in the wake of the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis, Tatmadaw leaders appeared to recognise the need to introduce some form of transition. This was heralded by four events: a referendum on the controversial new 2008 constitution; a sudden order in 2009 for ceasefire EAOs to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGFs) under Tatmadaw control; the 2010 general election after a polling suspension of two decades; and, ultimately, the first ‘elected’ government in fifty years.

In pace with these developments, the TNI programme was formalised to reflect a broader social and political outlook, with focus on three main elements: ethnic politics and conflict, drug policy and land policy. Initially, expectations of regime change were generally low. During the previous two decades, Gen. Ne Win had simply been replaced by another military strongman, Snr-Gen. Than Shwe. And this view of entrenchment seemed confirmed by the 2009 resumption of conflict in the Kokang region when the present-day SAC chief Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing (then an operational commander) launched an attack on the ceasefire Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) after it refused to accept the BGF order. This is an event that still resonates today, with the MNDAA a leading EAO in the anti-SAC resistance.

The same doubts continued during the 2010 general election. The NLD was still repressed, Aung San Suu Kyi and hundreds of democracy supporters remained in prison or detention, and a number of key EAOs remained in armed struggle. TNI examined these realities and challenges in a series of analyses about the critical stage in ethnic politics, the unlevel playing field at the polls, and the challenges and opportunities presented by the 2010 elections. It was thus no surprise that the Tatmadaw’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won an uncontested victory in elections that were far from free and fair. 

Subsequently, however, a largely unpredicted – and often dramatic – train of events followed, providing an unlikely moment of hope that new ways could be found to end the cycles of ethno-political conflict and state failure. Almost by default, the most optimistic decade since independence in 1948 was about to begin.

Looking back in 2024, the continuity of military rule looks unended. The 2008 constitution, which maintains the Tatmadaw’s leading role in ‘national political life’, was never likely to prove a template for the shape or scale of reforms that have always been needed. Under the new system of quasi-civilian government, the new president, ex-Gen. Thein Sein, was the SPDC’s former prime minister, while the new commander-in-chief, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, was Than Shwe’s chosen successor. And yet, despite these restrictions, the national landscape moved quickly in new directions after olive branches offered by the incoming government were greeted with alacrity within the country and abroad. Many doubts remained about Tatmadaw intentions. But it was also clear that peoples across the country wanted peace. As TNI highlighted, it was time for solutions.

Three events during Thein Sein’s first two years in office raised hopes for finding new pathways to national reconciliation and political dialogue: the release of political prisoners, the initiation of a new ethnic ceasefire process, and the entry of the NLD into the legislatures in 2012 by-elections. Very rapidly, ‘federalism’ – long a taboo word in Tatmadaw language – became a commonly-stated aspiration.

Simultaneous with these steps, actors across the international community stepped up engagement with President Thein Sein, eager for a meaningful presence in the country after decades of isolation. Western governments began to lift sanctions; Asian neighbours strengthened trade and political relationships; foreign companies rushed in; and international aid organisations scaled up budgets and programmes with aspirations to reach every part of the country. In a moment of high symbolism, President Thein Sein was lauded by the people when he suspended construction of the China-backed hydropower dam at Myitsone in Kachin State in September 2011. It remains a project of continuing controversy today.

As these events unfolded, TNI expanded its programme and activities. In the political field, analyses included the prospects for ethnic peace and new systems of governance, the need for leading parties to build momentum in the struggle for democracy and reform, and to move from stating aspirations to finding solutions. To back this up, an updated study was published highlighting the opportunities for socio-economic change as civil society continued to gain ground, adapting strategies to authoritarian government. Such discussions could now be held with relative freedom, a marked change from the repression of the past.

There were, however, many warnings over the underlying directions of change. With the international ‘open-door’ and arrival of the internet, the growing modernity and tentative liberalisations in Yangon, Mandalay and other conurbations were not in doubt. The post-2011 ceasefires also brought the first real halt to fighting in decades in several of the conflict-zones – in the Thailand border region especially. But, away from the centre of the country, a very different picture was emerging. Notably, in June 2011 the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was attacked, breaking a 17-year ceasefire as the Tatmadaw leadership changed their military focus to the northeast of the country. Until the present day, the ceasefire has not been resumed.

Over subsequent years, TNI continued to warn of the humanitarian consequences and political dangers as fighting spread from Kachin State into Kokang, Shan and Ta’ang regions in northern Shan State. Meanwhile 147 people died and 140,000 were displaced (mostly Rohingya Muslims) amidst communal violence and a 2012 security clampdown in Rakhine State. Very quickly opinion grew that Tatmadaw leaders were playing ‘divide and rule’ to ensure any peace and reform change on their own terms. 

In response, UN and many international actors engaged in ‘conflict resolution’ with the government preferred to see such breakdowns as ‘exceptions’ that should not be allowed to disrupt the broader reform process. After decades of conflict, overnight change was not expected. And in theory, it was argued, both the new legislatures and ethnic peace process were building new avenues to longer-term change. This was not enough, however, to allay doubts in domestic circles, and concerns were further raised in 2014 when international donors supported an ill-informed and poorly-conducted census that exacerbated rather than resolved ethnic differences. 

Economic loss and community instabilities, meanwhile, deepened in many parts of the country as land-grabbing and natural resource exploitation accelerated before the agreement of political reforms. Other than a reduction in fighting, there was little evidence of a peace dividend on the ground. Social and economic issues were highlighted, with the publication of reports on the linkages between ethnic conflict and land rights and the regional disparity in investment in borderland territories. The international dimensions were also having negative impact, especially from China where officials, shocked by the Myitsone suspension, reconfigured their Myanmar policy to embrace President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

Similar concerns were expressed about the uneven pace of change in narcotics. In support of ameliorative action, TNI began to organise and network with farmer forums, publishing a comparative study on harm reduction experiences in neighbouring Thailand and China, a review of Myanmar’s drug laws to support a healthier environment, and an analysis of counternarcotics policy and the drug reform debate. Progress, however, proved limited. Not only did a Chinese opium substitution programme have the consequence of financing dispossession among farmers but drug production also bounced back in the Golden Triangle region. Without reform, it was evident that new policy ideals were not being put into practice.

In this vacuum, hopes for political change came to centre on parliamentary reform and the ‘ethnic peace process’. With the Tatmadaw’s reserved powers under the 2008 constitution, political change was always likely to be difficult. Conflict was not totally ended, while the Tatmadaw continued troop build-ups and the expansion of militia (pyithusit) forces in several of the ethnic states. Despite these concerns, international momentum gathered pace to try and make regime transition work as the clock ran down on Thein Sein’s presidency. Support for this also came from the Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and a number of veteran EAOs. Their main vehicle for discussion was the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team, which came to include 16 of the 21 EAOs recognised in the peace process.

Once again, political and ethnic hopes began to rise. Transitional focus was on the end of 2015 when a general election was scheduled and pressures grew, supported by international donors, for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) to be signed before Thein Sein stepped down. With translations in Burmese, TNI followed these events with a series of analyses on the 2015 elections, the failures in ethnic representation, and the lack of gender equality. The polls would not be perfect. But, as research highlighted, for the first time since 1960 there was potential for a pro-democracy party to be elected to government.

Confirming these trends, the NLD won a landslide victory in the November polls, raising hopes for a new beginning. As yet, there had been no national breakthrough. But with the NCA signing and NLD majority in the legislatures, there finally appeared to be roadmaps to break the political deadlock. In January 2016 Thein Sein held a first Union Peace Conference (UPC) in Nay Pyi Taw shortly before his departure to officially kick start the NCA. Less noticed, however, only eight EAOs initially signed the accord.

It was early warning of troubles coming further down the road which remain today at the heart of ethno-political crisis in the country.

Initially, the inception of an NLD-led government appeared to continue the momentum for peace and political dialogue. Expectations reached a high in August 2016 when State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi called a 21st Century Panglong Conference in Nay Pyi Taw, effectively bringing the UPC of Thein Sein’s NCA and new Panglong procedure together on one track (UPC-21CP). Hopes, though, did not last long. Warnings of human rights violations and Tatmadaw dominance still continued: a new offensive was started against the KIO following the first UPC-21CP; the NLD’s legal advisor U Ko Ni was assassinated in January 2017; and a ‘regional clearance’ operation was launched by the Tatmadaw shortly afterwards targeting the Rohingya population, witnessing several thousand civilian deaths and over 700,000 refugees fleeing into Bangladesh. 

Against this backdrop, the NLD made little progress on constitutional reforms. The NLD-Tatmadaw partnership was always an unlikely hybrid in government and, as TNI highlighted, moving ‘beyond Panglong’ remained central to the challenges of achieving nationwide peace and reform. Meanwhile land-grabbing and economic hardships continued, especially in the ethnic states and regions, partly facilitated by legal reform which never seemed to be in line with the peace process. For many communities, there was little improvement in daily lives except in health where greater movement and access to treatment brought immediate benefits. In contrast, critical areas of public concern like education, environment and justice, national reforms appeared to be relegated to long-term processes.

This did not mean that aspirations and pressures for political change had come to an end. The greater freedoms enjoyed during the NLD years were marked by a continued acceleration in political discussion and civil society activity. Visions were publicly discussed, reflected in a new TNI commentary series authored by local analysts and actors. Ethnic and political topics included the need for peace and inclusion, generational change in the ending of poverty and corruption, bridging conceptual differences to end ethnic conflict, the 1961 Federal Process to revitalise the peace process, the importance of multiculturalism and justice in a modern nation-state, and an appeal by Archbishop Charles Maung Bo, Myanmar’s first cardinal, for an end to violence and terror in the country: ‘Heal: Do Not Wound’.

At the same time, discussions and networking continued on land, narcotics and other socio-economic fields in the TNI programme. Analyses included the right to land during a critical time in government transition; the dangers to peaceful reform caused by international investment protection treaties; the importance of land as a lifeline for the people; questions over who really gains from hydropower policies in Myanmar; concern over the continued social and environmental threat to the Irrawaddy River – ‘the life blood of our nation’ – by the suspended Myitsone dam; and the need to transform from authoritative land management to federal governance systems.

Of particular concern, alarm was expressed at land confiscations which further accelerated under government changes to the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law. As analysts warned, such regression had not been expected under an NLD-led government and was at odds with NCA hopes for ethnic peace and democratic reform. ‘First they grabbed our land with guns; now they are using the law,’ said a displaced farmer at a land workshop. Reflecting these concerns, TNI produced a series of primers on the meaning of land, defending customary tenure systems, and decriminalising agro-forestry by local farmers in discussion with local forum networks.

Under the NLD-led government, the inrush of outside business and international interests further widened the scope of these concerns. Local communities were not being consulted. The sense of marginalisation was symbolised by the government’s agreement of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a multi-infrastructure project, with Beijing. As worries deepened, TNI analyses looked at the recalibration of China’s Myanmar policy; the pressures on Kachin and other local peoples from Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative; the difficulties in selling the ‘Silk Road spirit’; the challenges of investment that benefit communities in Mon State; and the need to avoid the usual paradigm trap in economic transition by fostering alternative methods to development. The livelihoods of millions of people were at stake as the government went ahead with new land and economic policies without national or local inclusion in discussion and design.

The same worries about the lack of progress were expressed over the narcotics trade which continued to negatively impact on many communities and lives. Despite the greater space for reform discussion, opinion grew that opportunities to address the social impact were being lost due to the slow pace of peace-building and political reform. Not only were opium and methamphetamine production still continuing, but conflict had not ended in several parts of the country. Reflecting these concerns, a film was produced by the Myanmar Opium Farmers Forum, and TNI published a series of analyses on drug law enforcement practices, the ‘people’s war’ on drugs in Kachin State, the lives of opium farmers, and how gender inequality affects women farmers.

Over time, however, the greatest apprehension in national politics was expressed over the lack of peace-building and constitutional reform. In total, four UPC-21CP meetings were held, and in 2018 two more EAOs signed the NCA. But evidence was mounting that the accord was not being respected or implemented by the Tatmadaw. Several EAOs continued to be excluded from the NCA process, and in 2018 the Tatmadaw resumed military operations in northern Karen State in areas controlled by the KNU, a key signatory. Such actions further undermined public confidence in the accord.

In response, NCA non-signatory EAOs began to form new alliances in the northeast of the country, spearheaded by the seven-member Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) which included both ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups. Subsequently, clashes spread with MNDAA and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) forces in northern Shan State, while the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) – a fellow FPNCC member – established new base areas in the India-Bangladesh borderlands. Reflecting the deteriorating conditions of violence against civilians, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) began investigations into Tatmadaw war crimes against Rohingya communities during its 2017 clampdown in northern Rakhine State.

As tensions deepened, TNI stepped up workshops and analyses on the worsening crisis. Commentaries by local authors focused on such issues as voluntary return, restitution and right to land for IDPs and refugees; the challenges of constitution-making and peace process stagnation; national reconciliation and the advancement of peace; the need for international responsibility in political transformation; the protests by youth and civil society movements in Kayah (Karenni) State at the NLD’s construction of a statue of Aung San Suu Kyi’s late father; and the NMSP’s 25-year experience of ceasefires. Concerns were rising across the country that the peace process was badly faltering.

As case studies, TNI also published book reports on two historic, but often-overlooked, nationality lands on opposite sides of the country: Kayah (Karenni) State and Arakan (Rakhine State). Located on strategic geo-political crossroads, both should have become models of peaceful and progressive development in an ideal world. Instead, both were among the most impoverished and war-torn states in the post-colonial union, reflecting the patterns of repression and neglect by central governments after independence. Myanmar was never a land at the peace following the NCA signing, and it was little surprise when political and ethnic movements in non-accord territories – Kachin, Karenni, Kokang, Rakhine and Ta’ang – were among the most motivated and ready to challenge the SAC after the 2021 coup. 

Matters finally came to a head during 2020 when two key issues dominated the national landscape: Covid-19 and the November general election. Fortunately, Myanmar was spared the worst impact of Covid-19’s first wave. The government, nevertheless, put the country into immediate shutdown, adversely affecting the poor, freedom of movement and conduct of the polls. Tatmadaw operations, however, never stopped, and a game of ‘ceasefire diplomacy’ continued with EAOs right up until the day of voting. In this impasse, civil society movements took a lead in calling for strategic coordination in response to the pandemic.

Against this backdrop, the elections went ahead in tense social and political conditions, with voting suspended for ‘security’ reasons in a record number of constituencies. Following experiences in previous elections, criticisms were voiced over the voting map and procedures, which TNI analysed in commentaries and briefings. In particular, nationality parties tried a number of strategies to increase representation under the ‘first-past-the post’ system which hands domination to the winning party among the ethnic Bamar majority. Questions also continued as to how committed the NLD really was to the political goal of federal democracy. Since independence, no mainstream national party has sought to introduce an electoral system of genuine union.

A fateful moment was approaching. Once again, the NLD won a landslide victory in voting that was generally deemed to be ‘free and fair’ (where polls were held), raising hopes that endeavours for peace and reform would accelerate during a second NLD term in office. Such optimism was not fulfilled. On 1 February 2021, history was repeated when Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup d'état, once again putting a Tatmadaw roadblock on political freedoms. Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders were arrested, and central government was returned to the grip of military rule from which it is yet to emerge.

By his coup, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing may have been hoping to recalibrate national politics further to the Tatmadaw’s advantage. Instead, mass resistance escalated across the country in response to the killing of peaceful demonstrators, bringing to the surface many of the issues and dynamics that have always underpinned state failure and military rule. The SAC’s claimed risks of ‘fragmentation’ did not start with the 2021 coup but dated back to independence when conflict first began. In the meantime, the aspirations for democracy and freedom have never gone away, furthering determination that, this time, military rule must be brought to an end. 

All these factors came together quickly in the aftermath of the coup. Energised by the bravery and determination of Generation-Z, new movements and networks quickly emerged, symbolised by the Civil Disobedience Movement of public workers, National Unity Consultative Council of MPs-elect, EAOs and CSOs, and new National Unity Government (NUG). Both the ethnic peace process and legislatures were essentially dead and, within three months of the coup, there were two rival governments claiming legitimacy: the SAC and NUG. 

In this vacuum, a new cycle of conflict rapidly spread. The SAC imposed conscription and created new militia, while anti-regime People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) sprang up across the country, some of which were independent, some under the NUG, and some of which worked with EAOs. A number of powerful EAOs also stepped up operations against the Tatmadaw, with resistance forces gaining control of extensive areas – and in some places towns – in both ethnic states and Bamar-majority regions. In these advances, a strategic role was played by FPNCC members in the north of the country – the KIO, MNDAA, TNLA and ULA-AA – with local EAO and PDF support in behind. Meanwhile other EAO and PDF movements, generally allied with the NUG, pushed out Tatmadaw forces from large territories in Chin, Karen and Kayah States on the India and Thailand borders.

Once again, the UN and international community failed to summon an effective response. ASEAN officially took the lead with a ‘five-point consensus’. China and Thailand tried unilateral engagement in defence of their interests, with Chinese officials intervening on all sides. Western governments renewed sanctions and support to the democracy cause. And Russia became the SAC’s closest ally and arms’ supplier. It was, however, the strength of opposition by the peoples themselves that had the greatest effect, preventing the SAC from gaining recognition at the UN General Assembly. The regime did not control the country; it did not have legitimacy through elections or constitutions; and it did not follow international protocols and human rights law. Indeed the ICC, ICJ and other bodies stepped up investigations of the Tatmadaw after the coup.

All the time, the human cost was rising. As conflict intensified, the civil war in Myanmar became identified on the same humanitarian page as Syria, Sudan, Ukraine and, more recently, Gaza/Israel. Within three years of the coup, there were grave statistics to match: over four million internally displaced persons and refugees, up to 30,000 fatalities in the conflict-zones, and more than 20,000 political prisoners and over 5,000 killed by the security services.

To date, however, there has been no evidence of a conciliatory roadmap that might end conflict and lead to political solutions. Opposition groups have largely coalesced around aspirations for federal democracy. In contrast, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw generals have pledged future elections after securing military control – a claim that has little credibility for regime change in the country or abroad. Instead, human rights condemnations of the Tatmadaw have intensified as the SAC increasingly launches aerial and artillery strikes on civilian populations in response to its shrinking territory.

Against this backdrop, it is important to emphasise that hopes for better change have never been suppressed. In the age of digital media, networking and information-sharing have accelerated in all parts of country, with the common goals of peace, justice and democratic governance. This is not to underestimate the gravity of the situation. But, amidst civil war, aspirations for social and political reform have continued to gain momentum in one of the most critical struggles for human rights and against dictatorship in the world.

Reflecting these trends, TNI programmes have continued to develop and highlight needs. A continued emphasis is on the voice of local communities and organisations. While examining the broader questions of conflict resolution, federalism and constitutional reform, commentaries have looked at the contemporary challenges of such marginalised peoples as Karen, Karenni, Mon, Pa-O, Rakhine, Rohingya, Shan and Wa. Generally, the aspirations for federal democracy are shared. But not all movements have moved at the same pace or in the same direction since the coup – as, for example, in Mon and Rakhine States. The search for ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ continues.

Equally urgent, many national processes or structures for political dialogue and transitional reform immediately collapsed in the wake of the coup, bringing to a head a mounting legacy of disappointment. The failure of constitutional change under military-dominated government is evident today, maintaining an elite status quo in politics and society. As a TNI book concluded after a decade of monitoring, the NCA has become more an instrument for strengthening state control than promoting ethnic peace. The accord was never implemented, was frequently broken, and there was no political will.

In consequence, it has become a time for reflection and new solutions in national politics and society, stimulating discussions about new paradigms and pathways to secure a democratic future that is sustainable and just. In the context of civil war, there has been especial interest in the philosophy of ‘humanitarian resistance’, supporting capacity-building and self-determination – and in some cases federalism – among communities on the ground. Implicit in this strategy is the localization of aid and an end to the top-down infrastructures in international aid which, as civil society voices argue, have undermined local organisations in the past while sustaining military rule. Such issues as the ‘conflict trap’ and Tatmadaw stratagems for state control have also been explored in a new podcast series.

Furthering these perspectives, the need for localised approaches was illustrated in the aftermath of the SAC takeover as communities across the country struggled with Covid-19 and triple burden of coup, pandemic and civil war. Government promises of ‘no one left behind’ were shattered. Instead, it was local health organisations and CSOs that dealt with many of the challenges of emergency aid, including EAOs and opposition movements in the conflict-zones. Working with local organisations, TNI published home-based care guidelines in 26 ethnic languages for communities lacking access to testing, vaccination and accurate information on Covid-19. Two years later, this on-the-ground experience was repeated during Cyclone Mocha when new models of aid delivery were developed through local civil society and non-state armed groups to deliver relief and recovery support in Rakhine State.

Similar support for decentralised models has been reflected in other areas of TNI activity. The socio-economic pressures on local communities have been immense since the SAC coup. In response to land-grabbing and natural resource exploitation, there has been growing advocacy for customary land rights and practice systems in the building of federal democracy backed by the ‘5Rs’: recognition, restitution, redistribution, regeneration and representation. Reflecting regression in the narcotics field, TNI has also published new studies on the struggles of poppy farmers, the need for environmental justice in drugs policy, the kratom industry in Myanmar and Southeast Asia, and a primer on women and drugs. And, mirroring the broadening of socio-political discourse in the country, commentaries have highlighted the importance of rethinking gender justice and involvement of LGBTIQ people and communities in the struggle for freedom and democracy.

As these events signify, it has been a long road and, into another generation, the human costs have been high. The SAC coup may have been an attempt to return the country to a regressive past. Instead, in one of the poorest and most conflict-torn countries in Asia, ethno-political momentum and popular support for progressive change have only gathered pace. No aspect of politics and society has remained immune to the upheavals of the past four years. As a first step, the illegitimacy of military rule has been proven, reflected both within the country and abroad, and never before has there been such widespread determination around the country to ensure meaningful change. The challenge now is to move on to inclusive processes for reform that truly reach to all communities and peoples.

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The political and humanitarian crisis in Burma/Myanmar is undeniably grave. But, as TNI has witnessed, sentiment for progressive change is continuing to develop among communities and peoples across the country. The struggle today is not simply to replace an unpopular government or end military rule but to introduce a new era of peace, inclusion and democratic reform that will finally bring human rights, equality and justice to all peoples. That was the vision of newly-independent Union of Burma in 1948, and it remains just as valid today.

The country stands at a critical crossroads. Realism is needed about the scale of challenges, and precedent provides many warnings. But, after reflective years of discussion and essential build-up, hopes are undiminished that the present era represents the best opportunity to achieve nationwide peace and meaningful reform in many decades. For the moment, exact political roadmaps are difficult to predict. But, as TNI’s experience reflects, there are also many reasons to believe that the tides of history have finally turned.